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E R R A T U M

to MCO 3501.13

MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION SYSTEM  
(SHORT TITLE: MCCRES); VOLUME XII, MARINE SECURITY FORCE  
BATTALION

1. For administrative purposes, the Publications Control Number (PCN) has been reidentified. Change the PCN "10203354100" to read: "10203362000".

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MARINE CORPS ORDER 3501.13

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps  
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS COMBAT READINESS EVALUATION SYSTEM (SHORT TITLE:  
MCCRES); VOLUME XII, MARINE SECURITY FORCE BATTALION

Ref: (a) MCO 3501.1B

Encl: (1) Volume XII - Mission Performance Standards (MPS's)  
for Marine Security Force Battalion

1. Purpose. To promulgate Volume XII of MCCRES for use in the training and evaluation of Marine security forces per reference (a).

2. Information. The reference establishes MCCRES for implementation within the Marine Corps. The enclosure, supported by the policies and procedures set forth in the reference provides the MPS's for use in evaluation of the combat readiness of units to perform functions of Marine security forces.

3. Action. Commanders will:

a. Use the MPS's contained in the enclosure as guidelines for establishing training goals, training programs, and to prepare for formal readiness evaluations as directed by higher headquarters per the reference.

b. When appropriate, use the MPS's for informal evaluations, and/or as an inventory to determine a unit's current training status and areas for future progressive training programs.

c. Make every effort to conduct evaluations when the unit is participating in their appropriate role as part of a Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). This method will strengthen integration efforts and give a more complete evaluation of realistic combat readiness.

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6 Jan 92

4. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the  
Marine Corps Reserve.



J A BRABHAM  
By direction

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VOLUME XII

MISSION PERFORMANCE STANDARDS

MARINE SECURITY FORCE BATTALION

INTRODUCTION:

This volume of the MCCRES contains the Mission Performance Standards (MPS's) that have been specifically developed to permit effective evaluation of the performance, in simulated combat, of MAGTF units engaged in specialized actions related to unusual environment and special operations which may be adjuncts to various other operations. The sections contained within this volume are:

- \* Section 12A - MPS's that are related to Marine Corps Security Force Battalions (MCSF Bn).
- \* Section 12B - MPS's for antiterrorism operations.

The total number of MPS's used and the sections from which they are chosen for use in an evaluation will be a functions of the exercise scenario and the amount of support available. The MPS's contained in this volume can be used in conjunction with MPS's contained in other MCCRES volumes, to permit thorough evaluation of different types of units involved in special operations.

Recommended changes to these standards should be submitted to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, (MCCDC), (TE 31), Quantico, VA 22134-5000.

Submission should be in the following format:

- o Item to be changed (MPS, task requirement, or text location)
- o Comment
- o Recommendation

ENCLOSURE (1)

SECTION 12A

MARINE CORPS SECURITY FORCE (MCSF) BATTALIONS

ENCLOSURE (1)

INTRODUCTION:

This section of standards pertains to a MCSF unit assigned a security mission. These reflect the emphasis within the Marine Corps on providing protection for naval installations and sensitive materials.

These standards reflect the need to evaluate a highly sensitive and critical mission which is conducted on a daily basis. The threat to personnel and installations is one which requires a continually high state of readiness. In that there is very little detailed doctrine on MCSF operations within the Marine Corps, these MPS's will be subject to expansion and modification as MCCRES usage increases in the future.

The MPS's, tasks, and standards were derived from available doctrine, tactics, techniques, and field recommendations from appropriate commands.

It is recommended that commanders use MCCRES MPS's to establish training objectives, and take every opportunity to informally evaluate their units against these standards. The system provides the commander with a tool to formally or informally evaluate the readiness and training of his unit, to identify the strengths and weaknesses, and to enable the commander to prioritize the units future training requirements.

These standards apply to MCSF Bn elements performing security/operational tasks and it is preferred that evaluations be conducted in that manner. Therein, the role of the unit to exhibit their efficiency in completing security operations will be the basis for a successful demonstration of their readiness.

MCCRES tasks presuppose that personnel and logistics support are sufficient to achieve minimum acceptable standards. The standards are written so that those sections applicable to a particular exercise or training scenario can be selected for evaluation. The unit is not penalized if they cannot attempt all the standards. When other external factors contribute to limiting the unit's evaluation, it should be noted in the "COMMENTS" column of the evaluation sheet and recorded in the overall report.

ENCLOSURE (1)

XII-A-1

12A.1 (MCSF BN) HEADQUARTERS

TASK: 12A.1.1 CONDUCT CONTINGENCY STAFF PLANNING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a security mission to a location that may or may not be local. The battalion staff begins planning.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Provides Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team (FAST) input for the drafting of the higher command elements initiating directive.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Reviews existing contingency plans, SOP's, and lessons learned.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Issues a warning order to subordinate elements.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Determines intelligence and other information requirements.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Reviews essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) and recent vulnerability assessments, and initiates immediate measures to reduce OPSEC indicators.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Analyzes the mission in the initiating directive to identify specified and implied tasks.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Promulgates FAST planning guidance which addresses all aspects of the operation; ground, air, and combat service support (CSS).
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Develops and briefs proposed courses of action (Bn).
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates the preparation of estimates of supportability based upon the proposed courses of action.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Announces the commander's decision, and provides his overall concept of operations to subordinate elements.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Maintains close and continuous planning coordination with all supporting headquarters to include joint and combined commands.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Develops the operation plan.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Uses standardized procedures contained in SOP's and naval contingency plans to develop plans.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates all communication requirements.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.1.2 DIRECT INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a security mission and is preparing for embarkation. The S-2 directs the intelligence effort.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Prepares preliminary intelligence estimate based on contingency plans.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Prepares, if time permits, a detailed intelligence estimate upon receipt of the commander's guidance.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Determines, based on the assigned mission and guidance from the commander, intelligence requirements, basic requirements, EEI's, and other intelligence requirements (OIR's).



- .4    \_\_\_   Assigns a priority of effort to satisfy these requirements based on the situation and the commander's guidance.
  
- .5    \_\_\_   Gathers information on the enemy (threat), climate, weather, terrain, existing facilities, transportation, means, hospitals, and local supplies/stockpiles for logistics planning.
  
- .6    \_\_\_   Determines requirements for maps, charts, imagery, and other graphic aids.
  
- .7    \_\_\_   Request aerial imagery and other intelligence collection, as needed.
  
- .8    \_\_\_   Determines requirements for dissemination; i.e., timeliness, usability of form, pertinence, and security.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

---

TASK:   12A.1.3 DISSEMINATE INTELLIGENCE

CONDITION(S):   A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. The MCSF Bn unit commander, upon receiving intelligence information, determines need to know for his subordinates.

STANDARDS:   EVAL:   Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_   Receives responses to EEI's and OIR's.
  
- .2    \_\_\_   Determines form of intelligence presentation.
  
- .3    \_\_\_   Provides responsive, timely and pertinent intelligence support to all elements of the battalion.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

---

TASK:   12A.1.4 PLAN COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY

CONDITION(S):   A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. Prior to arrival at the mission site, the unit commander plans communications interoperability.

STANDARDS:   EVAL:   Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_   Preplanning conferences are hosted or attended to ensure the integration and coordination of efforts.
  
- .2    \_\_\_   Identifies unique communications requirements; i.e., equipment, format, procedures, etc., based on the specific command and control relationships established.
  
- .3    \_\_\_   Provides for voice, message, and/or data link exchanges between the FAST company/deployed elements and external control agencies.
  
- .4    \_\_\_   Identifies unique CMS considerations, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or allied forces interoperability requirements.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None:

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.1.5 PLAN LOGISTICS SUPPORT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is in receipt of a security mission. Prior to arrival at the mission site, unit personnel will plan logistics support.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Begins analyzing (upon receipt of a warning order) possible missions to identify potential CSS requirements.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Reviews existing plans, SOP's, and lessons learned.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Reviews proposed courses of action to ascertain the approximate numbers of troops who will be committed, commanders priorities for support, ammunition, equipment densities, maintenance support available, distances involved, critical weapons systems, and the anticipated duration of the operation.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Requests all available intelligence on the enemy and information on the area to determine climate, weather, terrain, existing facilities, transportation means, hospitals, distances both inside and outside the objective area, supplies/stockpiles which may be available locally, etc.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Prepares a detailed logistics estimate of supportability which compares all CSS related factors influencing each proposed tactical course of action; i.e., logistics requirements, availability of means, and identified shortfalls.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Determines, upon receipt of the commander's guidance or operations order, specific CSS requirements.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Establishes coordination with all agencies involved with CSS planning and operations.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Reviews the CSS personnel and equipment lists to ensure the required logistical support is available.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Assigns priority of effort for satisfying logistics requirements.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Requests support from higher authority or external agencies for CSS shortfalls or peculiar CSS requirements that cannot be satisfied from organic assets.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.1.6 PLAN FOR DETAINEE'S/PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S)

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit, prior to reaching the mission site and determining the threat, plans for detainee's/POW's.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Plans an estimate of the number of detainee's/POW's to be included in the estimate of supportability.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates with Naval facilities/supported unit on the location of collection points.

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- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Determines the requirement for Military Police (MP)/(SP) law enforcement support to collect, evacuate, and guard POW's.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes procedures for the evacuation, administration, and protection of detainee's/POW's per the SOP.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Publishes specific detainee/POW processing/handling instructions in the operation order/SOP. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: Instructions for detainee/POW handling should include the following:

#### SEARCHING

Detainee's/POW's should be disarmed and searched for concealed weapons and for equipment and documents of particular intelligence value immediately upon capture, unless the number of detainee's/POW's captured, enemy action, or other circumstances make such a search impracticable. Until each detainee/POW is searched, the responsible troops must be particularly alert to prevent the use of concealed weapons or destruction of documents or equipment. Detainee's/POW's should be tagged for identification and later matching with any documents/equipment found, and should be instructed not to talk to other detainee's/POW's to prevent collaboration of stories.

#### EQUIPMENT

Items of personal or individual equipment which are new or appear to be of a type not previously seen may be of intelligence value and should be processed via intelligence channels. Remove all signal devices, flashlights, cameras, field glasses, binoculars, radio transmitters/receivers, unit insignia, and articles which might facilitate escape. Types of equipment or supplies which may be individually carried or worn include, but are not limited to personal equipment, (protective masks, first aid kits, etc.) clothing, and rations.

#### DOCUMENTS

A document is any piece of recorded information which has been in the hands of the enemy. When such documents are taken from a detainee/POW for safekeeping and delivery to intelligence personnel, care must be taken to assure that they can later be identified with the individual detainee/POW from whom taken. Documents and records of a personal nature must be returned to the POW from whom taken. In no instance should the personal identity card of a detainee/POW be taken.

#### PERSONAL EFFECTS

Except as indicated below, detainee's/POW's should be permitted to retain all of their personal effects including money, valuables, and protective equipment such as helmets, protective masks, and like items; effects and articles used for clothing or eating, except knives and forks; identification cards or tags; badges of grade and nationality; and articles having above all a personal or sentimental value. When items of equipment issued for personal protection are taken, they must be replaced with equivalent items serving the same purpose. Although money and other valuables may be taken from POW's as security measure, they must be receipted for and a record must be maintained.

#### SEGREGATION

The segregation of detainee's/POW's by categories first requires that individual detainee's/POW's be identified as belonging to a particular category. While time and combat conditions may not permit the detailed interrogation of detainee's/POW's to make all such determinations, it should be possible to readily identify and separate detainee's/POW's according to status (officers/enlisted) and sex. Evacuate detainee's/POW's to collection points under guard as soon as possible. Rapid initial processing will contribute to the timeliness of interrogation.

SILENCE

Prevent anyone other than authorized interrogators from speaking with prisoners. Enforce silence among prisoners at all times.

MEDICAL CARE

Detainee's/POW's are entitled to the same medical care as friendly casualties, to include MEDEVAC priority. Any difference in treatment must be based solely on medical considerations.

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TASK: 12A.1.7 PLAN CONTINGENCY REHEARSALS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is in receipt of a security mission. The unit will plan and prepare for the specific environmental conditions and types of security missions assigned.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Issues a warning order to subordinate elements alerting them to the rehearsal schedule.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Develops a rehearsal plan in adherence to restrictions established on electronic emissions, flight activities, and other actions that might disclose the operation and cause OPSEC violations.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Publishes a rehearsal plan which gives the date and time for each, and the area in which they will be conducted.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the plan is detailed enough to test the adequacy, timing, combat readiness of the unit, and communications plan of the intended operation.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Compiles recommendations from subordinate elements, of those critical or irreplaceable items that should not be used during rehearsal operations.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Conducts prerehearsal briefings.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Conducts an integrated rehearsal, which at a minimum effectively evaluates the adequacy of the timing and readiness of participating forces, and the communications plan.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Conducts detailed critiques after each rehearsal.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Develops changes to planning documents based on problems noted during the rehearsal, and disseminates these changes to subordinates.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Rehearses again if time is available.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.1.8 IDENTIFY THE CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR CONTINGENCIES

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is in receipt of a security mission. Due to the varied and potentially complex security mission, the unit identifies the appropriate chain of command.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Identifies the chain of command required for each known OpPlan/Contingency Plan.
- .2    \_\_\_ Determines the effect of reinforcement options on the chain of command.
- .3    \_\_\_ Ensures that conflict resolution provisions are understood by all key personnel.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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TASK: 12A.1.9 PLAN COORDINATION WITH OUTSIDE AGENCIES

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is in receipt of a security mission. The receiving unit from MCSF Bn plans coordination with outside agencies.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Based upon OpPlan/Contingency plans establishes coordination with:
  - 1. Local Law Enforcement.
  - 2. Federal Law Enforcement.
  - 3. Other Federal Agencies (CIA/DIA/State Dept., etc.)
  - 4. Other DoD/military services; allied and domestic.
- .2    \_\_\_ Ensures unit medical personnel coordinate with hospitals in the operational area.
- .3    \_\_\_ Key personnel are familiar with location of radio stations in potential operational area(s).
- .4    \_\_\_ Key personnel are familiar with location of Fire departments and other emergency services in potential operational area(s).

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

---

TASK: 12A.1.10 PLAN MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR FLEET ANTITERRORISM SECURITY TEAM (FAST) DEPLOYMENT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is in receipt of a security mission. A medical plan for FAST deployment is established.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Ensures medical participation in all stages of operational planning.
- .2    \_\_\_ Ensures HIV testing and immunizations are up-to-date for all deploying personnel.
- .3    \_\_\_ Coordinates the scheduling of self-aid and buddy-aid training for troops prior to employment.
- .4    \_\_\_ Ensures the medical element assigned to support the FAST company is organized, equipped, supplied, trained, and ready to deploy with the supported unit.

- .5    \_\_\_ Ensures medical and dental records are administratively up-to-date. Ensures photocopies of health record forms 88 and 93 and a copy of dental panoramic film are all on file.
- .6    \_\_\_ Maintains up-to-date information on medical assets and facilities available at all contingency sites.
- .7    \_\_\_ Requests medical intelligence on the area of operations to include available resources both in the operational area and in the general region.
- .8    \_\_\_ Plans provisions for handling casualties under NBC conditions.
- .9    \_\_\_ Uses predeployment medical checklists to ensure unit readiness.
- .10   \_\_\_ Prepares alternate medical plans in coordination with other MCSF operational planners.
- .11   \_\_\_ Ensures medical personnel designated as alternates for deployment are knowledgeable in all areas of operations.
- .12   \_\_\_ Provides input to the medical and CSS estimate of supportability.
- .13   \_\_\_ Ensures briefings are held for medical personnel in order to assist in planning for equipment/supplies/coordination measures required to support the deployment.
- .14   \_\_\_ Coordinates the integration of medical support to ensure responsive and adequate treatment of casualties.
- .15   \_\_\_ Coordinates with the Naval installation/host facility to arrange support for the custody and accounting of injured detainee's/POW's and civilians.
- .16   \_\_\_ Coordinates casualty reporting procedures with all appropriate agencies.
- .17   \_\_\_ Coordinates the scheduling of a mass casualty practice during the rehearsal phase.
- .18   \_\_\_ Ensures medical resupply procedures are coordinated with all appropriate staff agencies.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.1.11 ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is in receipt of a security mission. Due to the potential for a deadly force situation for all MCSF units, a complete and continued understanding of deadly force is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Reviews contingency plans for specific deadly force requirements/special case procedures.
- .2    \_\_\_ Provides FAST input to contingency planners on the use of deadly force.
- .3    \_\_\_ Demonstrates the use (simulated) of deadly force during rehearsals.
- .4    \_\_\_ Coordinates with Naval Security forces on special case application procedures.
- .5    \_\_\_ Ensures personnel understand and use the degree of force necessary to prevent damage, loss, or compromise of vital assets.
- .6    \_\_\_ Ensures all possible actions, including the use of deadly force, are taken to preclude unauthorized access or seizure of any nuclear weapons storage area, transporting vehicle with weapons, or vital assets.

- .7    \_\_\_\_ Ensures all necessary actions, including the use of deadly force, are taken to ensure immediate reoccupation and/or securing of any exclusion area which is penetrated.
- .8    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that if hostages are used as a means of entering or occupying an exclusion area, or as a cover for the removal of vital assets from such an area, the welfare and safety of the hostages are considered but are not a deterrent in actions to stop the penetrating force.
- .9    \_\_\_\_ Identifies restrictions contained in existing status of forces agreements and host country laws at foreign locations.
- .10   \_\_\_\_ Ensures off-base activities are conducted per existing legal restrictions as well as agreements with local law enforcement agencies at all locations in the U.S. and its territories.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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12A.2 NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY FORCES

TASK: 12A.2.1 ENSURE PROCEDURES FOR USE OF DEADLY FORCE ARE ESTABLISHED

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is providing security for special weapons and the guard is posted. Guard force personnel are given a situation in which deadly force is authorized to protect special weapons.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_\_ Explains the definition of deadly force.
- .2    \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates how deadly force could be used.
- .3    \_\_\_\_ Explains the DoD's use of force policy as it applies to nuclear refueling/defueling operations.
- .4    \_\_\_\_ Describes ramifications of intent and temper on deadly force.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

---

TASK: 12A.2.2 CONDUCT INTERIOR GUARD

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is tasked with providing security for nuclear refueling/defueling operations. The guard of the day is established per NAVMC 2691A, NAVSEAINST C1920.22, applicable portions of OPNAVINST C8126.1, and the local SOP.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge of general orders and interior guard procedures per local SOP.
- .2    \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proficiency in conducting those operations covered by local special orders.
- .3    \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates proper methods of apprehension and restraint per local SOP.
- .4    \_\_\_\_ Exercises OPSEC per local SOP.
- .5    \_\_\_\_ Identifies information that is not to be discussed with nonguard personnel.

- .6 \_\_\_\_ Safeguards classified material.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Accounts for classified material.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Corrects and reports violations of OPSEC.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proper response to a bomb threat per local SOP.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the unarmed self defense methods employed by MCSF security guards.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the individual protective measures to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the local threat.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.3 CONDUCT CHALLENGING PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): Sentries posted as part of the guard of the day encounter unknown persons, in vehicles and/or on foot, on or near their posts.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper method for challenging personnel.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures challenged personnel are stopped in a position from which the sentry can not be threatened.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies, in a positive manner, the person being challenged.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Conducts all challenges per local SOP.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper method for challenging vehicles.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that while conducting vehicle patrol, and the need for challenging occurs, the driver drops the assistant driver in a covered and concealed position.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the assistant driver assumes a covered/ concealed position with adequate fields of fire and observation.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that drivers concentrate the head/spotlight on the challenged vehicle and driver.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Issues the challenge and instructions with authority.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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ENCLOSURE (1)



TASK: 12A.2.4 EXECUTE RESPONSE FORCE ELEMENTS

CONDITION(S): The normal guard of the day has been established and discovers a threat to a special weapon. The reaction force is alerted.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the security alert team (SAT) and explains its mission. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms and deploys a SAT per local SOP.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the back up alert force (BF) and explains its mission. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms, and deploys a BAF/BF per local SOP.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the reserve force (RF) and explains its mission. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms and deploys the RF per local SOP.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the augmentation force and explains its mission. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms and deploys the AF per local SOP.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

SECURITY ELEMENTS AFLOAT

Security Force on Duty: Those guards or sentries posted to provide protection for nuclear weapons.

Security Alert Team (SAT): Two or more individuals, armed, equipped, and capable of arriving at the affected security area(s) within 5 minutes after receipt of a security emergency alarm.

Backup Alert Force (BAF): Three or more armed and trained personnel designated to provide assistance to the security alert team within 10 minutes.

Reserve Force (RF): Ten or more designated personnel capable of responding in support of the on-duty security force personnel and capable of responding within 15 minutes.

Augmentation Force (AF): Additional military personnel (or units) other than those assigned to a specific security or Reserve force, trained and capable of augmenting a security team and Reserve force, as required.

SECURITY FORCE ASHORE

Security Force on Post. Those guards or sentries posted to provide protection for nuclear weapons.

Response Force (RF): Consisting of at least 15 security force personnel over and above those already on post, located inside the limited area and able to respond within 5 minutes.

Backup Force (BF): A force of 15 armed personnel capable of reinforcing the reaction force, arriving in time to ensure custody and control of nuclear weapons.

TASK: 12A.2.5 EMPLOY PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAM (PRP)

CONDITION(S): The unit has established a PRP per MCO 5510.7H.  
Members of the guard have been screened and are assigned to the PRP.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains the purpose and intent of the PRP.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that personnel meet and maintain the  
eligibility requirements set forth in MCO 5510.7F.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: The PRP is an administrative tool to assist nuclear capable units to ensure that everyone associated with nuclear weapons systems meet minimum, defined reliability standards to counter the psychotic or saboteur who might try to gain access to a nuclear weapon.

Qualification:

Consideration of an individual for entry into the PRP should include, but is not limited to the following attributes:

- 1. Physical, mental, and technical competence.
- 2. Dependable performance of military duties and demonstrated flexibility in the performance of these duties.
- 3. Good social adjustment.
- 4. Positive attitude and good motivation toward assignment of nuclear weapons duties.

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TASK: 12A.2.6 EMPLOY GUARD WEAPONS

CONDITION(S): The guard is armed per local SOP. The guard encounters tactical circumstances requiring the use of various weapons.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Maintains proficiency with all weapons in the guard inventory.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Selects the proper weapon mix (to include grenades) to resolve the tactical situation.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper employment of all guard weapons under varying tactical circumstances.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Clears malfunctions/stoppages on all weapons in the guard inventory.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper method of loading and unloading all weapons in the guard inventory.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates field stripping and proper cleaning procedures of all weapons in the guard inventory.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.7 DEMONSTRATE CRISIS/STRESS SHOOTING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. Guard members are required to fire weapons while subjected to a crisis/stress situation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proper modern combat shooting techniques with assigned weapons.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Engages multiple targets balancing movement, speed and accuracy.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets accurately under low light and no light conditions with assigned weapons.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Completes a short range timed fire drill.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets while wearing a gas mask.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Fires as a member of a fire team during fire and movement.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates/explains ricochet shooting.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates/explains airborne target engagement.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets while wearing a gas mask.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Completes a failure drill.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proficient tactical loading and unloading of assigned weapons.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Clears malfunctions under stress with assigned weapons.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Engages multiple targets accurately under stress.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.8 EMPLOY DESIGNATED MARKSMAN

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. The guard is given a situation requiring the use of highly accurate rifle fire to eliminate a threat to a special weapon.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that a designated marksman program has been established and maintained.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Fires a minimum of 100 rounds/month to maintain proficiency.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.9 EMPLOY ALARMS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is responsible for monitoring a security alarm system. The alarm system is installed per local requirements.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge of local security alarms used in support of special weapons security.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Identifies/explains proper response to each type of alarm provided by the local system.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates how to initiate an alarm status check.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.10 ENTRY CONTROL POINT (ECP) PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): An ECP is established and manned for the limited/exclusion area per the local SOP. Personnel requiring entry/exit are present.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates the proper procedure for processing personnel and vehicles through limited area and exclusion area ECP in both routine and emergency situations.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that Marines are positioned to best control access to open exclusion areas.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge/explains the two person concept.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Explains/identifies the local badge system.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Verifies personnel via the entry authorization list (EAL) prior to authorizing access.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Utilizes the EAL to identify the area clearance.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Identifies personnel with interim certification on the EAL.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Verifies visitor badges and access dates by utilizing the EAL.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a badge exchange per local SOP.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that when opening a magazine, escorts authorized personnel and establishes communications with the alarm control center/corporal of the guard and remains in communication throughout access procedures.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that when opening a magazine, the alarm control center (ACC) sentry/COG verifies the Marine sentry and unlock team by badge number, EAL code and password.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a proper badge count per local SOP.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a personnel search per local SOP.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Confiscates any contraband found during a personnel search.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Utilizes the vehicle access list to identify vehicles authorized to enter the limited area.
- .16 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a vehicle search per local SOP.
- .17 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that vehicle drivers open all compartments, doors, briefcases, etc.

ENCLOSURE (1)

- .18    \_\_\_    Conducts inspections of any vehicle area large enough to contain explosives or contraband.
- .19    \_\_\_    Detains anyone driving a vehicle found to have contraband.
- .20    \_\_\_    Evaluates and responds to alarms during access/secure.
- .21    \_\_\_    Employs a closed circuit TV system.
- .22    \_\_\_    Maintains a positive key control.
- .23    \_\_\_    Identifies the types of perimeter barriers, protective lighting, intrusion detection systems, and locking systems.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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TASK:   12A.2.11   CONDUCT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT/INCIDENT PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S):   A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. During nuclear weapons handling, events occur requiring the guard to respond to various threats of accidents/incidents.

STANDARDS:   EVAL:   Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_    Defines the terms nuclear accident and nuclear incident.
- .2    \_\_\_    Identifies the mission of the MCSF during an accident or incident.
- .3    \_\_\_    Demonstrates knowledge of local nuclear weapons accident/incident procedures.
- .4    \_\_\_    Explains the threat of high explosive (HE) detonation and demonstrate basic protective measures.
- .5    \_\_\_    Explains the radiological threat (alpha radiation) and demonstrates protective measures.
- .6    \_\_\_    Establishes the exclusion area, inner perimeter, and temporary ECP.
- .7    \_\_\_    Identifies Navy emergency response units (ambulance, radiological control (RADCON) team).
- .8    \_\_\_    Identifies and explains the purpose of the hotline.
- .9    \_\_\_    Explains and identifies the chain of command during a nuclear accident/incident.
- .10   \_\_\_    Selects the proper communication net for use during a nuclear accident/incident.
- .11   \_\_\_    Demonstrates the use of nuclear (weapons) emergency information sheet in a nuclear accident/incident.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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TASK: 12A.2.12 CONDUCT COMMUNICATIONS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. The guard is equipped with communications assets per local requirements.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates familiarity with local communications assets used by the MCSF.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Uses voice radio transmission procedures effectively.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Selects the proper radio net to be used during logistics moves.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Delivers a proper SALUTE report when the situation dictates.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Changes power supplies (per proper procedures) in hand-held/man-pack radios.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Enunciates an alert over voice and radio circuits (per local SOP).
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Identifies unit call signs and prowords per local SOP.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Establishes primary and alternate means of communication for security forces.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Reacts properly to jamming or interference on a radio net per proper procedures.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Describes hazards of electromagnetic radiation (HERO) and minimum safe separation distances from open and closed magazines for safe radio transmission.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Transmits a proper radio message.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.13 EMPLOY THE RESPONSE FORCE ASHORE AND AFLOAT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. A duress system is established and installed per local requirements. Situations arise requiring the activation of the duress system.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates the local duress system (physical/verbal/mechanical).
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Reacts appropriately to the alarm/duress code.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.2.14 RESPOND TO THE THREAT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. Situations arise requiring guard of the day to respond to threat or perceived threat to special weapons.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1   \_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge of proper recall procedures.
- .2   \_\_\_ Ensures the guard of the day properly briefs recalled personnel of the current situation.
- .3   \_\_\_ Ensures all hands are aware of the threat.
- .4   \_\_\_ Ensures all personnel are armed and equipped per local SOP.
- .5   \_\_\_ Ensures all personal weapons are at blank zero orientation (BZO).
- .6   \_\_\_ Ensures all Marines have recently FAM/qualified with personal weapons.
- .7   \_\_\_ Identifies the enemy (threat).
- .8   \_\_\_ Ensures all personnel tactically maneuver using terrain and man-made cover and concealment.
- .9   \_\_\_ Uses alternate routes to reach the affected security area.
- .10   \_\_\_ Performs appropriate actions to regain control of the affected security area.
- .11   \_\_\_ Meets minimum response time criteria.
- .12   \_\_\_ Ensures adequate communications.
- .13   \_\_\_ Utilizes proper radio procedures.
- .14   \_\_\_ Responds properly to jamming on radio nets.
- .15   \_\_\_ Reacts properly to chemical agents.
- .16   \_\_\_ Treats casualties with the buddy system.
- .17   \_\_\_ Responds per local SOP to drill simulation.
- .18   \_\_\_ Completes reports per local SOP.
- .19   \_\_\_ Conducts a debrief.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

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TASK: 12A.2.15 PLAN DEFENSE OF A LIMITED AREA

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned the mission of establishing security for the limited area of a nuclear weapons facility.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Posts established.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Establish fields of fire.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Reaction force organized. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Alarm control center (ACC) established.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Entry control point (ECP) procedures established.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the types of perimeter barriers, protective lighting, intrusion detection system, and locking systems.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Detection monitors in place at posts as warranted.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Procedures for escorting cleared personnel to exclusion areas are established.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: LOCATION: Within ACC.

POST: Weapons and ammunition staged separately with consideration for immediate access.

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TASK: 12A.2.16 PLAN FOR MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned the mission of security for the movement of nuclear weapons from, or delivery to a limited area.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Assign/organize convoy personnel.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Assign/organize 15 man back-up force in case of loss of control. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Conduct route reconnaissance.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Establish posts as warranted along route.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Coordinate with adjacent agencies; i.e., base security, NIS, station weapons officer, host country.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Identify unique communication requirements; i.e., equipment, procedures, etc., based on the specific command and control relationships established.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Identify unique CMS considerations, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or allied forces interoperability requirements.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Brief couriers on route, hazards and immediate action.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Purge exclusive area prior to arrival in cases of delivery.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Purge vehicles (to include air and ground type transports) in cases of outgoing weapons.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Establish an entry control point.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ In cases of outgoing weapons, convoy personnel remain on alert until confirmation that weapons will not need to return to origin.



EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: BACK UP FORCES

FAMILIAR WITH ROUTE. Reaction force participates in route reconnaissance.

LOCATION: Situated in location for rapid response.

LOGISTICS: Transportation and ammunition dedicated during entire movement, to include established contingency period after weapons departure during which time the outgoing weapons may need to return.

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TASK: 12A.2.17 CONDUCT A RECOVERY FORCE OPERATION

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit loses complete control over a nuclear weapon. On duty security forces will take prompt and decisive action to regain control.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Plan for CQB operation. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Security Forces will immediately report via their operational chain of command the loss of control over a nuclear weapon.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Personnel demonstrate knowledge of hot-pursuit and scenarios in which not-pursuing would be authorized.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensure all possible prompt and decisive actions, including the use of deadly force, are taken to regain control of the nuclear weapon. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Identifies restrictions contained in existing status of forces agreement and host country laws at foreign location.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensure that if hostages are used as a means of occupying an exclusion area, or cover for the removal of nuclear weapons from such an area, the welfare and safety of the hostages are considered but are not a deterrent action to recover a weapon.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ If control of nuclear weapon is lost to a hostile individual(s), surviving security forces will attempt to maintain contact with and regain control over the weapon.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ If contact with nuclear weapon is lost, security forces will immediately conduct search operations.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Ensure a back-up force(s) is organized/assigned for responding to the loss of control within the time frame prescribed by the station/installation Nuclear Weapons Security Plan.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Back-up force(s) is armed and equipped with sufficient arms and ammunition to successfully engage a well-armed and trained force. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: CLOSE QUARTER BATTLE (CQB)

Teams are organized and assigned missions.

CQB tasks and standards evaluated are identical to those of MPS 12.5.

DEADLY FORCE

MCSF personnel will be able to define deadly force and cite the requirements governing the uses of deadly force.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION

Employed weapons will be capable of disabling a vehicle.

MCSF personnel select proper aiming point to disable a stationary or moving vehicle.

Consideration of damage to nuclear weapons in choosing munitions.

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TASK: 12A.2.18 PLAN FOR SURVEILLANCE DETECTION

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned the security mission for a vital asset. Surveillance detection is an integral part of the security posture.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Coordinate with outside agencies for dissemination of information.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensure system exists for reporting of surveillance detection through chain of command.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies rules of engagement.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the local threat.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Vision and observation enhancement (i.e.; binoculars, night vision goggles, thermal imagers) are employed for observation, as applicable.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ System in place for response to detached surveillance.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.3 REACTION FORCE CAPABILITIES

TASK: 12A.3.1 CLEAR A BUILDING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned to participate in a contingency mission. A threat exists to the security of a special weapon in a magazine, storage space, or production building. The MCSF unit RF must respond to neutralize the threat and regain control of the weapon/device.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Organizes for urban fighting.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Moves tactically in urban terrain.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates fire support for a deliberate attack on a building.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Controls movement of a unit in urban terrain.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Conducts an attack on a building.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates three methods of entering a hostile building.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates individual firing positions.

ENCLOSURE (1)

- .8 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates crew-served weapons firing positions.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates techniques for crossing critical areas.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Uses area concealing and incapacitating agents to enter a building.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Clears a hostile building systematically.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Consolidates and reorganizes after securing a building.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Organizes a building for the defense.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Reinforces the structure to improve survivability.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Fires organic weapons from inside a structure.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.3.2 PLAN FOR THE ATTACK (DAY)

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit has been tasked with conducting a daylight attack. Planning is initiated.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Acknowledges receipt of the warning order and initiates detailed planning.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Analyzes the mission and available information to identify specified, implied, and deduced tasks with respect to METT-T and KOCOA. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Issues a warning order to subordinate units with an information copy to higher headquarters, if appropriate.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a leaders' reconnaissance, time permitting.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Reviews EEFI's if available.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Initiates immediate measures to reduce OPSEC indicators.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Reviews existing contingency plans, SOP's, and lessons learned.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Establishes liaison with the higher command elements and requests liaison be established with other command elements, as required.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Requests available intelligence and combat information on:
  - The enemy (threat) in general (SALUTE)
  - Enemy (threat) intentions, DRAW-D; i.e., defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay
  - Enemy (threat) vulnerabilities
  - The area of operations The weather
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Identifies collection means which provide for the continuous reconnaissance of the objective area.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Requests aerial imagery and other available special topographic products.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a detailed terrain analysis to highlight military aspects of terrain using KOCOA.

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- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Prepares a detailed description, sketch, terrain model, etc., of routes of advance into the affected security area.
- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ Issues commander's planning guidance.
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates procedures to allow for timely updates on the threat and weather while en route to the affected security area.
- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops CA's.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses standardized procedures contained in SOP's to develop the plan.
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ Evaluates the effects of weather and astronomical conditions on both friendly and enemy forces; e.g., ambient light levels and trafficability.
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a plan which isolates or fixes the enemy, (threat) facilitates the maneuver of friendly forces, and allows, at a decisive time, the delivery of an overwhelming attack by fire and maneuver.
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ Divides the attack into phases: preparatory phase, conduct phase, and consolidation and reorganization phase.
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ Adopts a plan of attack which integrates all available assets, both internal and external to the battalion, and consists of a scheme of maneuver and a fire support plan.
- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that the plan also covers the essential details of security as well as the establishment of the communications system necessary for control.
- .23 \_\_\_\_\_ Determines the organization for combat; i.e., the task organization and command relationships.
- .24 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies a base unit to govern movement.
- .25 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a detailed plan for movement to the area of attack.
- .26 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a reconnaissance plan to collect, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of enemy (threat) forces, obstacles and weather, and terrain.
- .27 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a schedule of events in preparation for the attack to include movement of forces, reorganization, resupply, issuance of the order, coordination, and rehearsals.
- .28 \_\_\_\_\_ Allocates the priority of fire support to the main attack.
- .29 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans a supporting attack to deceive the enemy (threat) as to the location of the main attack, to prevent his disengagement, and to cause the enemy (threat) to commit forces indecisively.
- .30 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates the positioning of fire support units to ensure coverage of attacking forces.
- .31 \_\_\_\_\_ Specifies a time of attack and coordinates the tactical movement of units from the assembly area to the line of departure (LOD) to ensure that units arrive in the desired sequence and to allow for the dispersal of assets until their massing is required.
- .32 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates the development of a plan to breach minefields and obstacles and to destroy known enemy (threat) positions which cannot be bypassed.
- .33 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops the plan to maintain the momentum of the attack and to minimize halts on intermediate objectives.
- .34 \_\_\_\_\_ Considers the use of smoke to protect friendly units, winds permitting.
- .35 \_\_\_\_\_ Task organizes available air defense assets according to the threat, terrain, and priority of support.
- .36 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a detailed plan for the handling of detainee's, POW's and civilians to include screening by intelligence personnel, evacuation, and medical treatment.
- .37 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates the movement and availability of supplies of ammunition and special equipment.

- .38    \_\_\_ Plans communications with supported, supporting, and adjacent units per the unit SOP.
- .39    \_\_\_ Specifies any reporting requirements that are not per SOP.
- .40    \_\_\_ Prepares and issues the attack orders, allowing sufficient time for subordinates to make revisions to orders and to complete movement, reorganization, rehearsal, and final preparation.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: The estimates of supportability can be either written or verbal on the situation and time available.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.3.3 PREPARE FOR THE ATTACK (DAY)

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit has been ordered to conduct a daylight attack. The order has been prepared and is ready for issue.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Completes movement to, and concentration of forces in, the forward area prior to the attack.
- .2    \_\_\_ Conducts a detailed briefing on the plan to all key subordinates.
- .3    \_\_\_ Utilizes a terrain model, sketch, or other training aids when briefing the plan. Contingencies are examined and a detailed understanding of the plan exists.
- .4    \_\_\_ Allows an opportunity for questions and comments.
- .5    \_\_\_ Completes reorganization and commences unit and individual readiness drills.
- .6    \_\_\_ Conducts an overall rehearsal, time permitting.
- .7    \_\_\_ Issues ammunition and special equipment and conducts maintenance checks, LTI's, and preoperation checks on required equipment.
- .8    \_\_\_ Conducts final brief for key leaders to include a ZIPPO brief for pilots if helicopters are involved.
- .9    \_\_\_ Conducts final inspections for all personnel and equipment to ensure that prescribed items are available, serviceable, and carried correctly, and that all personnel understand all required aspects of the attack.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.3.4 CONDUCT THE ATTACK (DAY)

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is ordered to conduct the planned daylight attack.

- .1    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that reconnaissance and surveillance elements detect enemy (threat) forces, positions, movement, and obstacles, and submit reports in a timely manner.
- .2    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that fire support elements are emplaced prior to the movement of maneuver elements.
- .3    \_\_\_\_ Crosses the line of departure at the specified time without halting.
- .4    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that attacking units use covered and concealed routes to approach the enemy (threat) and once discovered, they advance by fire and maneuver, and by fire and movement.
- .5    \_\_\_\_ Bypasses or breaches obstacles encountered en route to the objective.
- .6    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that units remain dispersed unless required to mass to overcome resistance, in which case they disperse as soon as the requirement for concentration ceases.
- .7    \_\_\_\_ Keeps halts on intermediate objectives to a minimum.
- .8    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that command element maintains status on the progress of the attack, on the enemy (threat) situation, and on the delivery of fire support.
- .9    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that ground forces are supported by a coordinated and simultaneous delivery of supporting arms.
- .10   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the commander moves to a position during the attack where he can best control and influence his forces.
- .11   \_\_\_\_ Exploits any advantage occurring during the attack.
- .12   \_\_\_\_ Maintains continuous pressure on the enemy (threat).
- .13   \_\_\_\_ Applies all available combat power during the attack to ensure rapid execution.
- .14   \_\_\_\_ Employs direct and indirect fires until the last possible moment and then shifts fires to the flanks and rear of enemy (threat) positions.
- .15   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that supporting units demonstrate the ability to deliver overhead machinegun fire.
- .16   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that assault units closely follow their supporting fires, deploy, and cross the final coordination line without delay when supporting fires are shifted.
- .17   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that supporting weapons displace by echelon to provide continuous support.
- .18   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the final assault covers a short distance, is well coordinated, and is characterized by a heavy volume of fire and an aggressive employment of fire and maneuver by assault units and of fire and movement by individual Marines.
- .19   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that assault units breach or bypass obstacles.
- .20   \_\_\_\_ Assault units reduce fortified positions.
- .21   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that assault units assume a hasty defensive posture immediately upon seizure of the affected security area, continue to fire on withdrawing enemy (threat), and prepare for possible counterattack.
- .22   \_\_\_\_ Exploits the success of the attack based on the commander's intent.
- .23   \_\_\_\_ Places emphasis on security, displacement and positioning of forces, fire planning, reconnaissance, and reorganization.
- .24   \_\_\_\_ Ensures that reconnaissance elements maintain contact with the enemy (threat) and report information.
- .25   \_\_\_\_ Conducts fires beyond the affected security area/objective to protect the consolidation and reorganization and to force the breakup of counterattacks.

- .26 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains communications with all elements throughout the assault, and those nets designated as secure remain covered throughout the attack.
- .27 \_\_\_\_\_ Fixes the location of other known positions in the zone by fire, maneuver, or deception.
- .28 \_\_\_\_\_ Submits required reports in a timely manner.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.3.5 PLAN FOR THE ATTACK (NIGHT)

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is tasked with conducting a night attack. Planning is initiated.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that leaders and staff demonstrate understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and the characteristics of the night attack by describing them.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Acknowledges the warning order and immediately begins planning.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Issues a warning order to subordinate units with an information copy to higher headquarters, if appropriate.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Reviews information concerning the availability of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) equipment and the state of unit night training.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Reviews planning sequence giving emphasis to those factors which require special consideration for a night attack.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Reviews existing contingency plans, SOP's, and lessons learned.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Analyzes the mission and available information to identify specific tasks using METT-T and KOCOA. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Initiates security measures to reduce OPSEC indicators which might alert the enemy (threat) that a night attack is being planned.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Determines EEI's.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Requests intelligence and combat information on:
  - The enemy (threat) in general (SALUTE)
  - Enemy (threat) intentions, DRAW-D; i.e., defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay
  - Enemy (threat) vulnerabilities
  - The area of operations
  - The weather
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Determines whether the light conditions will allow for the employment of tactics similar to a daylight attack and whether the ambient light level is sufficient for passive night vision devices to function.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies collection means which provide for the continuous reconnaissance of the objective area.
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Requests aerial imagery and special topographic products.

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- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes procedures to provide timely updates on the threat and the weather while en route to the objective area.
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ Evaluates the effects of weather and astronomical conditions on both friendly and enemy forces; e.g., visibility and trafficability.
- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses KOCOA to conduct a detailed terrain analysis and to highlight military aspects of terrain.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Prepares a detailed description and sketch (or a terrain model) of routes of advance to the objective area.
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ Allocates available time.
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ Orients the staff to the mission, the enemy (threat) situation, and the analysis of terrain and weather.
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ Issues commander's planning guidance.
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops and briefs CA's and estimates of supportability.
- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses KOCOA to plan a leaders' reconnaissance of the affected security area and proposed routes of advance with emphasis on bridges, defiles, and other critical points which can either restrict or channelize friendly forces.
- .23 \_\_\_\_\_ Prepares the unit for movement and ensures its readiness.
- .24 \_\_\_\_\_ Arranges coordination with supporting and adjacent units (if applicable).
- .25 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts leaders' reconnaissance.
- .26 \_\_\_\_\_ Gives commander's estimate of the situation.
- .27 \_\_\_\_\_ Announces the commander's decision.
- .28 \_\_\_\_\_ Briefs commander's concept of operations.
- .29 \_\_\_\_\_ In preparation for the movement to contact, develops a schedule of events, which may include movement of forces, reorganize, resupply, issue the order, coordinate, and rehearse. (KI)
- .30 \_\_\_\_\_ Issues a warning order which contains sufficient information to allow for planning, required movement, and rehearsals by subordinate units.
- .31 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates with adjacent and/or supporting units.
- .32 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a simple but detailed plan using SOP's to develop the plan and save time.
- .33 \_\_\_\_\_ Decides whether the night attack will be illuminated or nonilluminated.
- .34 \_\_\_\_\_ Considers the use of deception.
- .35 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans the attack to be conducted in three successive phases: the advance (movement from the LD to the probable line of deployment), the assault, and the consolidation and reorganization.
- .36 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a plan to attack the enemy's (threat's) flank, rear, or weakest position.
- .37 \_\_\_\_\_ Assigns objectives that are clearly identifiable at night.
- .38 \_\_\_\_\_ Assigns probable line(s) of deployment on terrain features that are clearly identifiable at night.
- .39 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans scheme of maneuver so that part of attack force is prepared to provide suppressive fire from overwatch positions while the assault echelon moves to PLD.
- .40 \_\_\_\_\_ Specifies the time for elements to cross the line of departure and the initial attack formation.
- .41 \_\_\_\_\_ Picks a time of attack based upon the mission, threat, distance to the objective, terrain, light conditions, maneuver, control, coordination, and any other relevant factors.



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- .42 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans reconnaissance patrols to reconnoiter and mark routes, to identify obstacles, to locate enemy (threat) forces, to report latest information prior to the attack, and to guide the maneuver elements.
- .43 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes air defense priorities and procedures (employment of air guards, air attack warning signals, areas of scan, etc.) per unit SOP.
- .44 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that light antiaircraft detachment (LAAD) rules of engagement (ROE), air warning conditions, weapons conditions, and methods of passing alert warnings are established, understood, and rehearsed.
- .45 \_\_\_\_\_ Requests EW support to reduce enemy C3 (threat) capabilities.
- .46 \_\_\_\_\_ Assigns additional control and coordination measures as appropriate.
- .47 \_\_\_\_\_ Specifies realistic rate of advance consistent with security, the terrain, and the situation.
- .48 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies additional navigation aids (NAVAIDS) to be used to assist in movement; e.g., chemical lights, infrared lights, and GSR.
- .49 \_\_\_\_\_ Concurrent with the development of the scheme of maneuver, develops detailed fire support plans for supported and unsupported night attacks which integrate all available supporting arms and includes the use of smoke and illumination.
- .50 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops contingency plans for mass casualties, enemy (threat) counterattack, etc.
- .51 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans for the handling of detainee's/POW's and civilians to include screening by intelligence personnel, evacuation, medical treatment, etc.
- .52 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans for consolidation and reorganization upon completion of the attack.
- .53 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans the use of illumination during reorganization and consolidation (if required).
- .54 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a detailed fire support plan to support consolidation and reorganization to isolate the objective area, to continue pressure on the enemy, to prevent enemy reinforcement, and to discourage counterattacks.
- .55 \_\_\_\_\_ Specifies report requirements.
- .56 \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinates the movement of and ensures the availability of supplies, ammunition, and special equipment.
- .57 \_\_\_\_\_ Specifies primary and alternate visual signals to use during the conduct of the attack.
- .58 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans communications with supported, supporting, and adjacent units per the unit SOP.
- .59 \_\_\_\_\_ Prepares the attack orders using the standard five paragraph order format (SMEAC).

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Estimate of supportability can be either written or verbal depending on the situation and time available.

KEY INDICATORS:

WARNING ORDER

The unit commander issues a warning order as early as possible so that subordinate commanders can adequately plan and conduct patrols and rehearsals. The warning order should contain as a minimum the following information:

1. Estimate of the situation.
2. Event.
3. Probable mission.

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4. Task organization.
  5. Earliest time of movement or degree of notice to be given to the main body.
  6. Location and time of the order.
  7. Statement whether commanders or their representatives are required to attend, the maps required, and the time an order can be expected.
  8. Orders for preliminary actions, reconnaissance, surveillance, and observation.
  9. Administration and logistics instructions, any special equipment required, regrouping of transportation.
  10. Preliminary movement to assembly areas, if necessary.
- 

TASK: 12A.3.6 PREPARE FOR THE ATTACK (NIGHT)

CONDITION(S): A night attack order has been prepared and is ready for issue.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Issues order to all key subordinates in a clear articulate manner.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Utilizes a terrain model, sketch, or other visual aids when briefing the plan.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Uses mental warfighting technique with subordinates to ensure that they have a detailed understanding of the plan and have examined all contingencies.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Allows an opportunity for questions and comments.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Commences unit and individual training readiness drills.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Small unit leaders conduct a physical reconnaissance or visual reconnaissance from observation posts, time permitting.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Issues ammunition and special equipment and conducts maintenance checks, LTI's, and operation checks on equipment and weapons.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Conducts an overall rehearsal on terrain similar to the objective during a period with the same expected light conditions as time of attack if time permits.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Conducts final brief for key leaders.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Conducts final inspections for all personnel and equipment to ensure that prescribed items are available, serviceable, and carried correctly, and all personnel understand all required aspects of the mission.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that assault units move to attack positions, if planned.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that support units move to overwatch direct fire, if planned.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that guides are used to assist the movement of the assault echelon from the assembly area to the PD/LD or attack position (if used).
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the assault echelon enters the attack position with a minimum of confusion, maintaining strict noise and light discipline.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Occupies attack positions for the minimum amount of time to effect final coordination.

- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that elements move to points of departure along the LOD without compromise.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Initiates preparation fires if attack is supported; is prepared to deliver fires if attack is unsupported.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.  
KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.3.7 CONDUCT THE ATTACK (NIGHT)

CONDITION(S): The MCSF unit has been ordered to conduct the planned night attack.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that security patrols precede assault units, clandestinely reconnoiter to locate enemy (threat) security forces and obstacles, mark routes for the assault echelons, and secure the probable line of deployment.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that assault units cross LOD on time and begin attack.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that support echelons fire in support of maneuver echelons, if planned.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that air defense assets are located to provide coverage that reflects the commander's priorities and changes to the threat, the terrain, the weather, and light conditions.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures light and noise discipline is maintained throughout per MPS, continuing actions by Marines.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures control measures are easily identifiable on the ground.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures movement is continuous once units cross the LOD until they reach the PLD.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts deliberate or hasty breaches of obstacles as required.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures guides and release points are used to control the movement.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures the PLD is an easily identifiable terrain feature or is clearly marked.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures assault elements reach the PLD without detection by the enemy (threat).
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures assault elements deploy into assault formations upon reaching the PLD.
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains rate of march and security.
- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures the signal to launch the attack is given after all elements report their readiness or when the situation requires an immediate assault.
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures smoke and illumination are properly used if planned or if dictated by the situation.
- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains radio silence until first contact.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that assaulting Marines place a heavy volume of well-aimed fire.
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures supporting fires are well-integrated with the execution of the assault.
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures the assault advances through the entire objective and sets up a hasty defense.
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ Pursues the enemy (threat) by small arms and supporting fires.
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes local security and prepares for possible immediate counterattack.

- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that the assault echelon quickly consolidates, reorganizes and prepares to continue the attack, coordinates fires in support of the consolidation, and marks cleared lanes through obstacles.
- .23 \_\_\_\_\_ Displaces mortars forward by echelon to ensure continuous support of assault units.
- .24 \_\_\_\_\_ Completes consolidation prior to daylight, if possible.
- .25 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains communications with all elements throughout the assault and those nets designated as secure remain covered throughout the attack.
- .26 \_\_\_\_\_ Adjusts distances between positions as visibility improves.
- .27 \_\_\_\_\_ Submits required reports in a timely manner.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.3.8 CONDUCT CONSOLIDATION

CONDITION(S): Following an attack, and upon securing the objective, the MCSF unit conducts consolidation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Assumes defensive positions along likely dismounted and mounted avenues of approach immediately upon halting and, based on priorities contained in the unit SOP, commences work to improve positions.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Displaces supporting arms/crew-served weapons and reserves forward to add strength and ensure continuous fire support.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Exploits the success of the attack based on the commander's intent.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures small unit leaders submit timely and accurate situation reports (SITREPS).
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures defensive positions take full advantage of terrain; troops are not exposed to direct fire weapons; and positions allow for cover, concealment and dispersion.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Adjusts initial positions as a result of the ground reconnaissance and changes in the enemy (threat) situation.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes both active and passive security measures immediately upon occupying the position to include LP's, OP's, patrols, and camouflage.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Employs snipers and countersnipers.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes communications with adjacent units.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses deception measures during consolidation.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Processes casualties according to the SOP and in a timely manner.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Processes detainee's/POW's according to the SOP.
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Redistributes personnel, supplies, and equipment to offset any losses.
- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ Prepares primary positions of units in the locations specified and according to the established priorities.
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ Integrates the use of natural obstacles and prepares barriers and obstacles.

- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Carries out replacement, resupply, maintenance, and other CSS activities as time permits.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Displaces command and control facilities to control the consolidation and to facilitate the conduct of future operations.
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes a wire communications system.
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes alternate and supplementary weapons positions.
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ Rehearses counterattack plans in the actual areas of assumed penetration or similar terrain.
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the ability to coordinate and conduct the entry and exit of local security.
- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ Augments defensive efforts with surveillance equipment and devices.
- .23 \_\_\_\_\_ Specifies withdrawal routes and coordinates these routes with available fire support agencies.
- .24 \_\_\_\_\_ Submits reports to higher command elements, as required.
- .25 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts preparation for on-call missions.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.4 TACTICAL MEASURES

TASK: 12A.4.1 EXERCISE DISCIPLINE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit has been a given mission to conduct security/tactical operations based on the threat.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Demonstrates unit discipline by individual members being in control of themselves and contributing to mission accomplishment.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines safeguard and clean their weapons, both individual and crewserved, daily.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures vehicles, etc., are given regular maintenance by the Marine assigned to operate them.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines employ their firepower in an orderly and organized fashion when engaged. Random waste of ammunition is not tolerated by unit leaders.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines do not waste or abuse unit supplies or material.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures supplies are safeguarded from the enemy (threat) and from the weather and are not scattered as litter on the terrain.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines operating radios do not expose themselves to radio direction finding (RDF) by unnecessary, wordy, or repetitious message traffic. Standard prowords are used and communication checks are limited. All personnel using radios adhere to require standards of performance regardless of grade.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that the unit cannot be detected by enemy (threat) as a result of poor noise discipline.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that the unit cannot be detected by enemy (threat) as a result of poor light discipline.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that Marines wear the prescribed uniform at all times including individual weapon, body armor, helmet, and first-aid kit.

- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that leaders actively promote field sanitation and personal hygiene by policing the area, inspecting feet and body sores, and enforcing use of designated heads and good personal health habits.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: With exceptions, evaluators will use the 90 percent rule (90 percent of the Marines 90 percent of the time) to determine whether requirements are being met. The exceptions will be communications, noise, and light discipline. These standards will stand literally. If a unit is located by RDF and an enemy indirect fire mission can be brought to bear on the unit's location as a result, or the unit is located or observed as a result of noise or light, the standard cannot be considered met. Evaluators must determine whether the unit is violating light and noise discipline and communications procedures when no aggressors or EW support is available. This task will be evaluated over the entire exercise and evaluators will note efforts of unit leaders to maintain and correct discipline. If there is improvement by the unit throughout the exercise so that standards are consistently met, the unit may receive a "YES" marking.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.2 DEMONSTRATE DISPERSION

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit has been given a mission to conduct security/tactical operations based on the threat.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines do not gather in groups when maneuvering, when waiting in assembly areas, or when deployed in the defense.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures dispersion is controlled by junior leaders who are active in keeping Marines spread out.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures units are not grouped together in small areas so that they combine to present a lucrative target for enemy indirect fire or mobile bombs.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures leaders set an example of dispersion by not allowing themselves to bunch up during briefings or issuing of orders.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures tentage, equipment, vehicles, and radios are placed in such a manner as to reduce their vulnerability to bursting munitions.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures firing positions for crew-served weapons generally are separated by a minimum of 30 to 35 meters.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Disperses all vehicles and takes advantage of terrain features to the maximum degree possible to seek cover and concealment, yet avoids positions that will cause difficulty in exiting.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: This task is applicable throughout the exercise. Evaluator reaches a YES evaluation based on his observation that 90 percent of the Marines in the unit participate throughout the exercise with the quality of performance defined by the requirements.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.3 DEMONSTRATE THE USE OF CAMOUFLAGE, COVER AND CONCEALMENT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit has been given a mission to conduct security/tactical operations based on the threat.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that individual Marines, including vehicle drivers, demonstrate by tactical and personal example an understanding of use of covered routes and covered positions.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures halted elements and vehicles do not remain in exposed locales but move immediately to the nearest cover.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures equipment, tentage, radios, and vehicle parking areas are sited to take advantage of cover provided by natural terrain features.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures individual and crew-served weapons firing positions are established in areas that permit use of natural cover while still allowing observation and adequate fields of fire.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures all individual Marines and crew-served weapons elements make use of available material to improve cover.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures individual Marines demonstrate attention to detail. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that the principles of camouflage sitting, discipline, and construction are employed continuously throughout the operations. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses natural materials to conceal positions and vehicles from enemy ground observation to a distance of 200 meters.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Camouflages all positions to prevent identification by employing soil, fresh foliage, netting, and other appropriate natural materials.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: This task is applicable throughout the exercise. Evaluator reaches a YES evaluation based on his observation that 90 percent of the Marines in the unit participate throughout the exercise with the quality of performance defined by the requirements.

KEY INDICATORS:

INDIVIDUAL MARINES

Apply camouflage paint (when used) to more than just their faces, covering neck, ears, arms, and other exposed areas that might permit their detection.

Include more than a handful of weeds tucked into their helmet cover as camouflage and concealment to cover or dull items that have a shiny reflective surface.

Continually change camouflage to match changes in vegetation and terrain.

VEHICLES

Dull or cover any light-colored tactical markings. Dull or cover all reflective surfaces to include mirrors and windshield.

Are equipped with proper camouflaging materials.

TASK: 12A.4.4 CONDUCT LOCAL SECURITY

CONDITION(S): The unit has formed a security/defensive posture. Threat forces are deployed throughout the area. Threat units have been sighted in close vicinity to positions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Briefs and inspects Marines assigned local forward security missions.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Emplaces Marines and weapons in positions which offer good observation, fields of fire, concealment, and cover and which control enemy (threat) avenues of approach.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Employs local security measures which provide for early warning, continual observation, and counter-reconnaissance screening and avoid the element of enemy surprise.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures individual weapons are available and ready for use at all times.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensures individual Marines are aware of signals for lifting or shifting fires.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures individual weapon shooters provide immediate well-aimed volume of fire at the sectors of fire assigned to each weapon.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures hand grenades are available and Marines are proficient in their use.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Considers active and passive OPSEC measures to prevent surprise and to provide greater security.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Positions elements to allow for their mutual support, emphasizing coordinated surveillance, exchange of information, coordinated fires, final protective fires, and patrolling.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Organizes defensive positions to allow for all-round defense.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Plans primary and supplementary positions.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Plans a defense in depth through the use of supplementary positions and through the planned use of shifting fires into threatened areas.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Employs a series of natural and artificial obstacles to restrict, delay, block, or stop the movement of enemy (threat) forces.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates a detailed fire plan, considering the fires of organic weapons, mortars, and, if available, artillery, NGF, and air.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that flexibility is built into the plan through the identification of a reserve, centralized control over supporting fires, shifting of fires, and supplementary positions.
- .16 \_\_\_\_ Patrols the assigned area actively.
- .17 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the dispersion of elements and individuals throughout the operation to avoid excessive casualties.
- .18 \_\_\_\_ Makes maximum use of surveillance devices in order to detect enemy (threat) movement.
- .19 \_\_\_\_ Uses available time effectively in the planning and preparation of defensive positions.
- .20 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that patrols are not dispatched in repetitive or stereotyped patterns.
- .21 \_\_\_\_ Ensures security elements report departure and return per the local SOP.
- .22 \_\_\_\_ Disseminates combat information acquired by security elements throughout the unit and as required to higher command elements.



EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.5 RESPOND TO ENEMY ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) CAPABILITY

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is conducting security/tactical operations. The threat is known to have an EW capability.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Operates all radio nets specified as covered circuits in the communications plan in the covered mode.
- .2    \_\_\_ Observes CEOI instructions for daily changing of frequencies and call signs.
- .3    \_\_\_ Observes emission control (EMCON) procedures.
- .4    \_\_\_ Chooses communication sites that provide for terrain masking to minimize enemy (threat) probability of intercept.
- .5    \_\_\_ Ensures that Marines require authentication operating unsecure radio and wire nets.
- .6    \_\_\_ Ensures that CEOI allocates alternate frequencies for critical radio nets.
- .7    \_\_\_ Ensures that Marines operating radios recognize enemy (threat) jamming (as opposed to equipment malfunctions), do not reveal effectiveness of enemy jamming efforts, and continue to attempt to communicate.
- .8    \_\_\_ Reports proven or suspected enemy (threat) electronic activity to higher headquarters by a MIJI report via wire, messenger, or other secure means in a timely manner.
- .9    \_\_\_ Relays communications by alternate means when radio nets are effectively jammed.
- .10   \_\_\_ Ensures BEADWINDOW procedures are established.
- .11   \_\_\_ Ensures that Marines operating radios and officers transmitting on those radios do not compromise unit locations, strength, or commit other "BEADWINDOW" security lapses.
- .12   \_\_\_ Utilizes expedient directional antennas to the maximum extent possible.
- .13   \_\_\_ Accomplishes uncovered transmissions in such a way as to discourage radio direction finding.
- .14   \_\_\_ Safeguards communications security material of all types.
- .15   \_\_\_ Sends low-priority and routine messages by means other than radio communications.
- .16   \_\_\_ Employs brevity codes promulgated by the appropriate communications SOP.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: The task is applicable in all instances in which the aggressor force described as the threat in the published scenario has an electronic warfare capability.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.6 RESPOND TO ENEMY AIR CAPABILITY

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is conducting security/tactical operations. The threat is known to have fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft capability.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Establishes procedures for both passive and active air defense.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures air guards are designated. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Maintains an alarm system to warn of air attack.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines within the unit are aware of the meaning of the alarm.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that if given advance warning of approaching hostile aircraft, Marines react by dispersing per established passive measures and by taking appropriate active defensive actions when attacked.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures unit machinegun teams engage enemy aircraft when under attack.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures small unit leaders demonstrate ability to concentrate small arms fire against attacking aircraft.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Reports attack by enemy air to higher headquarters using a flash message.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

AIR GUARDS

Air guards are designated to watch for the approach of hostile aircraft. These Marines are not specially trained beyond careful instruction by their immediate leader. They are able to:

- 1. State the nature of the threat; i.e., fixed-wing jet, fixed-wing prop, or rotary-wing.
- 2. Describe the signal established as the alarm for attack.
- 3. Identify friendly aircraft that are in support of the unit.

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TASK: 12A.4.7 HANDLE DETAINEE'S/POW'S

CONDITION(S): The security force has taken detainee's/POW's. The security force processes the detainee's/POW's and ensures their delivery to a collection point.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the unit has and uses a SOP for processing detainees/POW's.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures individual Marines handling detainees/POW's segregate them by type (officers, NCO's, troops, civilian combatants, etc.). (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Searching of detainee's/POW's is conducted immediately after capture; weapons and items of potential intelligence value are tagged and evacuated at the same time as detainee/POW; personal items and protective clothing and equipment are returned to detainee/POW. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that detainee's/POW's are allowed to retain personal protective equipment (e.g., helmet, gas mask, etc.).

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- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that detainee's/POW's are required to remain silent and not permitted to converse among themselves.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that detainee's/POW's are processed with speed to obtain maximum intelligence benefits.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that Marines handling detainee's/POW's safeguard them from abuse and from hazards of enemy fire.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures perishable information obtained from detainee's/POW's is reported immediately to higher headquarters.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures enemy casualties receive same medical care and MEDEVAC priority as unit casualties with any difference in treatment based solely on medical considerations.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures detainee's/POW's are escorted under guard to the designated collection point as soon as possible.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures detainee's/POW's and all recovered equipment/documents are transferred to higher command element as soon as possible.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluator ensures that detainee's/POW's are not mistreated.

KEY INDICATORS:

SEGREGATION

The segregation of detainee's/POW's requires that individual detainee's/POW's be identified as belonging to a particular category. While time and combat conditions may not permit the detailed interrogation of detainee's/POW's to make all such determinations, it should be possible to readily identify and separate detainee's/POW's according to status (officers/enlisted) and sex.

SEARCHING

Detainee's/POW's should be disarmed and searched for concealed weapons, equipment, and documents of particular intelligence value immediately upon capture, unless the number of detainee's/POW's captured, enemy action, or other circumstances make such a search impracticable. Until each detainee/POW is searched, the responsible troops must be particularly alert to prevent the use of concealed weapons or the destruction of documents or equipment.

EQUIPMENT

Items of personal or individual equipment which are new or appear to be of a type not previously seen may be of intelligence value and should be processed via intelligence channels.

DOCUMENTS

A captured document is any piece of recorded information which has been in the hands of the enemy. When such documents are taken from a detainee/POW for safekeeping and delivery to intelligence personnel, care must be taken to assure that they can later be identified with the individual detainee/POW from whom they were taken. Documents and records of personal nature must be returned to the detainee/POW from whom they were taken. In no instance should the personal identity card of a detainee/POW be taken.

PERSONAL EFFECTS

Detainee's/POW's should be permitted to retain protective equipment such as helmets, protective masks, and like items; effects and articles used for clothing or eating, except knives and forks; rations; identification cards or tags; and badges of grade and nationality. When items of equipment issued for personal protection are taken, they must be replaced with equivalent items serving the same purpose. Although money and other valuables may be taken from detainee's/POW's as a security measure, they must be receipted and a record must be maintained.

ENCLOSURE (1)

MEDICAL CARE

Detainee's/POW's are entitled to the same medical care as friendly casualties, to include MEDEVAC priority. Any difference in treatment must be based solely on medical considerations.

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TASK: 12A.4.8 HANDLE CASUALTIES

CONDITION(S): The security force is conducting security/tactical operations and has taken casualties that require evacuation. The security force has designated a medical collection point.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines dealing with casualties prior to arrival of corpsmen demonstrate buddy aid knowledge.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines tagged as lightly wounded apply self aid.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines who must be evacuated are transported by man carry, litter, vehicle, or helicopter to the collection point or treatment site in a tactically sound and expeditious manner that still shows regard for the type of wound of the casualty.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that casualty reporting begins immediately after a Marine is tagged, starting at the level of the junior leader and terminating at the unit headquarters.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Marines, including officers, who are tagged with incapacitating wounds drop when "hit". Marines tagged as incapacitated do not move under their own power, relying on other Marines to move them.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.9 PREPARE FOR NBC OPERATIONS

CONDITION(S): Threat forces have been reported to be capable of employing NBC munitions in the area where the MCSF unit is located. Due to the threat, passive and active defense measures must be used for survival of the unit.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Possesses an SOP which outlines procedures for enemy NBC strikes and reports required.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures individual NBC defense equipment authorized by the unit table of equipment (T/E) is serviceable and issued to each individual.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures unit NBC defense equipment (including mops, brooms, shovels, rags, etc.) authorized by unit T/E is operationally ready and distributed to designated and trained/knowledgeable operators.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures decontamination equipment and bulk decontaminates authorized by T/E's are available and ready for transport to a decontamination area.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensures M11 decontamination equipment units are filled (water used for training).
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures NBC trained personnel are available on a 24-hour a day basis.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures personnel thoroughly understand mission oriented protective posture (MOPP) for the control of exposure of personnel to NBC hazards.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Establishes MOPP level, and personnel are at or above the required MOPP level.

- .9     \_\_\_ Marines properly identify NATO or threat NBC contamination markers.
- .10    \_\_\_ Emplaces equipment to maximize utilization of terrain features for cover, concealment, and topographic shielding from NBC attacks.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Provide the unit information to expect an imminent nuclear attack by the enemy, and integrate NBC scenarios with normal operational assignments. Evaluator(s) should be school trained in the area of NBC Defense (MOS 57XX) or be thoroughly trained in this area as part of Evaluator's School.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.10 PREPARE FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is informed that nuclear attack is imminent. SOP's and/or operation orders are onhand to provide checklists, sequence of actions, and guidance.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1     \_\_\_ Identifies backup/alternate command, control, and communications procedures.
- .2     \_\_\_ Alerts subordinate/displaced elements.
- .3     \_\_\_ Unit continues mission while implementing actions to minimize casualties and damage.
- .4     \_\_\_ Protects vehicles and equipment by emplacing behind masking terrain.
- .5     \_\_\_ Initiates periodic monitoring using available survey instruments.
- .6     \_\_\_ Identifies/prepares shelters for defense against heat, blast, and radiation.
- .7     \_\_\_ Personnel minimize exposure possibilities by rolling down sleeves, buttoning collars, and wearing any additional clothing equal to a two-layered uniform.
- .8     \_\_\_ Secures/protects loose items, flammable/explosive items, food, and water from heat, blast, and radiation.
- .9     \_\_\_ Demonstrates proficiency in standard first aid procedures to provide self/buddy aid for nuclear blast, and thermal effects.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Commander is informed that nuclear weapons have been used.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.11 RESPOND TO THE INITIAL EFFECTS OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK

CONDITION(S): Nuclear attack is simulated by the detonation of an artillery or nuclear blast simulator, or by other appropriate means.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1     \_\_\_ Personnel take immediate action, upon recognizing the attack, to shield themselves from blast, heat of detonation by taking cover in fighting holes, bunkers, culverts, caves, tunnels, etc.
- .2     \_\_\_ Maintains or reestablishes chain of command and communications. Resumes mission if possible.

- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Submits NBC-1 initial and follow-up reports to higher headquarters. Reports are rapidly forwarded, by secure means, when possible.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Administers casualties first aid and evacuates to a medical treatment station as the mission permits.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Submits damage assessment by secure means to higher/supported command element per SOP.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Continues monitoring using available survey instruments.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluator will assess constructive casualties due to blast, heat, dazzle, radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Communications systems (antennas, receivers/transmitters) that are exposed (not in a covered or hardened location/vehicle) during the simulated nuclear detonations, will be assessed as EMP casualties.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.12 RESPOND TO THE RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK

CONDITION(S): A surface or subsurface nuclear detonation has occurred. The MCSF unit location is within the predicted fall-out zone. An M5A2 radiological fall-out-predictor, or substitute, is available. The unit gets effective downwind messages at least once every 3 hours. NBC-2 report is furnished to the unit about 15 minutes after the detonation, or prepared by the unit; NBC-3 report is furnished about 45 minutes after detonation; NBC-5 report and/or contamination overlay is provided about 4 hours after the detonation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Performs mission concurrently with all other actions.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Advises supervisors, and notifies subordinate elements of estimated time of fall-out arrival.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintain monitoring using available survey instruments.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Protects equipment, munitions, petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), food, and water from fall-out.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Takes individual protective measures to minimize fall-out effects as mission permits.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Forwards NBC-4 reports, as required, to the higher command element.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Records unit total dose information and reports this information to higher command elements, using available secure means.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Minimizes exposure while commanding officer determines if relocation to a clean area is necessary or possible. Calculates optimum time of exit.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Handles casualties and provides first aid treatment in a nuclear environment.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Assesses impact of casualties on unit mission.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Commander is advised of estimated time of fall-out arrival.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.13 PERFORM RADIOLOGICAL DECONTAMINATION

CONDITION(S): Fallout has ceased, and personnel and equipment are contaminated. The hazard to personnel does not allow time for radiation to decay to a minimum level. Time and situation permit decontamination.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Establishes decontamination priorities.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Establishes decontamination point.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures decontamination personnel wear appropriate protective clothing, and equipment.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Decontamination equipment, personnel, and individual weapons using appropriate decontamination equipment.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Decontaminates unit equipment and vehicles using appropriate expedient devices.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Marks contaminated areas with NATO standard NBC markers.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Determines adequacy of decontamination using available personnel and equipment monitoring instruments.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Discards contaminated materials according to SOP, marks as contaminated, and provides location to the higher command element.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Decontaminates decontamination personnel as necessary.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Remains within operational exposure guidance (OEG).
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Records total dose information and reports to the higher command element.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: FM 3-5 provides guidelines for the decontamination procedures.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.14 CROSS A RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATED AREA

CONDITION(S): The situation forces the MCSF unit to cross a radiological contaminated area while moving to a new site. Unit receives a NBC-5 report or contamination overlay from the higher command element.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Posts NBC-5 report and/or contamination overlay to situation map and determines route.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Obtains route clearance and approval, if necessary.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Provides turn back dose and dose rate to advance party and/or reconnaissance team.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures vehicles receive additional shielding and personnel are provided all available protection from dust.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Dispatches advance party and/or reconnaissance team to reconnoiter new areas.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Crosses contaminated area while employing contamination avoidance techniques.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Operates within OEG guidance.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Determines the degree of personnel and equipment contamination after clearing the contaminated area, using monitoring instruments.

- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes and follows decontamination priorities.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Records unit total dose information, using available total dose instruments, and reports to higher command element.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.15 PREPARE FOR A FRIENDLY NUCLEAR STRIKE

CONDITION(S): Unit receives a friendly nuclear STRIKWARN per FM 3-3, appendix G. The MCSF unit is located within minimum safe distance (MSD) zones 2 to 3.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Applies the STRIKWARN accurately and completely to the situation map within 5 minutes after message receipt.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Makes pertinent information regarding the planned detonation (time of burst, ground zero, fall-out coverage, MSD, etc.) available to the commanding officer.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Advises commanding officer on the vulnerability of the unit to the burst and residual contamination.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Advises commanding officer of the measures needed to prevent casualties, damage, and extended interference with the mission.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Implements protective measures, as directed by higher command element, consistent with the mission.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Increases MOPP level consistent with mission, temperature, work rate, and guidance.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Places vehicles behind masking terrain.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Turns off duplicate electronic devices; disassembles erected antennas; ties down antennas. Bare minimum radio equipment remains erected.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Places all loose items (small weapons, tools, etc.) and highly flammable/explosive items (POL, propellants, missiles, etc.) in vehicles or shelters.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Acknowledges the warning before the expected time of burst. All subordinate units have been warned and protective measures implemented. (KI)
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures personnel take cover in foxholes, bunkers, armored vehicles, existing shelters (basements, culverts, caves, tunnels, etc.), or lie prone on open ground.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluator simulates nuclear detonation with an artillery or nuclear blast simulator, or informs the unit that nuclear blast has occurred. Evaluator assesses casualties and damage to unprotected personnel and equipment.

KEY INDICATORS:

WARNING

MCSF unit should warn subordinate/detached elements of an impending nuclear detonation by using one of the following methods:

- 1. Using a code word or brevity code from the CEOI to indicate the message is a nuclear strike warning.



- 2. A brief, prearranged message that directs the receiver to implement specific protective measures.
- 3. Encoded message with expected time of burst, sent by most expedient means of communication.

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TASK: 12A.4.16 PREPARE FOR A CHEMICAL AGENT ATTACK

CONDITION(S): MCSF unit is informed that chemical weapons have been used in the theater of operations and that a chemical agent attack is imminent.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Implements the chemical defense SOP which addresses chemical defense/decontamination procedures.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Increases MOPP level consistent with mission, temperature, and work rate.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies unit tasks requiring a high degree of manual dexterity, strength, and difficulty while in MOPP 4.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans personnel rotation, or assigning additional personnel while in MOPP 4.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Marines demonstrate the capabilities for donning the protective mask and chemical protective ensemble.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses the buddy system to facilitate individual monitoring/treatment for chemical agent poisoning and emergency decontamination.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Continues mission while implementing all actions to minimize casualties and damage.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Covers essential equipment, munitions, POL, food, and water supplies that cannot be placed in a shelter with readily decontaminated tarps, ponchos, etc.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that M11's are filled and there is an available water source with a supporting road network.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Reports potential decontamination sites to the higher command element.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Erects and monitors available chemical agent alarms.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses protective NBC equipment and supplies properly and maintains equipment in a high state of serviceability.
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Demonstrates a knowledge of chemical agent symptoms.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: MCSF unit is informed that chemical weapons have been used, and that attack is imminent.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

TASK: 12A.4.17 RESPOND TO A CHEMICAL AGENT ATTACK

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is subjected to a chemical agent attack. Site should support the type of activities being conducted and permit the safe use of simulators and devices.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

CHEMICAL AGENT

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Responds to a chemical alarm by taking immediate protective measures followed by treatment/decontamination of casualties. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Personnel mask automatically upon notification of any enemy artillery, rocket, or air attack/overflight.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Personnel mask automatically upon perceiving a suspicious odor, airborne droplets/mist, or smoke from unknown source.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Marines unmask only when authorized. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Performs mission for at least 4 hours while in MOPP 4.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Identifies type of chemical agent using available detector kit.

PERSISTENT AGENT

- .7 \_\_\_\_ Locates and marks with NATO standard markers persistent agent contamination areas.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Reports location and type of contamination to the higher command element, and plots the location per FM 3-3.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Determines if immediate relocation to a clean area is necessary or possible and advises the higher command element.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Determines decontamination priorities and requests decontamination support, if required.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Wraps, marks as contaminated, and evacuates wounded in action (WIA's) as mission permits. Warns medical treatment facility.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Wraps, marks as contaminated, and evacuates killed in action (KIA's) as mission permits. Warns graves registration collection point.

NONPERSISTENT AGENT

- .13 \_\_\_\_ Follows unmasking procedures. (KI)
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Evacuates WIA's to the medical treatment facility as mission permits.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Evacuates KIA's to the graves registration collection point as mission permits.
- .16 \_\_\_\_ Services detector units and returns them to operation.
- .17 \_\_\_\_ Replaces expended chemical defense items, as required.
- .18 \_\_\_\_ Adjusts MOPP level, as required.
- .19 \_\_\_\_ Plans and provides first aid treatment to casualties in a chemical environment.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Selected personnel are presented decontamination training kits and first aid treatment training devices to "treat designated casualties". Every attempt must be made to provide a realistic situation through devices, scenarios, or other aids developed through innovation. The key to a thorough evaluation is a realistic, believable, well supported situation imposed by the trainer/evaluator. Ninety percent of the personnel must successfully accomplish the tasks for the unit to receive a "yes" evaluation.

KEY INDICATORS:

CHEMICAL CASUALTIES

Chemical casualties are described as:

1. Personnel without mask and hood within arms reach, without decontamination kits, or not wearing chemical protective clothing.
2. Personnel not taking immediate corrective actions upon perceiving the attack, hearing a chemical agent alarm, being ordered to mask, or using incorrect masking procedures (not masking within 9 seconds), or making incorrect use of decontamination kits/first aid treatment items.
3. Marines who unmask or therewise assume a lesser degree of MOPP without being authorized to do so.

UNMASKING PROCEDURES

When a detector kit is available, the following unmasking procedures will be adhered to:

1. After determining absence of agents, two or three Marines unmask for 5 minutes.
2. Marines remask and are examined in a shady area for symptoms for 10 minutes.
3. If no symptoms appear, remainder of unit may unmask.

When no detector kit is available, the following unmasking procedures will be adhered to:

1. Two or three Marines take a deep breath, hold it.
2. Then they clear their masks, reestablish the seal, and wait 10 minutes.
3. If no symptoms appear, the same Marines break the seal of their masks, take two or three deep breaths, clear and reseal their masks.
4. If after 10 minutes no symptoms have appeared, the same Marines unmask for 5 minutes and then remask.
5. If after 10 more minutes no symptoms have appeared, the rest of the unit may unmask.

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TASK: 12A.4.18 PERFORM HASTY DECONTAMINATION

CONDITION(S): Personnel and equipment have been contaminated by a chemical agent. Time is not available for complete decontamination. The hazard is such that hasty decontamination is required. All personnel are maintaining a maximum MOPP.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Decontaminates individual weapons and MCSF unit equipment using appropriate decontamination kits.
- .2 ☐ Determines extent of decontamination and establishes decontamination priorities.
- .3 ☐ Removes contaminated protective covers and decontaminates, or discards.
- .4 ☐ Uses appropriate decontamination procedures for items being decontaminated. (KI)
- .5 ☐ Decontaminates equipment and vehicles using appropriate expedient devices.
- .6 ☐ Determines adequacy of decontamination.
- .7 ☐ Discards contaminated materials according to tactical SOP, marks as contaminated, and provides locations to higher command element.

- .8 \_\_\_\_ Reduces MOPP level, if required.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

DECONTAMINATION PROCEDURES

If support is not available for conducting hasty decontamination, initial decontamination of unit equipment, vehicles and weapons may be accomplished by:

1. Removing all gross liquid contamination with sticks or other improvised devices, which are buried after use.
2. Utilizing M11 decontamination apparatus filled with DS2 to spray areas frequently used or touched (water is used to simulate DS2 in a training environment).

Contaminated items that may need special decontamination treatment are:

1. POL, food, and water containers and munitions. These are washed with soapy water, rinsed, and thoroughly air dried.
2. Communications equipment, electronic vans, and other electronic equipment are decontaminated with hot air, by weathering, or all metal parts are wiped with rags soaked with detergent solvent #2 (DS2) (water is used for training purposes).
3. Optical instruments are blotted with rags and then wiped with lens cleaning solution or organic solvent.

Adequacy of decontamination is determined using the chemical agent detector kit. If contamination is still present, procedures can be repeated, decontamination support can be requested, or the risk of using the equipment can be accepted.

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TASK: 12A.4.19 COORDINATE FOR DELIBERATE DECONTAMINATION OF EQUIPMENT

CONDITION(S): Equipment has been contaminated by a chemical agent. Hasty decontamination has been accomplished. Time is available for complete decontamination. Decontamination support from a decontamination unit is available upon request.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates with decontamination unit for arrival time, location, supplies, equipment, and personnel support to be furnished and estimated time of completion.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Dispatches advance party following receipt of route clearance to personnel/equipment decontamination stations (PDS/EDS) assembly area.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Moves main body to PDS/EDS assembly area and organizes for processing.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Begins decontamination as scheduled.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Reorganizes LAAM Bn/Btry personnel in a clean area upwind of residual effects for the resumption of their mission.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Adjusts MOPP level, as required.

ENCLOSURE (1)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.20 EXCHANGE PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

CONDITION(S): The protective clothing is contaminated and a suitable uncontaminated area is available.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Removes contaminated clothing without transfer of contamination.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Changes to new protective clothing.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.4.21 SCORE THE NBC EXAM

CONDITION(S): Classroom Atmosphere. An exam not to exceed 30 minutes, will be prepared at the Wing/Group level. All available personnel will take the exam.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 10 percent or higher.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 20 percent or higher.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 30 percent or higher.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 40 percent or higher.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 50 percent or higher.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 60 percent or higher.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 70 percent or higher.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 80 percent or higher.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 90 percent or higher.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Unit averaged 100 percent.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Standards will be marked either Y or N, as appropriate. As an example, if the team average was 76 percent, Task 12A.4.21.1 through 12A.4.21.7 would be marked Y (Yes) and the remainder would be marked N (No).

Required data:

- 1. Number of personnel in unit:\_\_\_\_
- 2. Number of personnel taking exam:\_\_\_\_
- 3. Unit average:\_\_\_\_

ENCLOSURE (1)

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.5 CLOSE QUARTERS BATTLE (CQB)

TASK: 12A.5.1 CONDUCT SPECIAL RESPONSE TEAM (SRT) INITIAL PLANNING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is conducting security/tactical operations. An SRT receives a mission which may involve CQB.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Determines intelligence and other information requirements.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Receives and analyzes the mission to identify specified and implied tasks.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies personnel and equipment requirements.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Establishes task organization.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Identifies rules of engagement.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Establishes command relationships.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Promulgates SRT planning guidance which addresses all aspects of the operation.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Integrates the designated marksman into the plan.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Maintains close and continuous planning coordination with the tactical operations center (TOC).
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Develops plans using standardized procedures contained in SOP's and local Navy contingency plans.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates all communication requirements to include a separate SRT frequency.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Requests maps, charts, imagery, and other graphic aids.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Receives and disseminates to all SRT members preliminary intelligence estimate based on contingency plans.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.5.2 ESTABLISH SRT COMMAND AND CONTROL

CONDITION(S): An SRT, upon receiving a mission which may involve CQB, establishes command and control.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Establishes TOC.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Identifies SRT chain of command.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies unique communications requirements; i.e., equipment, format, procedures, etc., based on the specific command and control relationships established.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Issues digital encryption system (DES) radio communication for all SRT members.

ENCLOSURE (1)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.5.3 CONDUCT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (BAMCIS AND METT-T)

CONDITION(S): An SRT, upon receipt of a mission, must conduct an estimate of the situation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Applies BAMCIS and METT-T to specific SRT mission.
- .2 ☐ Issues warning order to SRT.
- .3 ☐ Issues warning order to supporting elements.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.5.4 DEVELOP CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

CONDITION(S): An SRT, upon receiving a CQB mission, develops a concept of employment.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Develops a plan which allows for isolation of the target area.
- .2 ☐ Plans three dimensional (at, above, and below street level) ingress and egress routes, and plans for the rapid seizure of objectives.
- .3 ☐ Identifies techniques, procedures, weapons, and explosive devices, designated marksman, etc., to neutralize enemy sniper, antiarmor, and other direct fire weapons positions.
- .4 ☐ Develops a plan to rapidly regain control of the objective area.
- .5 ☐ Adopts a plan of attack which integrates all available assets, both internal and external to the unit.
- .6 ☐ Provides adequate guidance to subordinates; however, the concept demands centralized control but decentralized execution.
- .7 ☐ Provides guidance on the use of riot control agents.
- .8 ☐ Integrates the use of transport helicopters to take advantage of their inherent ability to bypass obstacles and enemy (threat) strongpoints, concentrate forces, provide fire support, and allow for immediate resupply.
- .9 ☐ Considers the use of smoke.
- .10 ☐ Plans for the use of the designated marksman team(s).
- .11 ☐ Develops a detailed fire support plan that takes into consideration protected areas and fire support coordination measures.
- .12 ☐ Provides guidance concerning assault site sensitivities.

- .13   \_\_\_   Reviews the DoD use of force policy.
- .14   \_\_\_   Designates signals which are distinctive and well understood, and which correspond with signals contained in the unit SOP's.
- .15   \_\_\_   Plans for reinforcement of the SRT.
- .16   \_\_\_   Plans mission brief and rehearsals prior to the deployment of forces.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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TASK: 12A.5.5 CONDUCT REHEARSAL

CONDITION(S):   An SRT, upon receipt of a mission, if possible, conducts a rehearsal.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1   \_\_\_   Conducts a detailed brief on the plan for all key individuals.
- .2   \_\_\_   Utilizes a terrain model, sketch, aerial photographs, or other training aids when briefing the plan.
- .3   \_\_\_   Ensures all personnel understand the plan, and are cognizant of their duties and responsibilities.   (KI)
- .4   \_\_\_   Allows an opportunity for questions and comments.
- .5   \_\_\_   Issues weapons and special equipment, and conducts maintenance, preops, and communications checks on required special equipment.
- .6   \_\_\_   Commences unit and individual training readiness drills.
- .7   \_\_\_   Schedules an overall rehearsal during a period with the same expected illumination conditions, if time permits.
- .8   \_\_\_   Rehearses breaching techniques, firing techniques, methods of entry, and crossing of critical areas.
- .9   \_\_\_   Sets BZO on all weapons and calibrates those with night vision sights mounted.
- .10   \_\_\_   Conducts classes for all SRT personnel on demolition techniques if not previously completed.
- .11   \_\_\_   Ensures all personnel have received training on special equipment, weapons, or ordnance issued.
- .12   \_\_\_   Advises all personnel of the DoD use of force policy.
- .13   \_\_\_   Conducts final brief for key leaders.
- .14   \_\_\_   Conducts final inspection for all personnel and equipment to ensure prescribed items are available, serviceable, carried correctly, and all personnel understand all requirement aspects of the mission.
- .15   \_\_\_   Updates concept of operations, if required.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.



KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.5.6 CONDUCT SRT OPERATION

CONDITION(S): An SRT conducts an operation involving CQB.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Exercises tactical movement to the objective area or target location without detection.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Conducts breaching of magazines, doors/hatches, bulkheads, overheads and decks, as required.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Utilizes discriminating shooting techniques in known spaces engaging targets without striking special weapons/critical systems with assigned weapon(s).
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Conducts team movement skills to include fast rope/rappelling as per unit/shipboard SOP under day/night/NBC environments.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Clears a room utilizing close quarter battle tactics.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Engages, neutralizes, and dominates the threat.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures designated marksman team(s) utilizes assigned weapon(s) and precision shooting to engage targets at less than 500 meters.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Ensures designated marksman team(s) engage in surveillance, communications, and reporting.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.5.7 CONDUCT POST OPERATION PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): An SRT takes appropriate actions upon mission completion.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Secures and consolidates the incident scene.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Assists in collection of information/evidence for investigative authorities.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.6 NUCLEAR REFUELING/DEFUELING OPERATIONS

TASK: 12A.6.1 ESTABLISH PROCEDURES FOR THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is tasked with providing security for nuclear refueling/defueling operations. Given a situation in which deadly force is authorized to protect nuclear refueling/defueling, the unit responds appropriately.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains the definition of deadly force.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates how deadly force could be used.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Explains the DoD's use of force policy as it applies to nuclear refueling/defueling operations.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Describes ramifications of intent and temper on deadly force.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.2 CONDUCT INTERIOR GUARD

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is tasked with providing security for nuclear refueling/defueling operations. The guard of the day is established per NAVMC 2691A, NAVSEAINST C1920.22, applicable portions of OPNAVINST C8126.1, and the local SOP. Personnel at their assigned posts/positions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge of general orders and interior guard procedures per the local SOP.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proficiency in conducting those operations covered by local special orders.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates proper methods of apprehension and restraint per the local SOP.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Exercises OPSEC per the local SOP.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Identifies information that is not to be discussed with nonguard personnel.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Safeguards classified material.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Accounts for classified material.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Corrects and reports violations of OPSEC.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper response to a bomb threat per the local SOP.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the unarmed self defense methods employed by MCSF security guards.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the individual protective measures to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the local threat.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

ENCLOSURE (1)

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.3 CONDUCT CHALLENGING PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): Sentries posted as part of the guard of the day encounter unknown persons in vehicles and/or on foot, on or near their post.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper method for challenging.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures challenged personnel are stopped in a position from which the sentry can not be threatened.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies, positively, the person being challenged.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Executes all challenges per the local SOP.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Challenges a group of personnel properly.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper method for challenging vehicles.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that while on vehicle patrol/post the driver drops the assistant driver in a covered and concealed position.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the assistant driver assumes a covered/ concealed position with adequate fields of fire and observation.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that drivers concentrate the head/spot light on the challenged vehicle and driver.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Issues the challenge and instructions with authority.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the types of perimeter barriers, protective lighting, intrusion detection systems and locking systems.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.4 EXECUTE REACTION FORCE ELEMENTS

CONDITION(S): The normal guard of the day has been established and discovers a threat to a nuclear refueling/defueling operation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the initial response force (IRF) and explains its mission.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms and deploys an IRF per the local SOP.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the back-up alert force (BAF) and explains its mission.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms and deploys a BAF per the local SOP.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the composition of the RF and explains its mission.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Organizes, arms and deploys the RF per the local SOP.

ENCLOSURE (1)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.5 EMPLOY GUARD WEAPONS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is tasked with providing security for nuclear refueling/defueling operations. The guard is armed per the local SOP and encounters tactical circumstances requiring the use of various weapons.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Maintains proficiency with all weapons in the guard inventory.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Selects the proper weapon mix (to include grenades) to resolve the tactical situation.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper employment of all guard weapons under varying tactical circumstances.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Clears malfunctions/stoppages on all weapons in the guard inventory.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates field stripping and proper cleaning procedures of all weapons in the guard inventory.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the proper method of loading and unloading all weapons in the guard inventory.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.6 DEMONSTRATE CRISIS/STRESS SHOOTING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is tasked with providing security for nuclear refueling/defueling operations. Guard members are required to fire weapons while subjected to stress.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proper modern combat shooting techniques with assigned weapons.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates proficient tactical loading and unloading of assigned weapons.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Engages multiple targets balancing movement, speed, and accuracy.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Clears malfunctions under stress with assigned weapons.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Engages multiple targets accurately under stress.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets accurately under low light and no light conditions with assigned weapons.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Completes a failure drill.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Completes a short range timed fire drill.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets while wearing a gas mask.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Fires as a member of a fire team during fire and movement.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates/explains ricochet shooting.

- .12 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates/explains airborne target engagement.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Transitions to a back-up weapon.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.7 EMPLOY DESIGNATED MARKSMAN

CONDITION(S): The guard is given a situation requiring the use of highly accurate rifle fire to eliminate a threat to nuclear refueling/defueling operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ A designated marksman program has been established and maintained.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Fires a minimum of 100 rounds/month to maintain proficiency.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.8 UTILIZE ALARMS

CONDITION(S): An alarm system is utilized per the local requirements.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge of local security alarms used in support of refueling/defueling operations.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Identifies/explains proper response to each type of alarm provided by the local system.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates how to initiate an alarm status check.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.9 CONDUCT NUCLEAR FUELING/DEFUELING OR WEAPONS ACCIDENT PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): During nuclear refueling/defueling operations events occur requiring the guard to respond to various threats of accidents/incidents.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Defines the term nuclear accident.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Explains the mission of the Marine Security Forces during an accident.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates knowledge of local nuclear accident procedures.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Explains the radiological threat (alpha radiation) and demonstrates protective measures.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Establishes the inner perimeter and temporary entry control point.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Identifies Navy emergency response units (ambulance, RADCON team).
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Identifies and explains the purpose of the hotline.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Identifies and explains the chain of command during a nuclear accident.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Selects the proper communication net for use during a nuclear accident.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the use of the nuclear emergency information sheet in a nuclear accident.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.10 CONDUCT COMMUNICATIONS

CONDITION(S): The guard is equipped with communications assets per the local requirements.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates familiarity with local communications assets used by the MCSF.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Uses voice radio transmission procedures effectively.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Selects the proper radio net to be used during logistics moves.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Delivers a proper SALUTE report when the situation dictates.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Changes power supplies per proper procedures in hand-held manpack radios.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Enunciates an alert over voice and radio circuits.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Identifies unit call signs and prowords per the local SOP.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Establishes primary and alternate means of communications for security forces.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Reacts to jamming or interference on a radio net per the proper procedures.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Describes hazards of electromagnetic radiation (HERO).
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Transmits a proper radio message.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.11 EMPLOY THE RESPONSE FORCE ASHORE AND AFLOAT

CONDITION(S): A duress system is established and installed per OPNAV and local requirements. The guard of the day is on duty. Situations arise requiring the activation of the duress system.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Explains/demonstrates the local duress system (physical/verbal/mechanized).
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Reacts appropriately to the alarm/duress code when utilized.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.6.12 RESPOND TO THE THREAT

CONDITION(S): Situations arise requiring the guard of the day to respond to a threat or perceived threat to nuclear refueling/defueling operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures all hands are aware of the threat.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines have recently FAM/qualified with personal weapons.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures personnel are armed and equipped per the local SOP.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures weapons with which Marines are armed are at BZO.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensures reports are completed per the local SOP.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures adequate communications.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Utilizes proper radio procedures.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Meets minimum response time criteria.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the enemy (threat).
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Denies access to or dislodges from the affected security area any authorized personnel.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Treats casualties utilizing the buddy system.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Reacts properly to chemical agents.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Ensures personnel tactically maneuver using terrain and man-made cover and concealment.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a debrief.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

ENCLOSURE (1)

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.7 DENIAL AND RECONNAISSANCE PATROLLING

TASK: 12A.7.1 PLAN PATROLS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit is conducting a security mission and has been tasked with conducting a patrol.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Analyzes the mission and available information to identify specific tasks with respect to the commander's guidance, METT-T, and KOCOA.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Reviews EEFI's and immediately initiates measures to reduce OPSEC indicators.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Uses standardized procedures contained in SOP's to develop a day and night patrol schedule.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Reviews available patrol reports in the area.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Requests available intelligence and combat information on the enemy (threat); his disposition; his capabilities; his intentions; i.e., defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, or delay (DRAW-D); his identified vulnerabilities; the area of operations; and the weather.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Requests aerial imagery and other available special topographic products.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a detailed terrain analysis to highlight military aspects of terrain using KOCOA.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Prepares a detailed description, sketch, or terrain model of routes of advance into the patrol area.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Evaluates the effects of weather and astronomical data on both friendly and enemy (threat) forces; e.g., ambient light levels and trafficability.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates procedures to allow for timely updates on the threat and the weather while on patrol.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Issues commander's planning guidance.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Develops courses of action and estimates of supportability.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Assigns a specific mission and provides required support, personnel, equipment, supplies, and ammunition.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Provides DoD's use of force policy to subordinates.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Specifies adequate control measures; i.e., patrol schedules, specific times of departure, time restrictions, checkpoints, directives, communications procedures, available land NAVAIDS and night movement procedures.
- .16 \_\_\_\_ Identifies available fire support (i.e., air, NGF, artillery, and mortars) and procedures to request these assets.
- .17 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates patrol plan with adjacent units, if required.
- .18 \_\_\_\_ Identifies insertion and extraction means.
- .19 \_\_\_\_ Prepares a patrol operations order.
- .20 \_\_\_\_ Develops a withdrawal plan and plans for other contingencies; e.g., downed aircraft and mass casualties.



EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: The estimate of supportability and patrol operations order can be either written or verbal depending on the situation and time available.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.7.2 PREPARE AND ISSUE A PATROL WARNING ORDER

CONDITION(S): The unit either has developed a patrol schedule or is conducting patrols according to the unit SOP. Subordinate units have been tasked to conduct both reconnaissance and combat patrols. Patrol members have been designated.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Prepares brief statements on the enemy (threat) and friendly situations and capabilities.
- .2    \_\_\_ Clearly states the mission of the patrol.
- .3    \_\_\_ Lists all members of the patrol.
- .4    \_\_\_ Establishes the chain of command.
- .5    \_\_\_ Assigns positions and duties in elements and teams to all patrol members, as required.
- .6    \_\_\_ Covers all necessary individual requirements in the assignment of positions and duties.
- .7    \_\_\_ Follows established principles in organizing the patrol into elements and teams.
- .8    \_\_\_ Assigns a weapon for each patrol member to include the provision for a suppressed weapon capability.
- .9    \_\_\_ Lists all special equipment required to accomplish the mission.
- .10   \_\_\_ Designates the proper element to carry the special equipment.
- .11   \_\_\_ Selects a common uniform and equipment based on weather, terrain, and mission.
- .12   \_\_\_ Publishes a time schedule which includes the date/time of the issuance of the patrol order, the rehearsal, the inspection schedule, and the issuance of supplies, equipment, and weapons.
- .13   \_\_\_ Ensures that all designated patrol members initial the patrol warning order.
- .14   \_\_\_ Issues specific instructions to key individuals to includes duties and responsibilities.
- .15   \_\_\_ Issues warning order within 30 minutes of receiving a warning order from supported unit.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.7.3 ISSUE A PATROL ORDER

CONDITION(S): The patrol leader has issued a patrol warning order to patrol members, completed his patrol order, and is ready to issue the order.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that all patrol members are present prior to issuing the order.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Conducts an orientation briefing for all members prior to issuing the patrol order.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Uses a terrain model, map sketch, or other training aids when briefing the plan.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Provides a weather forecast for the patrol period.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Describes the terrain over which the patrol is to operate.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the size, type, capabilities, suspected locations, and recent activities of enemy (threat) units known or suspected to be in the area of operations.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Provides planned routes of other patrols operating in the immediate area.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Briefs the fire support plan, which includes all available supporting arms, and location of approved targets.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Identifies any attachments to the patrol.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Specifies the patrol mission.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Provides a complete concept of the patrol's operation.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Specifies the task of each element and all key individuals.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Includes all coordinating instructions to include time of departure and return, primary and alternate routes, organization for movement, procedures for crossing danger areas while en route, actions on enemy (threat) contact, actions at rallying points, actions at the objective area, actions at obstacles, emergency extractions, and rules of engagement.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Briefs the patrol in the event of POW capture, injury to personnel, and inadvertent compromise.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Briefs plan for insertion of patrol in detail as a separate annex to the patrol order.
- .16 \_\_\_\_ Specifies times and places of rehearsals and inspections.
- .17 \_\_\_\_ Briefs those administrative and logistics items requiring highlighting not covered in the warning order or not previously mentioned.
- .18 \_\_\_\_ Reviews all signals to be used within the patrol.
- .19 \_\_\_\_ Briefs communications as a separate annex to the patrol order.
- .20 \_\_\_\_ Identifies time and frequency of required reports to higher command element.
- .21 \_\_\_\_ Covers intrapatrol and unit challenge and passwords.
- .22 \_\_\_\_ Specifies the locations of the patrol leader, assistant patrol leader, and element leaders during all stages of the patrol.
- .23 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that all personnel understand the order and are cognizant of their duties and responsibilities.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.7.4 CONDUCT PATROL REHEARSALS

CONDITION(S): The patrol leader has issued his patrol order and has specified an inspection and rehearsal time.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Allots adequate inspection and rehearsal time.
- .2 ☐ Utilizes a premission checklist.
- .3 ☐ Conducts the inspection in the patrol formations after ammunition is distributed and rucksacks/loadbearing equipment (LBE) are packed.
- .4 ☐ Inspects the uniform for completeness and correctness and ensures that clothes fit loosely.
- .5 ☐ Ensures that essential existence/survival equipment is carried separately from the packs.
- .6 ☐ Ensures that documents, CEOI, maps, and notebooks are carried in the same pocket.
- .7 ☐ Checks for the completeness of all equipment necessary to accomplish the mission; e.g., binoculars, night vision goggles, camera, etc.
- .8 ☐ Inspects packs to ensure that no shiny metal is evident, that all snaps and buckles are taped (but not with paper tape), that a waterproof bag lines the inside of the pack, and that items are adjusted for noise discipline.
- .9 ☐ Checks the contents of the pack for compromising information, cigarette lighters, etc.
- .10 ☐ Ensures that grenades are properly carried, taped, and camouflaged with black or olive drab (OD) spraypaint.
- .11 ☐ Test fires all weapons and ensures that all weapons swivels and muzzles are taped and that cleaning equipment is carried.
- .12 ☐ Loads magazines per procedures contained in the unit SOP; e.g., placement of tracers to alert the shooter of number of rounds remaining.
- .13 ☐ Checks to ensure that each patrol has a map and that the maps show an area of 5 to 10 km outside the planned patrol route.
- .14 ☐ Conducts an operational check of communications equipment, presets radio frequencies, inspects spare radio batteries to ensure that they are left in plastic, and ensures that erasers are carried to clean radio and handset terminals.
- .15 ☐ Checks medical supplies and ensures that cough and stomach medicines, water purification tablets, and aspirin are carried.
- .16 ☐ Quizzes patrol members.
- .17 ☐ Places packs in a secure area to prevent tampering.
- .18 ☐ Time permitting, rehearses major actions; e.g., breaking contact, recovery of wounded, actions at the objective, actions at danger areas, reaction to ambush (right, left, front), reaction to contact, and obstacle crossing.
- .19 ☐ Rehearses intrapatrol communications and control measures.
- .20 ☐ Rehearses insertion and extraction procedures.
- .21 ☐ Prepares expedient antennas and rehearses antenna erection.

- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts a ZIPPO brief prior to any planned helicopter insertion.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.7.5 CONDUCT A SECURITY COMBAT PATROL

CONDITION(S): A MCSF unit has been given a mission to conduct a combat patrol; e.g., an ambush or a raid patrol. Enemy (threat) forces are known to be operating in the area in small units, and they have direct and indirect fire, both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and EW capabilities.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses guides, NAVAIDS or other techniques to control movement through the passage point.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains dispersion during the passage of lines, and completes the passage with minimal confusion or delay.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts a security halt after moving from the passage point and establishes communications.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Utilizes control measures: checkpoints, rally points, stand to/stand down, etc.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses patrol routes that avoid civilian centers, roads, trails, etc.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Except as necessary to maintain communications, avoids ridgelines or topographic crests or other terrain features that are natural lines of drift.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains all-around security.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts frequent security halts.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Remains oriented throughout the patrol, and is able to locate the patrol within 200 meters at all times.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Enforces light and noise discipline (no talking, noises, smoking, etc.) throughout the patrol.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that the count is passed forward periodically, after crossing danger areas or obstacles, and after enemy (threat) contact.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Designates rally points frequently or as designated in the patrol order.
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures that all members are informed of rallying points.
- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ Recognizes danger areas and halts the patrol a safe distance away; then provides security and/or support teams to designated Marines reconnoitering the far side.
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ Submits required reports in a detailed and timely manner.
- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Takes immediate action on enemy (threat) contact, as covered in the patrol order.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains control over the patrol during enemy (threat) contact.
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ Uses all fire support means available during enemy (threat) contact.
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ Halts the patrol a safe distance from the tentative objective rally point and sends/takes the pointman forward to check for enemy (threat).
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ Occupies the objective rally point as planned and rehearsed and provides security.
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ Reviews the contingency plan prior to conducting a leader's reconnaissance.

- .22    \_\_\_    Takes appropriate personnel on the leader's reconnaissance;  
              e.g., element leaders and key individuals.
- .23    \_\_\_    Conducts a leader's reconnaissance of the objective  
              and, at a minimum, prepares a sketch.
- .24    \_\_\_    Maintains or ensures communication with the patrol  
              during the leader's reconnaissance.
- .25    \_\_\_    Avoids enemy contact during the conduct of the leader's  
              reconnaissance.
- .26    \_\_\_    Keeps the objective under surveillance by patrol  
              personnel after the leader's reconnaissance.
- .27    \_\_\_    Issues an appropriate FRAGO to element leaders to either  
              change or confirm the plans in the patrol order and  
              allows them time to brief their elements/teams.
- .28    \_\_\_    Employs security teams prior to the assault/support teams  
              for an ambush or at approximately the same time for a raid.
- .29    \_\_\_    Utilizes terrain effectively during the movement to  
              the objective.
- .30    \_\_\_    Maintains stealth during movement to the objective.
- .31    \_\_\_    Exercises positive control over element, teams, and  
              individuals at the objective.
- .32    \_\_\_    Actions at the objective accomplish the mission and  
              are according to the plan as briefed.
- .33    \_\_\_    Employs supporting arms at the objective and during  
              withdrawal.
- .34    \_\_\_    Withdraws from the objective area quickly, quietly,  
              and according to the plan.
- .35    \_\_\_    Reorganizes at the objective rally point in an  
              expeditious and orderly manner and disseminates  
              collected information to all patrol members.
- .36    \_\_\_    Security and stealth override any concern for speed.
- .37    \_\_\_    Rotates the pointman often.
- .38    \_\_\_    Changes direction frequently to confuse anyone who  
              is following.
- .39    \_\_\_    Selects a harbor site away from natural lines of drift.
- .40    \_\_\_    Adheres to the priority of work within the harbor site and  
              establishes an alert plan.
- .41    \_\_\_    Ensures that all patrol members are aware of the  
              evacuation plan from the harbor site.
- .42    \_\_\_    Conducts police calls after rest halts, after chow,  
              at patrol bases, etc., to ensure that no trace of  
              the patrol's presence is left behind.
- .43    \_\_\_    Enforces and supervises personal hygiene measures.
- .44    \_\_\_    Maintains a detailed record of all information  
              collected and reports submitted.
- .45    \_\_\_    Uses proper procedures for security, recognition,  
              etc., when reentering friendly lines.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

TASK: 12A.7.6 CONDUCT PATROL DEBRIEFING

CONDITION(S): A patrol has returned. The intelligence section, if available, assists in the debriefs.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates the debriefing of the recovered patrol with the S2 section, if available.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Uses a post mission checklist.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Debrief concentrates on answering the EEI's of the unit commander.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Conducts a communications debrief.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the entire patrol participates in the debrief.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Provides debriefers with all notes and map notations made during the patrol.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Submits a detailed patrol report within 6 hours after recovery.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Submits film and a film log which includes detailed information concerning the photograph taken during the patrol.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Properly tags and turns over all enemy (threat) material collected on the patrol.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.8 SECURITY FORCE REINFORCEMENT

TASK: 12A.8.1 PLAN FOR A REINFORCEMENT OPERATION

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission. The unit must plan for the operation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Initiates detailed planning upon receipt of the warning order.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Issues a warning order to subordinate units expected to be involved in the reinforcement effort, and provides information copy to higher headquarters. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Analyzes the mission to develop specific tasks.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Reviews EEFI and the vulnerability assessment conducted during contingency planning; and initiates immediate measures to reduce OPSEC indicators.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Reviews existing contingency plans, SOP's, lessons learned, and gathers all available intelligence information.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Requests direct liaison with other outside agencies, as required.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Requests direct liaison authority immediately to identify security procedures, interoperability problems with host nation forces, location of positions, exchange of liaison personnel, communications, logistics requests, and rules of engagement, etc.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Issues commander's guidance.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Develops courses of action and estimates of supportability.

- .10 \_\_\_\_ Arranges for and conducts a leader's reconnaissance.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Uses standardized procedures contained in SOP's and contingency plans to develop the plan.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the DoD use of force policy is implemented.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Produces a detailed plan.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Develops contingency plans.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Estimates of supportability can be either verbal or written.

KEY INDICATORS:

WARNING ORDER

The warning order should at a minimum contain the following information: mission, forces anticipated to become involved, timeline, special instructions, and available information on the area of operations. The warning order should be written, if time permits.

LEADER'S RECONNAISSANCE

If possible, the commander performs a detailed reconnaissance of the area. Based upon this reconnaissance and other information obtained, he analyzes his defensive sector to determine which terrain feature(s) must be controlled to accomplish the mission. After determining key terrain, the commander analyzes the avenues of approach into his sector from all directions. He also analyzes the observation, fields of fire, concealment, cover, and obstacles in the sector. Because of the uniqueness of the mission, he must consider the rules of engagement and plan for procedures which adhere to the rules of engagement while providing for early warning, adequate security, and, most importantly, allow for adequate reaction time.

The planning and coordination for the construction and/or improvement of obstacles and barriers to enhance the defense is also begun.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

The commander coordinates the rules of engagement, and approved entry and exit procedures. These procedures are not limited to, but should include methods for advanced word of official visitors prior to their arrival at the compound, and outline entry/exit checks to be used. If not already in use, the commander should also make known the requirement to temporarily borrow hand-held radios which have approved encryption devices to coordinate this effort. Special orders for the various fighting positions are agreed upon as well as the profile and manning of those positions.

An exchange of liaison personnel, information, and the development of linkage measures must be accomplished. The identification of interoperability problems is key.

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TASK: 12A.8.2 CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE PLANNING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission. The unit must conduct intelligence planning.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Requests intelligence support from higher headquarters. Requests imagery of the target area immediately, and utilizing all available topographic products, conducts a detailed terrain analysis.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Enforces active counterintelligence measures; i.e., enforces strict security, isolates reinforcement force, and ensures classification of details.

- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies requirements for special equipment generated by terrain and weather, especially as it effects the employment of night vision devices, and other observation devices.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Estimates enemy reaction capabilities.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies ITT/CIT requirements.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.8.3 DEVELOP CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission. The unit must develop a concept of operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Integrates available intelligence and combat information into the overall planning process.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Analyzes terrain and determines key terrain and major avenues of approach.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Identifies forces to be involved in the reinforcement operation.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Defines command structure and relationships.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Develops a security plan based on reconnaissance and other information which allows for the control of the assigned objective, and allows for forces to accomplish any other tasks that may become necessary.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Integrates all available fire support means into the defense plan.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Determines requirements for obstacles, antitank/antivehicle defense, and other defensive measures.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes necessary control and communication measures.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Determines administrative and logistics support requirements.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Attempts early coordination with reinforced unit to refine the concept of operations.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Reviews DoD's use of force policy.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Schedules mission brief and rehearsals prior to deployment of forces.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

XII-A-66



TASK: 12A.8.4 TASK ORGANIZE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission.  
The unit must task organize to accomplish the mission.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Organizes according to the mission assigned, the enemy threat, available assets, and policy limitations.
- .2 ☐ Considers special skills and equipment of all units available.
- .3 ☐ Considers liaison personnel for assignment to reinforced unit forces with adequate communications assets.
- .4 ☐ Considers CSS/medical support augmentation with assets for communications.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.8.5 PLAN COMMUNICATIONS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission.  
The unit must plan its communications.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Identifies required communications needs.
- .2 ☐ Plans communications redundancy.
- .3 ☐ Utilizes wire communications extensively in all defensive positions.
- .4 ☐ Employs various types of radios; i.e., UHF, VHF, and HF, with enough redundancy to ensure reliable communications for all long range requirements.
- .5 ☐ Establishes communications with outside agencies as directed.
- .6 ☐ Identifies interoperability problems with reinforced unit.
- .7 ☐ Coordinates with the security force elements to ensure required connectivity is planned.
- .8 ☐ Develops communications contingency plans.
- .9 ☐ Ensures an adequate number of frequencies are allocated.
- .10 ☐ Ensures communications discipline measures are adhered to during planning.
- .11 ☐ Ensures that the communications plan reflects correct key lists and edition numbers, and verifies that units possess them.
- .12 ☐ Plans for HF field expedient antennas.
- .13 ☐ Plans for spare parts to be deployed.
- .14 ☐ Performs communications checks with all elements aboard ship prior to deployment, paying particular attention to those radios deemed critical.
- .15 ☐ Disseminates any special communications to be used between naval forces and the reinforcement force.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.8.6 CONDUCT LOGISTICS PLANNING

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission. The unit must conduct its logistics planning.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Initiates detailed planning upon receipt of the warning order.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Analyzes the mission to develop specific CSS tasks.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Coordinates the size of the security force, type support required, critical weapons systems, special equipment requirements, distances involved, and the anticipated duration of the operation.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Develops a detailed CSS estimate of supportability which compares all CSS related factors influencing each proposed course of action.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Reviews existing contingency plans, SOP's, and lessons learned.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Determines the feasibility of sustainability.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Calculates amounts and types of special Class V support for the security effort and contingency plans.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Develops a medical emergency evacuation plan for the operation.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Ensures adequate communication links and redundancy.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Identifies other peculiar CSS requirements.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: The estimate of supportability can be either written or verbal depending on the situation and time available.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.8.7 PREPARE FOR REINFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission. The unit must prepare for the operation.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Conducts detailed brief on the plan to all key individuals.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Utilizes a terrain model, sketch, or other training aids when briefing the plan.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures all personnel understand the plan and are cognizant of their duties and responsibilities.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Allows an opportunity for questions and comments.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Issues weapons and special equipment, and conducts maintenance checks, LTI's, and conducts preops checks on required special equipment.

- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Commences unit and individual training readiness drills.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Sets battle sights zero (BZO) on all weapons and calibrates those with night vision sights (NVSS) mounted.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts classes for all MCSF personnel on demolition techniques, if time permits.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures all personnel have received training on special equipment, weapons, or ordnance issued.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Advises all personnel of DoD's use of force policy.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts final inspection for all personnel and equipment to ensure prescribed items are available, serviceable, carried correctly, and all personnel understand all requirement aspects of the mission.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.8.8 CONDUCT HELICOPTERBORNE MOVEMENT

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a reinforcement mission. The reinforcement force has been ordered to execute the mission by helicopter. L-hour has been established.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Configures aircraft to conduct preplanned mission (troops, internal cargo, external lift, etc.).
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Completes all preflight requirements prior to scheduled take-off times. (zone inspection, planning, preparation order).
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Conducts a ZIPPO brief to ensure last minute details requiring coordination are discussed face to face between the air and ground commanders. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Stages helicopter teams and conducts final inspection prior to calling the teams away.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Manifests all Marines embarked.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Boards helicopters with minimum delay with each Marine demonstrating a clear understanding of safety procedures.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Exercises communications discipline during flight operations.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Inserts security force into correct landing zone (LZ).
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures Marines deplane quickly, safely, and disperse as helicopter's lift out of zone.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Lifts appropriate representatives in assault lift to initiate LZ control.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: The ZIPPO briefing guide, as follows, should be utilized.

MISSION NO.	_____
UNIT SUPPORTED/CALL SIGN	_____/_____
ALO CALL SIGN	_____
HC(A) CALL SIGN	_____
TAC(A)/AFAC CALL SIGN	_____
HELO TRANSPORT CMDR CALL SIGN	_____
ATTACK HELO FLIGHT COORDINATOR/LEADER CALL SIGN	_____
F/W CALL SIGN NUMBER	_____
AND TYPE OF HELOS	_____/_____

	_____ / _____
	_____ / _____
PICK-UP COORDINATES	_____
LZ DESCRIPTION	_____
DROP COORDINATES	_____
LZ DESCRIPTION	_____
APPROACH/RETIREMENT ROUTES	_____
	_____
	_____
TOTAL TROOPS/HEALTEAM SIZE	_____
INTERNAL CARGO LOADS: TYPE/WEIGHT	_____
EXTERNAL CARGO LOADS: TYPE/WEIGHT	_____
ASSAULT FM	PRI _____ SEC _____
ASSAULT UHF	PRI _____ SEC _____
GROUND TACTICAL/LZ CONTROL	
CALL SIGN	PRI _____ SEC _____
F/W CONTROL FM/UHF	_____ / _____
WEATHER MINIMUMS/ALTERNATE PLAN	_____ / _____
PICK-UP TIME/LATEST ACCEPTABLE	_____ / _____
L-HOUR/LATEST ACCEPTABLE	_____ / _____
ARTY PREP TIME/END OF MISSION	_____ / _____
F/W FLIGHTS/TOS/ORDNANCE	_____ / _____ / _____
F/W CAP/TOS/ORDNANCE	_____ / _____ / _____
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/CLEARANCE	_____ / _____
TO FIRE	_____ / _____
INTELLIGENCE	_____
	_____
	_____
REFUEL	
MIN BINGO	_____ # _____ MINS
MISSION UNDERTAKE	_____ # _____ MINS
LENGTH OF (EST.)	_____ MINS
MEDEVAC	
PRIORITY	_____
PRECEDENCE	_____
RESUPPLY	
INTERNAL EA SORTIE	_____ #WT _____ LIFTS
EXTERNAL	_____ #WT _____ LIFTS

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- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures indirect fire weapons are displaced to the rear to ensure continuous support should penetration occur.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures assault/antitank weapons are emplaced to engage vehicles attacking on avenues of approach.
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures observation posts equipped with long-range observation or direction devices such as NOD's, MULE's, RABFAC beacons, and ground surveillance radar, etc., are established.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Employs ground sensors.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Controls the rooftops within the assigned sector.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Constructs obstacles and barriers both inside and outside buildings, and, if time is available, improve them.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures underground avenues of approach, sewers, utility conduits, etc., are located and obstacles emplaced, areas flooded, search lights installed, etc.
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ Installs wire communications.
- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ Established local security patrols, LP's, and OP's as well as urban checkpoints, if required.
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ Employs snipers effectively.
- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures employment of night vision devices is maximized.
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ Restricts and controls movement of civilians in and around the defensive positions.
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ Attempts to shutdown all movement at night.
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ Enforces strict communications/noise discipline, and ensures all radio transmissions are covered.
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ Schedules countermine sweeps where required.
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ Reinforces positions with sandbags, and screens windows and doors to protect against thrown grenades and other projectiles.
- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ Establishes a reaction force capability.
- .23 \_\_\_\_\_ Disperses logistics installations and material, and places them in covered locations to limit damage and/or destruction.
- .24 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures first aid kits are made individually available as evacuation may be impossible immediately.
- .25 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures individual Marines fully understand DoD's use of force policy.
- .26 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensures fire control procedures are simple, distinctive, and well understood.
- .27 \_\_\_\_\_ Preplans supporting fires, to include attack helicopter and fixed-wing delivered ordnance, if available.
- .28 \_\_\_\_\_ Maintains close liaison with counterintelligence personnel, if available.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

#### DEFENSIVE POSITIONS

If buildings are available for use during security operations, the unit leader is able to ascertain the suitability of a buildings. He selects key buildings for occupation which provide him with the best observation, fields of fire, mutual support, shelter, and communications. An understanding of the different types of construction materials used in buildings is necessary in the building evaluation process.

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1. Concrete Reinforced Buildings. These buildings are the most suitable for defense. Their ceilings have a great resistance which provides increased protection from indirect fires. The exterior walls on this type of building are extremely difficult to breach because of the steel reinforcing bars. The basements in these type buildings are suitable for conversion to covered positions for personnel and storage of supplies. However, concrete reinforced buildings normally require more work to convert them to defensive positions because of the larger window openings and lightly constructed interior walls.
2. Natural Stone and Brick. These buildings are also suitable for defense. The strong walls of larger buildings can normally withstand bombardment. The cellars, however, do not always have the necessary strength to support the rubble and therefore are reinforced with timbers.
3. Half-Timbered Buildings. Half timbered buildings and buildings of wood are the least suitable for defense. Their construction method and combustibility make them a constant danger to the defender.

#### SELECTION OF KILL ZONES

1. In selecting a "kill zone," the small unit leader looks for narrow streets, turns in roads, road intersections (ideally a "T" intersection), bridges, tunnels, split-level roads, crests of hills, and areas where street rubble will channelize or restrict vehicular movement. Antiarmor and antipersonnel weapons positions are selected in conjunction with the "kill zone." The antiarmor weapons positions provide the gunner with a flank, oblique, rear, or top shot. Positions which are obvious and easy to distinguish and designate are avoided. Prior to engaging armor targets, a distraction of some sort is created to attract the armored vehicle crewman's attention. This can be accomplished through the use of various explosives; e.g., hand grenades, claymores, etc. When establishing priority of targets, the small unit leader engages the most dangerous target first. If a tank and a loaded armored personnel carrier appear in the "kill zone," the personnel carrier is engaged first. The reason for this is that the infantry troops of the armored personnel carrier present a potentially greater threat to friendly forces.
2. Establishment and Use of Observation Posts. Observation of the battle area is critical for both the attacker and the defender during combat operations in a build-up area. While elevation over the battle area is important, the small unit leader does not assume that this is an overriding consideration. The small unit leader selects an inconspicuous location that is difficult to designate even when spotted rather than obvious locations which can be expected to be taken under fire by enemy direct and indirect fire weapons. An example of this would be a position located relatively high in a multistory building and several windows in from the corner of the building. Once the position is selected, it is extremely important that communication is established and maintained. Ideally, wire communications are the best and most reliable. During the hours of darkness or reduced visibility, small units defending buildings post listening posts observation posts (LP/OP) in prepared positions, outside of buildings to preclude the enemy from approaching through stealth or surprising the defender. Each morning, all buildings occupied by friendly forces are searched for infiltrators who might have slipped by the LP/OP's during the night.
3. Barricading of Buildings. When conducting a defense in a built-up area, every effort is made to impede and hamper the enemy's movement through the area. In addition to constructing barricades and obstacles outside buildings, the same efforts are employed inside buildings to slowdown and/or to stop personnel movement, if the situation allows. Several techniques can be employed. In unoccupied buildings, doors, and windows are blocked with furniture, concertina wire, etc. The stairwells are removed or blocked. In occupied buildings, the same precautions are taken with the exception that interior passages should not be completely blocked. Specific routes between various floors are designated, and the remainder barricaded. Windows are barricaded or screened to keep out enemy grenades and permit the defender to fire without disclosing his position. Care is taken to barricade other windows in a like manner to avoid giving away occupied positions.

#### RESTRICTION AND CONTROL OF DEFENSIVE AREA

Entry and exit procedures will be rigidly enforced. A system which allows thorough screening and the protection of U.S. personnel and equipment is instituted. This system is three tiered at a minimum. The first tier consists of signs which indicate who may enter, and posts the rates of speed for vehicles approaching the checkpoint. The second tier, the trigger position, is where searches are conducted as well as identification is checked. The third tier is where weapons capable of destroying incoming vehicles are located. Special orders for each post are established. The last tier, however, has the well defined mission to destroy, immediately, any vehicle passing the checkpoint without proper authorization.

ENCLOSURE (1)

XII-A-72

12A.9 ANTITERRORISM

TASK: 12A.9.1 DETERMINE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. The unit must have and understanding of its legal authority and jurisdiction. In the case of Marine Corps units overseas, requirements 12A.9.1.2 and 12A.9.1.3 would not apply.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Determines the authority/jurisdiction over terrorist events based upon geographic location.
- .2 ☐ Understands Secretary of the Navy Instructions 5820.7A.
- .3 ☐ The unit commander and his principal staff understand the jurisdiction of the FBI over terrorist acts within the U.S.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

TASK: 12A.9.2 DEMONSTRATE GENERAL/SPECIAL ORDERS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a security mission. Members of the MCSF Bn demonstrate knowledge of general/specific orders. The guard is at assigned posts/positions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Ensures that NCO's demonstrate knowledge of general orders.
- .2 ☐ Ensures that nonrated Marines demonstrate knowledge of general orders.
- .3 ☐ Publishes unit special orders and promulgates DoD's use of force policy.
- .4 ☐ Ensures that NCO's demonstrate knowledge of special orders.
- .5 ☐ Ensures that nonrated Marines demonstrate knowledge of special orders.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Randomly selected NCO's and nonrated Marines to evaluate knowledge of general and special orders.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

ENCLOSURE (1)

TASK: 12A.9.3 DEVELOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI's BASED UPON THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a security mission. Based on mission requirements, the unit develops appropriate EEI's.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Contacts local law enforcement officials and the Naval Investigative Service to ascertain how they might assist the unit in an antiterrorism role.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that key personnel have appropriate security clearances and access to intelligence information.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that operations and intelligence personnel create a protrait/profile of the terrorist organization(s) in the local or intended area of operations.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Consults open sources to determine additional information on terrorism in the intended area of operations.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Establishes a threat assessment group.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Develops EEI's to fill in knowledge gaps of the terrorist threat in the intended area of operations. The intelligence cycle is employed.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates a general awareness of the nature of terrorism to include weapons and activities.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates a general awareness of terrorist goals.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates a general awareness of the military as a terrorist target.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.9.4 PROCESS ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI's)

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit has been assigned a security mission. Based on mission requirements, the unit has developed appropriate EEI's. The unit now processes the EEI's.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures EEI's have been developed.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures EEI's are under continuous review for applicability, pertinence, and reliability.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that as EEI's are filled they are expeditiously passed to the operational forces.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.9.5 EXECUTE ACTIONS DURING TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION  
(THREATCON) ALPHA

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is operating in an area where there is a possibility of terrorist activity. THREATCON ALPHA has been declared.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Acknowledges declaration of THREATCON ALPHA.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Implements THREATCON ALPHA protective measures. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Implements, if necessary, selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

THREATCON ALPHA

Threatcon ALPHA is declared as a general warning of possible terrorist activity, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, when the circumstances do not justify full implementation of the measures contained in a higher THREATCON. However, it may be necessary to implement selected measures from THREATCON BRAVO.

(Measure 1) At regular intervals, reminds all personnel, including dependents, to be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers; alerts for unidentified vehicles on, or in the vicinity of, U.S. installations; and alerts for abandoned parcels or suitcases or any unusual activity.

(Measure 2) Keeps available at all times the duty security officer, or other appointed personnel, who have access to plans for evacuating buildings and areas in use and for sealing off any areas where an explosion or attack has occurred. Keeps on call key personnel who may be needed to implement security plans.

(Measure 3) Secures buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(Measure 4) Increases security spot checks of vehicles and persons entering the installations and nonclassified areas under the jurisdiction of the US command and agency.

(Measure 5) Limits access points for vehicles and personnel commensurate with a reasonable flow of traffic.

(Measure 6) As a deterrent, apply one of the following measures from THREATCON BRAVO individually and randomly.

1. Secures and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use. (Measure 14)
2. At the beginning and end of each workday and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious activity or packages. (Measure 15)
3. Checks all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. (Advise dependents to check all home deliveries.) (Measure 17)
4. As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents. (Measure 18)

(Measure 7) Reviews all plans, orders, personnel details, and logistic requirements related to the introduction of the higher THREATCON.

(Measure 8) Reviews and implements, as appropriate, security measures for high-risk personnel.

(Measure 9) A spare measure is designated.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

TASK: 12A.9.6 EXECUTE ACTIONS DURING TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION  
(THREATCON) BRAVO

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is operating in an area where there is an increased and predictable threat of terrorist activity.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Acknowledges declaration of THREATCON BRAVO.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Implements THREATCON BRAVO protective measures. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

THREATCON BRAVO

Threatcon BRAVO is declared when there is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.

(Measure 10) Repeats Measure 1 and warns personnel of any other form of attack to be used by terrorists.

(Measure 11) Keeps all personnel involved in implementing antiterrorist contingency plans to call.

(Measure 12) Checks plans for implementation of the measures contained in the next THREATCON.

(Measure 13) Where possible, cars and such objects as crates, trash containers, etc., are to be moved at least 25 meters from buildings, particularly those buildings of a sensitive or prestigious nature. Considers the application of centralized parking.

(Measure 14) Secures and regularly inspects all buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.

(Measure 15) At the beginning and end of each work day and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspects the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages.

(Measure 16) Examines all mail for letter or parcel bombs. (This examination is increased above normal.)

(Measure 17) Checks all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. (Advise dependents to check all home deliveries.)

(Measure 18) As far as resources allow, increases surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other soft targets to improve deterrence and defense and to build confidence among staff and dependents.

(Measure 19) Makes staff and dependents aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.

(Measure 20) At an early stage, informs members of local security committees of any action being taken and why.

(Measure 21) Upon entry of visitors to the unit, physically inspect them and a percentage of their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

(Measure 22) Wherever possible, operates random patrols to check vehicles, people, and buildings.

(Measure 23) Protects off-base military personnel and military transport per prepared plans. Remind drivers to lock parked vehicles and to institute a positive system of checking before they enter and drive a car.

(Measure 24) Implements additional security measures for high-risk personnel, as appropriate.

(Measure 25) Briefs personnel who may augment guard force on use of deadly force.

(Measures 26-29) Spare measures are designated.

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TASK: 12A.9.7 EXECUTE ACTIONS DURING TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION  
(THREATCON) CHARLIE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is operating in an area where a terrorist incident has occurred. THREATCON CHARLIE has been declared.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Acknowledges declaration of THREATCON CHARLIE.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Implements THREATCON CHARLIE protective measures.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: THREATCON CHARLIE is declared when an incident occurs or when intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.

(Measure 30) Continues all BRAVO THREATCON measures or introduce those outstanding.

(Measure 31) Keeps available at their places of duty all personnel who are responsible for implementing antiterrorist plans.

(Measure 32) Limits access points to absolute minimum.

(Measure 33) Strictly enforces control of entry and searches a percentage of vehicles.

(Measure 34) Enforces centralized parking of vehicles away from sensitive buildings.

(Measure 35) Issues weapons to guards. (Local orders should include specific orders on issue of ammunition.)

(Measure 36) Introduces increased patrolling of the installation.

(Measure 37) Protects all designated vulnerable points (VP's) and gives special attention to VP's outside military establishment.

(Measure 38) Erects barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.

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TASK: 12A.9.8 EXECUTE ACTIONS DURING TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION  
(THREATCON) DELTA

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is operating in the immediate area where a terrorist incident has occurred. THREATCON DELTA has been declared.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Acknowledges declaration of THREATCON DELTA.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Implements THREATCON DELTA protective measures. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

THREATCON DELTA

THREATCON DELTA is declared in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized warning.

(Measure 40) Continues or introduces all measures listed for THREATCON BRAVO and CHARLIE.

(Measure 41) Augments guards as necessary.

(Measure 42) Identifies all vehicles already on the installation within operational or mission support areas.

(Measure 43) Searches all vehicles entering the complex or installation as well as vehicles' contents.

(Measure 44) Controls all access and implements positive identification of all personnel.

(Measure 45) Searches all suitcases, briefcases, packages, etc., brought into the complex or installation.

(Measure 46) Takes measures to control access to all areas under the jurisdiction of the US command or agency concerned.

(Measure 47) Makes frequent checks of the exterior of buildings and of parking areas.

(Measure 48) Minimizes all administrative journeys and visits.

(Measure 49) Consults local authorities about closing public (and military) roads and facilities that might make sites vulnerable to terrorist attack.

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TASK: 12A.9.9 UTILIZE OPSEC MEASURES

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission in an area where terrorist actions are possible. The MCSF unit demonstrates utilization of OPSEC measures.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures unit has an OPSEC Plan.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures planned OPSEC measures are understood and demonstrated by individual Marines of the unit.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.9.10 RAISE THE LEVEL OF THREAT AWARENESS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. Terrorist actions are possible. The unit raises the level of threat awareness.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures all personnel are made aware of the terrorist threat in general.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures personnel are made aware of specific threat targeting of people or facilities, as appropriate.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Encourages personnel to learn the preventive measures which they can use to counter the threat.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

ENCLOSURE (1)

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.9.11 EDUCATE PERSONNEL ON ANTI-TERRORISM PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is assigned a security mission. Terrorist actions are possible. Education of personnel is necessary.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Ensures all personnel receive training in crime prevention techniques.
- .2 ☐ Encourages military personnel and dependents to participate in crime watch programs.
- .3 ☐ Ensures all personnel know how to report suspicious activities.
- .4 ☐ Ensures all personnel receive self-protection training.
- .5 ☐ Ensures personnel know how to appear less conspicuous.
- .6 ☐ Stresses precautionary measures to be taken while traveling.
- .7 ☐ Ensures that use of special protective measures are based on the threat.
- .8 ☐ Ensures all personnel know techniques used to survive as a hostage.
- .9 ☐ Ensures all personnel know proper reactions to bomb threats.
- .10 ☐ Ensures all personnel know proper reactions to extortion threats.
- .11 ☐ Ensures all personnel know proper reactions to bombings or assaults.
- .12 ☐ Stresses families to practice personal security.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.9.12 CONDUCT PERSONAL SECURITY ACTIONS TO PROTECT PERSONNEL AT HIGH RISK

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is providing security in an area of possible terrorist activity. Certain personnel are considered to be at high risk. The unit must educate these people on personal security actions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Plans personal security mission carefully in advance.
- .2 ☐ Maintains close and continuous coordination between all agencies involved in a personal security mission.
- .3 ☐ Defines every phase of the security mission.
- .4 ☐ Ensures security measures include protection of temporary living accommodations, when used.
- .5 ☐ Ensures personnel assigned to a team to provide personal security are trained for this type of mission.

- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the team providing personal security is allowed direct access to the person to be protected.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the person to be protected is briefed on the exact nature of the threat.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the person to be protected is briefed on the measures which will be used.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the driver assigned to the person to be protected is trained in evasive driving techniques.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Stresses families to practices personal security.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.9.13 EXECUTE HOSTAGE/BARRICADED SUSPECT PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is performing an assigned security mission. A hostage/barricade situation has developed. The unit takes appropriate action.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures plans/SOP's emphasize priority for safety of hostages and other persons involved.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures sequence of actions to be conducted when terrorist hostage/barricade situation occurs are specified.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures actions to be taken by the initial response force are contained in the SOP.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures all sentries and/or military police patrols not directly involved with the initial response remain in their assigned areas.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the inner perimeter security element establishes the inner perimeter.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the outer perimeter security element establishes the outer perimeter.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Notify the FBI/host nation that a hostage incident has occurred.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Supports the FBI/host nation force in cases where they assume control of the situation.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that in the event, FBI or host nation declines jurisdiction the military commander takes steps to resolve the situation.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that a course of action involving appropriate level of force is decided upon.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ On order, the Crisis Management Plan is implemented.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ TMF activated and deploys to scene of the incident.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ FBI/host nation force is supported in cases where they assume control of the situation.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Encourage families to establish family security procedures.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

ENCLOSURE (1)

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.9.14 PREPARE FOR THE THREAT OF MOBILE BOMBS

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit is providing security in an area of possible terrorist activity. The threat of mobile bombs has increased. Appropriate precautions are required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the threat assessment group develops EEI's to assess potential threat for mobile bomb use by terrorists.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures specific intelligence agencies are tasked to satisfy the EEI's developed.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Determines the vulnerability of the unit area/installation to attack by mobile bomb.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Reviews physical security measures in effect which provide protection against vehicle bombs.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Determines physical security measures which need improvement or need to be implemented.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Determines improvements to physical security which can be made with local assets.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that improvements to physical security which cannot be made with existing assets are contracted for or requested from higher headquarters.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Monitors and supervises all actions underway to improve physical security.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Stringent program is in effect to control vehicle decals (including issuance, monitoring, and recovery).

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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12A.10 WEAPONS PERFORMANCE EXERCISES

TASK: 12A.10.1 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE M16A2 RIFLE

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned the M16A2 rifle as their personal weapon. Demonstrated proficiency is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Identifies the four safety rules.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Performs operator maintenance on M16A2 rifle, magazine, and ammunition.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Loads, reduces a stoppage, and clears the M16A2 rifle.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Sets battle sight zero an M16A2 rifle.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Qualifies with the M16A2 rifle.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Performs limited visibility techniques.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Performs mounting and dismounting a night vision sight on an M16A2 rifle.

- .8 \_\_\_\_ Zeroes a night vision sight when mounted on the M16A2 rifle.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the service rifle using night vision sight.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the service rifle using night vision device.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the service rifle using field firing techniques.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Loads weapon to Condition 1. (KI)
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Loads weapon to Condition 3. (KI)
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Unloads weapon to Condition 4. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: Condition 1: A round in the chamber, fully loaded magazine in magazine well, bolt forward, safety engaged.

Condition 3: Fully loaded magazine in magazine well, no rounds in the chamber, hammer forward.

Condition 4: No rounds in the chamber, no rounds in magazine well, hammer forward, safety engaged.

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TASK: 12A.10.2 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE .45 CAL. PISTOL

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned the .45 cal. pistol as their personal weapon. Demonstrated proficiency is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Inspects the service pistol.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the service pistol.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Qualifies with the service pistol.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Simulates immediate action.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Loads the weapon to Condition 1. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Loads the weapon to Condition 3. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Unloads the weapon to Condition 4. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets with the service pistol using the Weaver stance and grip.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Engages targets with the service pistol at varying distances during low-light and nighttime.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Engages single and multiple targets with the service pistol at varying distances using the weak hand only.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: Condition 1: A round in the chamber, fully loaded magazine in magazine well, hammer cocked, safety engaged.

Condition 3: Fully loaded magazine in magazine well, no rounds in chamber, hammer forward.

Condition 4: No rounds in the chamber, no rounds in the magazine well, hammer forward, safety engaged.

ENCLOSURE (1)



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TASK: 12A.10.3 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE SHOTGUN

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned the shotgun as their personal weapon.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_ Performs inspection of the shotgun.
- .2    \_\_\_ Names the parts of the shotgun.
- .3    \_\_\_ Fieldstrips and reassembles the shotgun.
- .4    \_\_\_ Conducts a function check of the shotgun.
- .5    \_\_\_ Demonstrates and explains the four readiness conditions of the shotgun.
- .6    \_\_\_ Loads the shotgun with four rounds into Condition 1. (KI)
- .7    \_\_\_ Loads the shotgun with four rounds into Condition 3. (KI)
- .8    \_\_\_ Unloads a loaded shotgun to Condition 4. (KI)
- .9    \_\_\_ Unloads a shotgun in Condition 3 to Condition 4. (KI)
- .10   \_\_\_ Fires one round from the shotgun and cycles the action immediately after firing the weapon.
- .11   \_\_\_ Performs preventive maintenance on the shotgun.
- .12   \_\_\_ Performs immediate action on the shotgun.
- .13   \_\_\_ Identifies the four most common malfunctions of the shotgun.
- .14   \_\_\_ Clears the shotgun.
- .15   \_\_\_ Conducts familiarization firing with the M590 shotgun.
- .16   \_\_\_ Engages single and multiple targets with the shotgun at varying distances.
- .17   \_\_\_ Engages targets with the shotgun at varying distances during low-light and nighttime.
- .18   \_\_\_ Engages single and multiple targets with the shotgun at varying distances using the weak hand only.
- .19   \_\_\_ Performs immediate action on the shotgun.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: Condition 1: A round in the chamber, fully loaded magazine, bolt forward, safety engaged.

Condition 3: Fully loaded magazine, no rounds in the chamber, hammer forward.

Condition 4: No rounds in the chamber, no rounds in the magazine, safety engaged.

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TASK: 12A.10.4 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE M203 GRENADE LAUNCHER

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned the M203 grenade launcher as their personal weapon. Demonstrated proficiency is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Inspects the grenade launcher.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the grenade launcher.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Zeroes the grenade launcher.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the grenade launcher.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target using limited visibility techniques.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Performs immediate action.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Loads weapon to Condition 1. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Unloads the weapon to Condition 4. (KI)
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Clears the M203 grenade launcher.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Conducts familiarization fire with the M203 grenade launcher.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: Condition 1: A round in the chamber.

Condition 4: No round in the chamber.

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TASK: 12A.10.5 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE M249 SQUAD AUTOMATIC WEAPON (SAW)

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned the M249 (SAW). Demonstrated proficiency is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Inspects the M249 squad automatic weapon.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the M249 squad automatic weapon.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Zeroes the M249 squad automatic weapon.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Field zeroes the M249 squad automatic weapon.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Qualifies with the M249 (SAW) using the night vision sight.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the M249 (SAW) using night vision sight.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the M249 (SAW) using limited visibility techniques.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Clears the M249 (SAW).
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Conducts familiarization firing with the M249 (SAW).

ENCLOSURE (1)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.6 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE SHOULDER-LAUNCHED MULTIPURPOSE ASSAULT WEAPON (SMAW)

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned the SMAW. Demonstrated proficiency is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Inspects the SMAW.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the SMAW.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the SMAW training and noise simulator.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the SMAW tactical or practice round.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Simulates immediate action for a SMAW spotting rifle.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Simulates immediate action for a SMAW launcher.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the SMAW using a night vision sight.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.7 DEMONSTRATE PROFICIENCY WITH THE M2.50 CAL MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): Members of the unit are assigned to a M2 .50 cal. machine gun. Demonstrated proficiency is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Inspects the M2 machine gun.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the M2 machine gun.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Mounts and emplaces the M2 machine gun on the ground.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Constructs an M2 a machine gun position.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Mounts the M2 machine gun on a vehicle.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Sets head space and timing.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Zeroes the M2 machine gun.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Lays the M2 machine gun.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Prepares a range card for the M2 machine gun.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Fires the M2 machine gun.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Qualities with the M2 machine gun.

ENCLOSURE (1)

- .12 \_\_\_\_ Engages a target with the M2 machine gun using a night vision sight.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ Simulates immediate action on the M2 machine gun.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Maintains the night vision sight.
- .15 \_\_\_\_ Loads the M2 machine gun to Condition 1. (KI)
- .16 \_\_\_\_ Unloads the M2 machine gun to Condition 4. (KI)
- .17 \_\_\_\_ Clears the M2 machine gun.
- .18 \_\_\_\_ Conducts familiarization firing with the M2 machine gun.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: Condition 1: A round in the chamber, bolt forward, safety engaged.

Condition 4: No round in the chamber, bolt forward, safety engaged.

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TASK: 12A.10.8 PERFORM M60 MACHINE GUN DRILL

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is preparing for security/tactical operations. The squad has completed its movement and initial preparation and has begun rehearsing its actions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

Machine gun team members must:

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Possess correct equipment. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate their knowledge of the M60 machine gun by verbally explaining what they are looking for when examining the equipment.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Report any discrepancies that cannot be corrected by the team.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Position and place the M60 machine gun in action within 90 seconds. Start: Assistant gunner places tripod in the direction of fire.  
Stop: Gunner reports, "Gun up."
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Execute the change of barrels using the correct procedures within 25 seconds.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Take the M60 machine gun out of action.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Live ammunition is NEVER used in gun drill.

KEY INDICATORS:

EQUIPMENT

Squad Leader: Binoculars and compass.

Team Leader: Tripod and one bandoleer of dummy, blank, or expended ammunition.

Gunners: Machine gun with pintle and platform group attached, one bandoleer of dummy, blank, or expended ammunition, and combination wrench.

Ammunition Bearer: Spare barrel, case, traversing and elevating mechanism, and one box of dummy, blank, or expended ammunition.

ENCLOSURE (1)

TASK: 12A.10.9 CLEAR MALFUNCTIONS AND STOPAGES

CONDITION(S): A machine gun team is placed in action and the team is in position to fire the gun. The evaluation can occur during daylight or under limited visibility conditions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

Machine gun team members must:

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate correct immediate action procedures to reduce stoppages.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate the correct procedures to use to remedy sluggish operation of a machine gun.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate the correct procedures to stop a runaway machine gun.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluator has team members rotate duties until all Marines have demonstrated their knowledge of reducing malfunctions and stoppages.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

TASK: 12A.10.10 CONDUCT FIELD ZEROING OF THE M60 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is preparing for security/tactical operations. The squad has completed its movement and initial preparation and has begun rehearsing its actions. Each team has been provided with three six-round belts of ammunition.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the ability to estimate range to within 50 meters.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Completes field zeroing using not more than one six-round belt of ammunition.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Confirms the field zeroing by firing the second six-round belt of ammunition.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Completes the field zeroing after firing a third six-round belt of ammunition.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

TASK: 12A.10.11 PERFORM PREDETERMINED TARGET ENGAGEMENT FROM THE TRIPOD (M60 MG)

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad is on the move and is tasked to fire on a number of targets using the M122 tripod. Each team is provided with a 50-round belt of ammunition.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_    Selects firing positions that separate the guns by  
          a minimum distance of 35 meters.
  
- .2    \_\_\_    Places the guns into position, issues fire commands,  
          and fires the first round within 45 seconds after alert.
  
- .3    \_\_\_    Engages a wide target of at least 50 mils in width  
          at a range in excess of 400 meters with six-round  
          bursts, firing approximately 30 rounds.
  
- .4    \_\_\_    Ensure the squad leader, on command, shifts fire  
          to successfully engage an oblique target of at  
          least 50 mils in width at a range in excess of 400  
          meters, engaging it with six-round bursts, firing  
          approximately 30 rounds.
  
- .5    \_\_\_    Ensure the squad leader, on command, shifts fire to  
          successfully engage a column-type target which is  
          more than 200 meters in depth at a range in excess  
          of 400 meters, engaging it with six-round bursts,  
          firing until the original belt fires out.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: This task is evaluated three times, once with each belt of ammunition. One of these repetitions is fired with all team members masked simulating an NBC environment. Evaluator can eliminate the ammunition limit and number of rounds to engage the targets (but not the burst size) if in his opinion the range does not allow for grazing fire.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.12 CONDUCT A FIELD FIRING ENGAGEMENT OF PREDETERMINED TARGETS (M60 MG)

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad has been emplaced in a defensive position.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_    Ensure team leaders prepare rough terrain sketches (range  
          cards) within 45 minutes based on the sector limits, final  
          protective fires, and predetermined targets provided by  
          the squad leader to include the T&E data for each.
  
- .2    \_\_\_    Ensure team leaders prepare partially completed range cards  
          for supplementary positions.
  
- .3    \_\_\_    Lays guns on FPL or PDF when cards have been completed.
  
- .4    \_\_\_    Delivers final protective fires per SOP or at the rapid rate  
          for a full 2 minutes followed by the sustained rate until  
          cease-fire command is given.
  
- .5    \_\_\_    Ensure targets are covered by the beaten zone of the  
          fire delivered.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.13 DELIVER OVERHEAD FIRE WITH THE M60 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/offensive operations. The squad has been tasked to deliver overhead fire.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Estimates range to within 50 meters.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Selects a safety limit after the exact positions of the guns have been established and identifies a readily identifiable terrain feature which corresponds to the safety limit.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Delivers effective overhead fire until friendly troops reach the safety limit on the ground, ceasing or shifting fires, as directed.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Prepares a sketch of the overhead fire situation.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Employs overhead fire in a safe and controlled manner, using the tripod depression stops, observing the safety limit, and not firing if the gun-target range exceeds the maximum effective range of the gun.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.14 CONDUCT A FIELD FIRING ENGAGEMENT USING A VEHICLE MOUNT (M60 MG)

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad is tasked to fire on three targets using a vehicle mount. All targets are at ranges greater than 400 meters. Each team is provided with a 50-round belt of ammunition.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Engages the initial target within 30 seconds after loading.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Shifts fire on command to two additional targets after effectively engaging a target.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the ability to deliver controlled fire onto each target in three to five round bursts, whose beaten zones impact on each target safely and within the 50-round allocation.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.15 DELIVER DEFILADE FIRE WITH THE M60 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad has been tasked to deliver fire from defilade.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Selects suitable defilade (i.e., maximum, minimum, or partial defilade positions) based on the situation and terrain available.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Establishes minimum mask clearances (minimum elevation) for the entire sectors of fire or for each individual target.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Lays the machine guns for direction.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Lays the machine guns for elevation.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Adjusts fire and designates targets.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Engages the targets successfully.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.16 SELECT AND PREPARE M60 MACHINE GUN POSITIONS

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad or section has had primary, alternate, and supplementary firing positions designated. The machine gun teams are preparing to occupy these positions using the M122 tripod.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensure squad leader designates the exact primary firing positions for each machine gun, assigning sectors of fire and final protective line (FPL) or principal direction of fire (PDF).
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensure squad leader designates the exact alternate positions for both machine gun teams from which the assigned sector can be covered.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Lays machine guns immediately to cover the sector.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Prepare primary positions for machine gun teams, using available materials, including overhead protection and camouflage, and draw up range cards.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensure squad leader identifies two supplementary positions where he would likely emplace his machine guns as dictated by probable changes in the machine gun mission.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensure positions are completed, range cards submitted, and machine guns are laid in on the FPL or PDF within 4 hours of the command to begin.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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TASK: 12A.10.17 CONDUCT AERIAL GUNNERY WITH THE M60 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): The machine gun section is supporting security/tactical operations. Threat forces have rotary and fixed-wing aircraft as well as RPV's. The machine gun teams have been assigned sectors of scan. The hostile criteria, weapons control status, and air defense warnings are established. Enemy aircraft are approaching friendly units.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Assigns a primary and secondary sector of fire for each machine gun team.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Estimates range in which hostile aircraft are entering the maximum effective range.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Determines a point of aim, and line and lead angle depending on the type aircraft engaged.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Adjusts fire as necessary based on observation of the tracer stream.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Fires guns continuously throughout the engagement.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Engages the target aircraft successfully.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.18 CONDUCT QUALIFICATION FIRING ON THE 12.7 METER TARGET WITH THE M60 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): The machine gun section is preparing to support security/tactical operations. The machine gun teams have zeroed their guns and are prepared to fire on a 12.7 meter course. Each machine gun team is provided four 6-round belts, one 30-round belt, and two 48-round belts.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

Team number one:

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Achieves expert gunner.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Achieves first class gunner.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Achieves second class gunner.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Team is unqualified.

Team number two:

- .5 \_\_\_\_ Achieves expert gunner.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Achieves first class gunner.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Achieves second class gunner.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Team is unqualified.

Team number three:

- .9 \_\_\_\_ Achieves expert gunner.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Achieves first class gunner.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ Achieves second class gunner.

- .12    \_\_\_\_    Team is unqualified.  
  
                 Team number four:
- .13    \_\_\_\_    Achieves expert gunner.
- .14    \_\_\_\_    Achieves first class gunner.
- .15    \_\_\_\_    Achieves second class gunner.
- .16    \_\_\_\_    Team is unqualified.  
  
                 Team number five:
- .17    \_\_\_\_    Achieves expert gunner.
- .18    \_\_\_\_    Achieves first class gunner.
- .19    \_\_\_\_    Achieves second class gunner.
- .20    \_\_\_\_    Team is unqualified.  
  
                 Team number six:
- .21    \_\_\_\_    Achieves expert gunner.
- .22    \_\_\_\_    Achieves first class gunner.
- .23    \_\_\_\_    Achieves second class gunner.
- .24    \_\_\_\_    Team is unqualified.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:    FMFM 6-4A and OH 6-9 provide amplifying details.  
For each machine gun team there should be one "Y" and three "NE" marks.  
The "Y" will signify the level of qualification for the team.

KEY INDICATORS:    None.

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TASK:    12A.10.19    CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE, SELECTION, AND OCCUPATION OF  
60 MM MORTAR POSITIONS

CONDITION(S):    The 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical  
operations.    An area for the establishment of a mortar position and a  
sector of fire has been designated.

STANDARDS:    EVAL:    Y; N; NE

                 Section leader:

- .1    \_\_\_\_    Conducts a reconnaissance of the assigned area and  
                 considers position selection criteria and time  
                 requirements for site preparation.    (KI)
- .2    \_\_\_\_    Evaluates the factors of METT-T in determining which  
                 formation to use in a given firing position.  
  
                 Mortar section:
- .3    \_\_\_\_    Checks the position and the immediate vicinity for  
                 mines, NBC contamination, and enemy forces.
- .4    \_\_\_\_    Conducts a rapid measurement of mask clearance and  
                 overhead obstruction.
- .5    \_\_\_\_    Prepares a section overlay, selecting targets within  
                 the sector; plotlines them with target numbers; and  
                 illustrates the FPF.
- .6    \_\_\_\_    Establishes local security.

- .7    \_\_\_\_ Ensures section is ready to fire within 7 minutes after arrival in position.
- .8    \_\_\_\_ Digs in the weapons and camouflages the positions.
- .9    \_\_\_\_ Ensures section leader and Marines not assigned within the mortar pits prepare and camouflage fighting holes.
- .10   \_\_\_\_ Prepares alternate and supplementary positions as time permits.
- .11   \_\_\_\_ Completes mortar section position within 4 hours.  
  
         Prior to displacing:
- .12   \_\_\_\_ Retrieves wire, claymores, trip flares, etc.
- .13   \_\_\_\_ Inspects mortar position for documents, overlays, litter, and anything that may compromise security.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:    None.

KEY INDICATORS:

POSITION SELECTION CRITERIA

With mission accomplishment the most important factor, mortar firing positions are selected based on:

- 1.    Tactical situation
- 2.    Range criteria
- 3.    Survivability
- 4.    Surface conditions
- 5.    Communications
- 6.    Routes
- 7.    Overhead and mask clearance

---

TASK: 12A.10.20 CONDUCT 60 MM MORTAR PREFIRE SAFETY CHECKS

CONDITION(S): The 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. The mortar section is in position and the guns have been mounted and laid. The guns are ready for action following the prefire safety checks.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_\_ Conducts a mask clearance and overhead interference check for each mortar using the deliberate method of measurement.
- .2    \_\_\_\_ Locks the tubes to the baseplate and ensures that the open ends of the socket cap are pointed in the direction of fire.
- .3    \_\_\_\_ Inspects the tube and swabs the bore.
- .4    \_\_\_\_ Secures the yoke coupling.
- .5    \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the bipod leg cable is taut.

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- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the locking sleeve nut is handtight.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Inspects the ammunition.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Ensures that the weapon is on drop fire.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Completes all of the safety checks within 2 minutes with no errors.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.10.21 REMOVE A 60 MM MORTAR MISFIRE

CONDITION(S): The mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations and a misfire has occurred.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Handles misfires correctly.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Completes the required sequence of action correctly and within 5 minutes.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: All members of the squad are required to demonstrate their knowledge per the procedures contained in FM 23-36.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.22 MOUNT AND LAY THE 60 MM MORTAR FOR DIRECTION (DIRECTIONAL STAKES)

CONDITION(S): The 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. A mortar position has been selected and is ready for occupation. Premount checks have been made and the squad leader has emplaced the base plate stake and the direction stake.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Assembles the mortar correctly within 90 seconds and meets the safety criteria.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures vertical crosshair of the sight is within 2 mils of the left edge of the directional stake.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensures deflection setting is 3200 mils and the elevation setting is 1100 mils.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensures both leveling bubbles are centered and the tube is positioned at center traverse (within two turns).

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Vertical crosshair on the sight reticle is to be positioned on the left edge of the directional stake with all bubbles level.

ENCLOSURE (1)

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.23 FIRE REGISTRATION AND ADJUST A PARALLEL SHEAF WITH THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): The 60 mm mortar section is in support of security/tactical operations. The section is required to register and adjust a parallel sheaf. The section is in established positions. A registration point has been identified.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Adjusts and records firing data in the registration point within 12 minutes.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures the last adjusting round hits within 25 meters of the registration point.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Makes parallel sheaf adjustments in another 12 minutes.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Completes the task within an allocation of 5 WP rounds and 10 HE rounds.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.10.24 HIT AN AREA TARGET WITH THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): A 60 mm mortar section is supporting tactical operations. The section is in prepared positions. An area target has been identified by an FO and a call for fire is initiated.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Fires the first adjustment round within 3 minutes after receipt of the call for fire.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures section fires for effect within 12 minutes of receiving the call for fire.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Fires for effect hit within the target area.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Completes the task within an allocation of 5 WP and 10 HE rounds.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.25 SHIFT FIRE TO AN AREA TARGET WITH THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): A 60 mm mortar section is supporting tactical operations. The section is firing from prepared positions. The section has just completed fires for effect and a second target has been identified within 400 meters of the last target. The FO has requested a shift fire mission.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Fires for effect on the second target within 3 minutes of the request.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Fires for effect hit within target area.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Completes the task within an allocation of 10 HE rounds.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.26 CONDUCT ADJUSTMENT OF A FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRE WITH THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): The 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. The section is in prepared positions. An FO has been given the grid of an assigned FPF not more than 100 meters forward of friendly troops (simulated).

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Makes all adjustments within 20 minutes.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures final adjusting round lands within 25 meters of the target.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Uses the creeping method to adjust onto the target.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Completes the task within an allocation of 5 WP rounds and 10 HE rounds.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.27 FIRE PROTECTIVE FIRE WITH THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): A 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. The section is in prepared positions. The unit commander has called for the FPF to be fired.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Fires the first rounds within 30 seconds after the call.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Fires for effect hit within the target area.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.28 HIT AN AREA TARGET WITHOUT AN FDC WHILE EMPLOYING THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): A 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. The section is in the process of occupying a new position. The FDC is not established. The squad leader moves to a position within 100 meters of the gun target line.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Fires the first adjusting rounds after receipt of the fire mission.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures section fires for effect within 8 minutes of the receipt of the mission.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Fires for effect hit within the target area.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Completes the task within an allocation of 5 WP rounds and 10 HE rounds.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.29 PROVIDE BATTLEFIELD ILLUMINATION WITH THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): A 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. The section is firing from prepared positions. The section is prepared to support operations under limited visibility conditions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Delivers illumination over the designated target within 4 minutes of request.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains illumination on a continuous basis for 2 minutes.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: This task can be evaluated during the conduct of other tasks. A maximum of 10 illuminated rounds is allocated for this mission.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.30 SCREEN FRIENDLY MOVEMENT WITH SMOKE UTILIZING THE 60 MM MORTAR

CONDITION(S): A 60 mm mortar section is supporting security/tactical operations. The section is firing from prepared positions. The section has received a call for fire to screen the movement of friendly troops with smoke. An area of about 100 meters wide must be screened. One minute of obscuration is required.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Establishes an effective screen within 12 minutes of the request for fire.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Maintains an effective screen for 1 minute.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Completes the task within an allocation of 10 WP rounds.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.31 PERFORM MK 19 GUN DRILL

CONDITION(S): A MK 19 squad is preparing for security/tactical operations. The squad has completed its movement and initial preparation and has begun rehearsing its actions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

MK 19 squad members:

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Possess correct equipment. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate their knowledge by verbally explaining what they are looking for when examining the equipment.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Report any discrepancies that cannot be corrected by the team.

- .4 \_\_\_\_ Position and place the machine gun in action within 90 seconds. Start: Assistant gunner places tripod in the direction of fire. Stop: Gunner reports, "Gun up".
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Take the machine gun out of action.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Live ammunition is NEVER used in gun drill.

KEY INDICATORS:

EQUIPMENT

Team Leader: MK 19, binoculars, and compass.

Assistant Gunner: Tripod and one box of dummy or expended ammunition.

Ammunition Bearer: Equipment bag, cradle, and traversing and elevating mechanism, and one box of dummy or expended ammunition.

---

TASK: 12A.10.32 CLEAR MK 19 MALFUNCTIONS AND STOPPAGES

CONDITION(S): A machine gun team is placed in action and the team is in position to fire the gun. The evaluation can occur during daylight or under limited visibility conditions.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

Machine gun team members:

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate correct immediate action procedures to reduce stoppages.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate the correct procedures to use to remedy sluggish operation of a gun.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate the correct procedures to stop a runaway machine gun.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: Evaluator has team members rotate duties until all Marines have demonstrated their knowledge of reducing malfunctions and stoppages.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.33 FIELD ZEROING OF THE MK 19 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A MK 19 squad is preparing for security/tactical operations. The squad has completed its movement and initial preparation and has begun rehearsing its actions. Each team has been provided with three 6-round belts of ammunition.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

Machine gun team members:

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Demonstrate the ability to estimate range to within 50 meters.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Complete field zeroing using not more than one 6-round belt of ammunition.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Confirm the field zeroing by firing the second 6-round belt of ammunition.



- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Complete the field zeroing after firing a third 6-round belt of ammunition.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.34 PERFORM TARGET ENGAGEMENT OF PREDETERMINED TARGETS FROM THE TRIPOD WITH THE MK 19 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A MK 19 squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad is tasked to fire on a number of targets using the M3 tripod. Each team is provided with a 50-round belt of ammunition.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure team leaders prepare rough terrain sketches (range cards) within 45 minutes based on the sector limits, final protective fires, and predetermined targets provided by the squad leader to include the T&E data for each.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure team leaders prepare partially completed range cards for supplementary positions.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Lay machine guns on FPS or PDF after cards have been completed.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Delivers fires within 45 seconds on a target located in excess of 500 meters distant after receiving a fire command, using six-round bursts with 2 mil shifts in elevation and deflection after each burst.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Cover target with the beaten zone of the fires delivered.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: This task is evaluated three times, each time with a 50-round belt of ammunition: once during the daylight, once during nighttime, and once in a masked NBC environment.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.35 DELIVER OVERHEAD FIRE WITH THE MK 19 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/offensive operations. The squad has been tasked to deliver overhead fire.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Demonstrates the ability to estimate range to within 50 meters.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Selects a safety limit after the exact positions of the machine guns have been established and identifies a readily identifiable terrain feature which corresponds to the safety limit.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Delivers effective overhead fire until friendly troops reach the safety limit on the ground, ceasing or shifting fires, as directed.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Prepares a sketch of the overhead fire situation.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Employs overhead fire in a safe and controlled manner, using the tripod depression stops, observing the safety limit, and not firing if the gun-target range exceed the maximum effective range exceeds the maximum effective range of the guns.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.36 CONDUCT FIELD FIRING ENGAGEMENT USING A VEHICLE MOUNT (MK 19 MG)

CONDITION(S): A MK 19 squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad is tasked to fire on three targets using a vehicle mount. All targets are at a range greater than 400 meters. Each team is provided with a 50-round belt of ammunition.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Engages the initial target within 30 seconds after loading.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Effectively engage a target and on command shift to two additional targets.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Delivers controlled fire onto each target in three to five round bursts, the beaten zones impact on each target safely, and within the 50-round allocation.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.37 DELIVER DEFILADE FIRE WITH THE MK 19 MACHINE GUN

CONDITION(S): A machine gun squad is supporting security/tactical operations. The squad has been tasked to deliver fire from defilade.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Selects suitable defilade (i.e., maximum, minimum, or partial defilade) positions based on the situation and terrain available.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Establishes minimum mask clearances (minimum elevation) for the entire sectors for the entire sectors of fire or for each individual target.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Lays the machine guns for direction.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Lays the machine guns for elevation.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Adjusts fire and designates targets.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Engages the targets successfully.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

---

TASK: 12A.10.38 SELECT AND PREPARE MK 19 MACHINE GUN POSITIONS

CONDITION(S): A MK 19 squad or section has had primary, alternate, and supplementary firing positions designated. The machine gun teams are preparing to occupy these positions using the M3 tripod.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensures squad leader designates the exact primary firing positions for each gun, assigning sectors of fire and FPL or PDF.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensures squad leader designates the exact alternate positions for both gun teams from which the assigned sector can be covered.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Lay machine guns to immediately cover the sector.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Prepare primary positions for machine gun teams, using available materials, include overhead protection and camouflage, and draw up range cards.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensure squad leader identifies two supplementary positions where he would likely emplace his guns as dictated by probable changes in the machine gun mission.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensure positions are completed, range cards are submitted, and machine guns are laid in on the FPL or PDF within 4 hours of the command to begin.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.39 EMPLOY MACHINE GUNS IN THE DEFENSE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit with organic or attached machine guns is conducting defensive operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns missions to machine gun squads.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander designates primary and alternate firing positions for each machine gun squad that allow the squad to cover the primary infantry avenues of approach and to employ grazing fire as close to the maximum range of 700 meters as possible.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander defines each machine gun squad's area of responsibility by assigning a sector of fire to each squad that does not exceed 800 mils (45 degrees) and that overlaps the adjacent machine gun squad's sector of fire.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns an FPL to each squad that comprises the rear boundary of its sector, maximizes flanking fires, allows machine gun fire to interlock, provides mutual support between units, and minimizes dead space.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns a principal direction of fire, when terrain or mission does not permit effective FPL's, to each squad that falls within the sector of fire or compromises either of its boundaries.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander identifies supplementary positions in which to emplace his squads in order to accomplish other defensive missions.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander ensures positions are completed, range cards are submitted, and guns are laid in on the FPL or PDF within 4 hours of the command to begin.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

POSITION SELECTION CRITERIA

With mission accomplishment the most important factor, machine gun firing positions are selected to provide:

1. Fields of fire.
2. Observation of friendly maneuver units.
3. Direct fire without premature masking.
4. Cover and/or concealment.
5. Covered routes for occupation and resupply.
6. Sufficient space to allow dispersing the weapons with at least 35 meters between weapons.
7. Availability and accessibility of alternate positions.
8. Local security.

---

TASK: 12A.10.40 EMPLOY MACHINE GUNS IN THE OFFENSE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit with organic or attached machine guns is conducting offensive operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns missions to machine gun squads.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander initially positions squads near LD/LC or moves them forward to occupy initial positions that allow machine guns to provide effective supporting fire to the company along the route of movement of the company and, if possible, at the objective.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander displaces machine gun squads forward to new positions by echelon in order to provide continuous support.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander displaces machine gun squads forward when objective is seized to aid in consolidation or shifts fires to new targets to support other missions.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns each machine gun squad an area target to engage. Point targets are assigned only when more suitable weapons are not available.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.41 EMPLOY MK MACHINE GUNS IN THE DEFENSE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit with attached MK 19 machine guns is conducting defensive operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns missions to MK machine gun squads.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander designates primary and alternate firing positions for each MK 19 machine gun squad that allow the squad to cover the primary enemy avenues of approach with fire as close to the maximum effective range of 1500 meters as possible. He assigns areas that cannot be engaged by direct fire (dead space) to the MK 19 machine gun squads.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander defines each MK 19 machine gun squad's area of responsibility by assigning a sector of fire to each squad that does not exceed 800 mils (45 degrees) and that maximizes flanking fires, allows MK 19 machine gun fire to interlock with other machine guns, provides mutual support between units, and minimizes dead space.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns a principal direction of fire to each squad that falls within the sector of fire or comprises either of its boundaries.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander identifies a priority for target engagement that includes point targets, such as light armored vehicles and crew-served weapons; and area targets, such as dismounted infantry or suspected positions.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander identifies supplementary positions in which to emplace his squads in order to accomplish other defensive missions.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander positions are completed, range cards are submitted, and guns are laid in on the FPL or PDF within 4 hours of the command to begin.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12A.10.42 EMPLOY MK 19 MACHINE GUNS IN THE OFFENSE

CONDITION(S): A MCSF Bn unit with attached MK 19 machine guns is conducting offensive operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns missions to MK 19 machine gun squads.
- .2 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander initially positions squads near LD/LC or moves them forward to occupy initial positions that allow MK 19 machine guns to provide effective supporting fire to the company along the route of movement of the company and, if possible, at the objective.
- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander displaces MK 19 machine gun squads forward to new positions by echelon in order to provide continuous support.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander assigns each machine gun squad a portion of the target or point targets to engage.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ Ensure unit commander displaces squads forward when objective is seized to aid in consolidation or shifts fires to new targets to support other missions.

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6 Jan 92

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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ENCLOSURE (1)

XII-A-104

SECTION 12B  
COMBATTING TERRORISM

ENCLOSURE (1)

## INTRODUCTION:

The number of terrorist attacks against military personnel, units, and installations has increased considerably during recent years.

Antiterrorism measures decrease the probability of a terrorist act. Antiterrorism is the proactive, preventive stage of combatting terrorism.

Counterterrorism measures are taken in response to an ongoing terrorist incident. Counterterrorism is the reactive, tactical stage of combatting terrorism.

Successful operations to prevent terrorist action against a unit or an installation require systematic measures to be taken to decrease the probability of a terrorist incident occurring. This includes steps to ensure that the unit/installation is prepared to respond if an incident does take place.

This is one of several types of security operations, unique in that they are the only operational missions that are shared by Fleet Marine Forces (FMF's) and other Marine Corps organizations such as posts and stations.

The MPS's contained in this section, therefore, are designed to be applicable to both operational forces and the support establishment. In certain instances FMF units have built in agencies to handle functions such as intelligence/threat assessment and crisis response, etc., and do not need to form separate organizations described in this section to deal with a terrorist situation. Accordingly, plans, SOP's, and orders that provide for the functions described, but use already existing agencies to perform the required actions, are acceptable. Those Marine Corps units/organizations that do not possess these agencies should be capable of temporarily organizing into the structure described to combat terrorism.

Evaluation of the unit's capability to combat terrorism necessarily includes an evaluation of those counterterrorism actions commensurate with implementing the Crisis Management Plan developed as part of the antiterrorism readiness preparations.

The MPS contained in this section which deal with antiterrorism measures include:

- 9D.1 - Antiterrorism - Knowledge
- 9D.2 - Antiterrorism - Intelligence
- 9D.3 - Antiterrorism - Planning
- 9D.4 - Antiterrorism - Operations Security
- 9D.5 - Antiterrorism - Personnel Security
- 9D.6 - Antiterrorism - Physical Security

The last MPS:

- 9D.7 - Counterterrorism - Management of a Crisis Response

Contains standards which are designed to allow evaluation of the adequacy of a unit/installation plan as well as their preparations for its implementation.

## REVIEW

These MPS's should be reviewed, applied, and validated as appropriate.

Recommendations for additions/changes to these proposed standards should be submitted to the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (TE 31), Quantico, VA 22134-5000.

Submission should be in the following format:

Item to be changed (MPS, task, requirement, or text location);  
Comment; and,  
Recommendation.

ENCLOSURE (1)



GLOSSARY - ACRONYMS

<u>ACRONYM</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
ACC	Alarm Control Center
BAF	Backup Alert Force
CIB	Combat Information Bureau
CMT	Crisis Management Team
CSS	Combat Service Support
COC	Combat Operations Center
DoD	Department of Defense
ECP	Entry Control Point
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
HERO	Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
LOD	Line of Departure
NAVAIDS	Navigation Aids
OIR's	Other Intelligence Requirements
OPPAT	Operational Patterns
PHOTINT	Photointelligence
PRP	Personnel Reliability Program
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SIGNIT	Signals Intelligence
SIR	Serious Incident Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SRT	Special Reaction Team
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TMF	Threat Management Force

ENCLOSURE (1)

12B.1 ANTITERRORISM - KNOWLEDGE

TASK: 12B.1.1 IDENTIFY THE NATURE OF TERRORISM

CONDITION(S): This standard is evaluated by oral interview of randomly selected members of the unit by evaluators.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Training is being conducted by the unit on the nature of terrorism. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ A general awareness of the nature of terrorism to include weapons and activities is displayed by members of the unit.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

NATURE OF TERRORISM

DEFINITION: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individual(s) or property, with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for a political or an ideological purpose.

Terrorism may be used by individuals or well-organized groups to attain goals that are beyond their capability by other means such as demonstrations, political processes, or more conventional armed conflict. Terrorism is low intensity warfare in that the terrorists are normally few in number and relatively lightly armed. The motivation can be ideological, financial, or the result of mental imbalance. They may share the common features of:

- 1. Promoting fear.
- 2. Being militarily weaker than opposing police or military forces.
- 3. Striving for news media attention above tactical success.
- 4. High mobility.
- 5. Exploiting the cheapness of terror.
- 6. Possessing limited resources.
- 7. Operating under varying degrees of cover.
- 8. Believing in small groups for security.
- 9. Causing confusion, disruption, and delaying techniques that promote psychological terror within target audience/area.

TERRORIST GOALS

Most short term terrorist goals are aimed at gaining recognition, reducing Government credibility, obtaining funds and equipment, disrupting communications, demonstrating power, delaying the political process, reducing the Government's economy, influencing elections, or freeing prisoners. Long range goals may be to topple governments, influence top level decisions, or gain legitimate recognition for their cause.

ENCLOSURE (1)

### TERRORIST GROUPS

Terrorist groups will often share assets as long as the groups are not ideologically opposed. In some cases, governments will employ terrorists as a surrogate army by funding their activities against another nation. These groups tend to be small and compartmentalized for security reasons. These groups will maintain their clandestine cells unless they are in an area of considerable popular support where they may choose to move about in the open while secure from their enemies.

### TERRORIST WEAPONS

Terrorists generally employ basic arms and explosives. These range from handguns to light machineguns and from grenades to mobile apparatus full of explosives. The terrorists seek portable, sophisticated weapons, but do not always have access. The use of advanced weapons, such as surface to air missiles would add to the sensationalism of the act and, hence, increase news media coverage. However, the favorite weapon of the terrorist remains the homemade bomb or IED. These IED's are most often employed in pairs with the first device being smaller than the second. The concept of employment is to draw a crowd with the first weapon and then attack the crowd.

### TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

BOMBING. Sixty-seven percent of all terrorist incidents in the last decade involved bombs; they are cheap, reliable, easy to make, and materials are readily available. Additionally, a mix of real bombs and hoaxes can tie-up security forces and keep the public in a panic. As previously mentioned, they are often used in pairs. Bombs can be delivered by wide variety of means.

ARSON. Arson is a useful tactic against public utilities, hotels, houses of government, and industrial centers. The incendiary devices are cheap and easy to hide. An act of arson can also be used to draw a crowd to a killing zone for a bomb or other weapon.

HIJACKING/VEHICLE THEFT. A popular terrorist tactic to provide an organization with the contents of the vehicle hijacked or stolen, and to provide a means of delivery. Hijackings or theft of certain vehicles could indicate the intended use of a vehicle bomb.

SKYJACKING/AIRCRAFT THEFT. A terrorist tactic to provide the organization with hostages and/or the means for unique delivery of explosives to a target. Skyjacking and aircraft thefts could indicate the intended use of an aircraft or "Kamikaze" type terrorist attack.

ASSASSINATION. Assassination is one of the oldest terrorist tactics. It is relatively easy, cheap, and terrifying. It is a favorable secondary activity when physical security measures prohibit terrorists from attacking major installations.

AMBUSH. A well-planned ambush allows for assassination or kidnapping to occur at the place and time of the terrorist's choosing. It is particularly easy to accomplish if the victim always uses the same routine.

KIDNAPPING. Kidnapping is a favorite method of financing terrorist movements or forcing governments to accede to terrorist demands for prisoner release, etc. Kidnapping generally requires a safehouse in which to keep the victim while bargaining.

HOSTAGE TAKING. Hostage taking is overt and is designed to attract and hold the media's attention. Because the hostages lives are threatened, this can be used to force concessions from the Government. The terrorist has bargaining chips in the lives of his hostages.

ROBBERIES AND EXPROPRIATIONS. In some environments these methods enhance other terrorist activities. However, these are not required when terrorists are functioning as surrogates of other nations.

PSYCHOLOGICAL TERROR. A form of terrorism designed to alter behavioral characteristics of an individual, group or activity/organization through the application of sophisticated psychological techniques.

BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ATTACK. The use of biological and chemical agents by terrorists cannot be dismissed. While there is no indication of such terrorist activity in the past, this form of warfare must be considered when planning to combat terrorism.

THE MILITARY AS A TERRORIST TARGET

The military represents our nation throughout the globe. It is a symbol of our national power and strength. We are terrorist targets as individuals or groups on and off our ships and bases. Further, we present the terrorist with a source of arms, ammunition, and explosives. Attacks against U.S. military personnel and facilities worldwide are increasing.

TASK: 12B.1.2 DETERMINE AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION OUTSIDE CONUS

CONDITION(S): Prior to an act of terrorism occurring, the unit commander and his principal staff officers should have a clear understanding of their authority and jurisdiction in the event that a terrorist act occurs in U.S. or while deployed to a foreign country.

In the case of Marine Corps units overseas, requirements 12B.1.2.2 and 12B.1.2.3 would not apply.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 Determine the authority/jurisdiction over terrorist events based upon geographic location. (KI)
- .2 Ensure the unit has an understanding of the Posse Comitatus Act. (KI)
- .3 The unit commander and his principal staff understand the jurisdiction of the FBI over terrorist acts within the U.S. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

DETERMINING AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION

The basis for determining primary authority and jurisdiction over terrorist actions is determined primarily by location. In the United States the primary authority is always the FBI. The jurisdiction falls to the base commander, only if the act takes place aboard the base. Outside of the United States, the host country has primary authority as set forth in the international agreement. Basically, it's their country unless it's an embassy or you have classified items the compromise/capture of which are threatened by terrorist activity. The following chart should assist the evaluator in clarifying questions of authority and jurisdiction.

	INITIAL	PRIMARY	PRIMARY	EXERCISING	PRIMARY
LOCATION	RESPONSE	AUTHORITY/ JURISDICT.	ENFORCE RESPONSE	CONTROL OF MILITARY ASSETS	INVEST RESPONSE

Within the United States:

On Base	Military Police	FBI/Base Commander	FBI/Provost Marshall	Base or Unit Commander (Support FBI)	FBI/NIS
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Off Base	Civilian Police	FBI	FBI	Base or Unit Commander (Per Posse Comitatus Act)	FBI/Local Authorities
-----					
On Base	Military Police	Host Government/ Base Commander	Government Provost Marshall	Base of Unit Commander applicable Status of Forces Agreement	Host Government/ NIS
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Off Base	Host Country Law Enforcement	Host Government	Host Government	Base of Unit Commander/ Host Government (Per applicable Status of Forces Agreement)	Host Government
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NOTE: Coordinate with the local SJA to clarify authority and questions of jurisdiction. Coordinate with Department of State officials as required. Coordinate in advance with local law enforcement agencies to ensure response support procedures are in place and established information/communications channels are functioning.

POSSE COMITATUS ACT

This act is only applicable to military forces in the U.S. or its possessions. It does not apply in foreign countries nor to actions aboard military bases or in military contracted buildings or spaces, or in guarding military property in transit.

THE POSSE COMITATIS ACT (18 U.S.C. 1385)

The Posse Comitatus Act is a post-Civil War statute originally enacted in 1878 to curtail the use of military troops by local Federal law enforcement agencies in the reconstructed South. Despite its age, the law is in effect today and must be followed. It provides that:

1. "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the law shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both."
2. The term "posse comitatus" is defined as the power of force of the country or the entire population of a country which a sheriff may summon to his assistance in certain cases; as to aid in keeping the peace, in pursuing and arresting felons.
3. The Act has been interpreted as a prohibition against the use of the uniformed services of the DoD, either as part of a posse comitatus or in a military role other than provided by statute, to assist local law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties. The same prohibition runs against the use of troops to execute Federal laws [41 Op. Atty. Gen. 330 (1957); 16 Op. Atty. Gen. 162 (1878)]. This restrictive legislation sought to restore congressional control over the manner and circumstances under which military power could be used in domestic affairs.

CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONS

The constitutional exceptions are based upon the inherent legal right of the United States Government--a sovereign national entity under the Federal Constitution--to ensure the preservation of public order and the carrying out of governmental operations within its territorial limits, by force if necessary. They are:

1. The emergency authority--authorizes prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation.
2. Protection of Federal property and functions--authorizes Federal actions, including use of military forces, to protect Federal property and functions when the need for protection exists and duly constituted local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection.

STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS

Congress pursuant to its constitutional authority has provided a broad range of legislation authorizing the President to use regular and federalized militia forces to execute the laws. To illustrate, the President is currently empowered to use military forces:

1. To restore and maintain public order.

ENCLOSURE (1)

2. To respond to requests for aid from state governments (10 U.S.C. 332) it is the constitutional duty of the President to see that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed (U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 3). Congress has implemented this provision by providing that whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws in any state or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may utilize such Federal Armed Forces as he deems necessary to enforce those laws, or to suppress the rebellion under this statute.
3. To protect the constitutional rights under certain conditions (10 U.S.C. 333) the 14th Amendment to the Constitution forbids any state to deny equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction. Congress has implemented this provision by providing that whenever insurrection, civil violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies in any state so oppose, obstruct, or hinder the execution of the laws of the state, and any of the United States, as to deprive any of the population of that state of rights, privileges, and immunities named in the Constitution and secured by laws, and the authorities of that state are unable, fail, or refuse to provide such protection, it will be deemed a denial by that state of the equal protection of the laws. Thereupon, it becomes the duty of the President to take such measures, by intervention with Federal Armed Forces, or by other means, as he deems necessary, to suppress such disturbances.
4. To protect Federal property and functions (18 U.S.C. 1361 and 231, the latter prohibits participation in civil disorders affecting commerce or Federal function and 50 U.S.C. 797).

To meet specified contingencies:

1. To assist the U.S. Secret Service in protection of the President, Vice President, major political candidates, and foreign dignitaries (HRJ Res 1292; 18 U.S.C. 3056).
2. To assist Federal magistrates in carrying out magisterial orders relating to civil rights violations (42 U.S.C. 1989).
3. To assist the Attorney General in the enforcement of drug abuse prevention and control [21 U.S.C. 873(b)].
4. To assist the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency EPA in water pollution control functions (33 U.S.C. 1361).
5. To assist the FBI in congressional assassination, kidnapping, and assault investigations [18 U.S.C. 351(g)].

To cope with domestic emergencies and to protect public safety:

1. Furnish aid to civilians in times of natural disasters (42 U.S.C. 4401.84).
2. Render humanitarian or emergency assistance in cases of national disasters (41 U.S.C. 1855).

#### EMERGENCY RULE

When the calamity or extreme emergency render waiting for instructions from the proper military department dangerous, a commander may take whatever action the circumstances reasonably justify and comply with the following:

1. Promptly report the military response to higher headquarters.
2. Document all the facts and surrounding circumstances to meet any subsequent challenge of impropriety.
3. Retain military response under military chain of command.
4. Limit military involvement to the minimum demanded by necessity.

The policy of the DoD is to limit extensive relief operations by the military services to those measures authorized by the Disaster Relief Act, except where the overriding demands of humanity compel immediate action to save human life, prevent immediate human suffering, mitigate major property damage or destruction, and local resources are clearly inadequate to cope with the situation. In keeping with this policy, the military services can provide support, that is, furnish food, clothing, shelter, medical help, or similar aid in sudden emergencies which call for immediate action at the time the aid is furnished. (42 U.S.C. 4431 (predisaster assistance)).

ENCLOSURE (1)

1. Emergency civilian or mixed civilian/military fire-fighting assistance where base fire departments have mutual aid agreements with nearby civil communities.
2. Emergency EOD service. (See MCO 8027.1)
3. Emergency use of working dog teams to aid in locating lost persons (humanitarian act) or explosive devices (domestic emergency).
4. Emergency use of military aircraft in air piracy or aircraft hijacking cases may be authorized by the National Military Commander Center (NMCC) (Deputy SecDef memo, Subj: Support of Civil Authorities in Airplane Hijacking Emergencies, 29 June 1972). Military aircraft may be committed for use as chase planes. Use of military personnel to apprehend aircraft hijackers and the use of any type of military aircraft as platforms for weapons against suspected hijackers are prohibited by the memorandum. Caveat: Necessity gives birth to emergency rule, determines the degree of its application, and limits the duration of its existence. Make sure it is an emergency before advising the commander to act.

#### AUTHORITY OF THE FBI

The responsibility for the management of the Federal response to acts of terrorism in the United States rests with the Attorney General. As the chief law enforcement officer of the Federal Government, the Attorney General coordinates all Federal Government activities during a major terrorism crisis and advises the President as to whether and when to commit military forces in response to such a situation. Within the Department of Justice the lead agency for the operational response to a terrorist incident is the FBI. The initial tactical response to such incidents is made by the FBI special agent in charge (SAC) at the scene, under the supervision of the Director of the FBI, who has overall responsibility for ongoing operations to contain and resolve the incident.

All military preparations and operations, including the employment of military forces at the scene of a terrorist incident, will be the primary responsibility of the SecDef. In discharging these functions, he will observe such law enforcement policies as the Attorney General may determine. To the extent practical, such law enforcement policies will be formulated during the early stages of the terrorist incident to ensure that military planning and operations are consistent with administration policy and the requirements of law.

The responsibilities of the DoD will be carried out principally through the Department of the Army, inasmuch as the Secretary of the Army is assigned primary responsibility for such matters, as DoD Executive Agent.

The Attorney General through the FBI will remain responsible (1) for coordinating the activities of all Federal agencies assisting in the resolution of the incident and in the administration of justice in the effected area, and (2) for coordinating these activities with those state and local agencies similarly engaged.

Upon notification of a Presidential approval to use military force, the Attorney General will advise the Director of the FBI who will notify the SAC; the SecDef will advise the military task force commander. The military commander and the SAC will coordinate the transfer of operational control to the military commander.

Responsibility for the tactical phase of the operation is transferred to military authority when the SAC relinquishes command and control of such operation and it is accepted by the onsite military task force commander. However, the SAC may revoke the military commitment at any time prior to the assault phase if he determines that military intervention is no longer required, provided that the military commander agrees that a withdrawal can be accomplished without seriously endangering the safety of military personnel or others involved in the operation. The military commander may utilize FBI personnel as hostage negotiators, translators, sniper/observers, and in other similar support roles, but FBI personnel may not participate in the tactical assault unless expressly authorized by the SAC.

When the military task force commander determines that he has completed the assault phase of the operation, command and control will be promptly returned to the SAC.

The respective roles of the DoD, the Justice Department, and the FBI with respect to a terrorist incident on a military reservation are essentially the same as described above. However, the installation commander is responsible for the maintenance of law and order on a military reservation and may take such immediate action in response to a terrorist incident as may be necessary to protect life and property. The FBI will be promptly notified of all terrorist incidents and will exercise jurisdiction if the Attorney General or his designee determines that such incident is a matter of significant Federal interest. When the FBI assumes jurisdiction, the Attorney General will coordinate the Federal response. Should military assistance be required, it will be furnished in a manner consistent with the principles of this memorandum. If the FBI declines to exercise its

jurisdiction, military authorities will take appropriate action to resolve the incident.

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TASK: 12B.1.3 IDENTIFY GENERAL/SPECIAL ORDERS

CONDITION(S): Under field conditions, members of the unit being evaluated will be orally examined to determine knowledge of general orders. Requirement 12B.1.3.2 is designated as the critical component of this task. A "NO" grade on this requirement causes the unit to fail this task. Members of the guard/force will be evaluated concerning special orders and ROE. These ROE must reflect guidance received from higher headquarters.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Randomly selected NCO's demonstrate knowledge of general orders. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Randomly selected nonrated Marines demonstrate knowledge of general orders.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Ensure unit has published special orders and ROE. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Randomly selected NCO's demonstrate knowledge of special orders.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Randomly selected nonrated Marines demonstrate knowledge of special orders.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

THE ELEVEN GENERAL ORDERS

(Selected members of the force must be orally examined.)

- 1. To take charge of this post and all Government property in view.
- 2. To walk my post in a military manner, keeping always on the alert, and observing everything that takes place within sight or hearing.
- 3. To report all violations of orders I am instructed to enforce.
- 4. To repeat all calls from posts more distant from the guardhouse than my own.
- 5. To quit my post only when properly relieved.
- 6. To receive, obey, and pass on to the sentry who relieves me all orders from the commanding officer, field officer of the day, officer of the day, and officers and noncommissioned (petty) officers of the guard only.
- 7. To talk to no one except in the line of duty.
- 8. To give the alarm in case of fire or disorder.
- 9. To call the Corporal of the Guard in any case not covered by instructions.
- 10. To salute all officers and all colors and standards not cased.
- 11. To be especially watchful at night, and during the time for challenging, to challenge all persons on or near my post, and to allow no one to pass without proper authority.



SPECIAL ORDERS

ROE would come down chain of command to the evaluated unit. Unit special orders would be based on these approved ROE.

Copies of applicable special orders and ROE must be obtained from the unit being evaluated. Selected members of the guard force must be orally examined.

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TASK: 12B.1.4 THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN A TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT

CONDITION(S): Guidance for public affairs is found in the Marine Corps Public Affairs Manuals (MCO P5720.60 and P5720.61).

This should be consulted when planning the unit's use of public affairs assets. Generally, MAGTF's will establish agencies similar to the CIB.

When a unit does not have public affairs personnel assigned/available, this need must have been considered and assignments/plans/preparations must have been made accordingly.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ A public affairs officer (PAO) or representative is available, or the unit has designated a unit member to act in this capacity. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ The PAO is prepared to provide support to nearby Marine Corps units or installations in the event of a terrorist threat or act. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ The MAGTF PAO published a plan for a CIB to be activated in case of a terrorist operation. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ The MAGTF PAO is prepared to activate his CIB plan.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

PAO/REPRESENTATIVE DESIGNATED

Because the terrorist plays to all news media for recognition, the flow of information to the news media must be in the best interests of the unit. When a terrorist incident takes place, there must be a flow of information to the news media. As a minimum, this flow of information must be screened by the commander or his designated representative, to ensure proper operations security and to protect the commander's legal position. In cases where a PAO is assigned or available he would play a key role in this process. In other instances the unit must have a designated staff member to perform these duties, as required, and until a PAO team can be obtained, if required.

It must be stressed that the news media should never be allowed to become a vehicle for debriefing terrorists after an operation. Widespread dissemination of lessons learned and friendly operational procedures will result in a better prepared, more formidable terrorist for the next event.

DUTIES OF THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER/REPRESENTATIVE

Check with the G-3/S-3 upon entering the COC/Crisis Management Center.

Establish the CIB, per plan.

Control press release; coordinate with G-3/S-3.

Provide other public affairs resources as required.

Control news media personnel with press passes, escorts, etc.

Obtain approval for following items from the commander:

1. News releases;
2. News media personnel to enter outer perimeter;
3. Release of photographs of suspects, victims, and immediate scene;
4. Interviews with anyone other than the commander; and
5. Direct communication with press personnel and suspect(s).

PUBLIC AFFAIRS SUPPORT OF NEARBY UNITS

In cases where one is present in the area, the PAO must be prepared to support nearby Marine Corps activities threatened by terrorism. This support must be both proactive, such as using local news media to promote threat awareness in an antiterrorism role, and reactive, such as setting up a press center in a counterterrorism operation. (See KI 12B.5.2.)

COMBAT INFORMATION BUREAU (CIB) PLAN

A sample CIB plan is contained in the Marine Corps Public Affairs Manual (MCO P5720.61). Obviously, this plan should include provisions for control of output to the news media in the event of a terrorist threat or a terrorist operation.

Every effort must be made to deny the terrorist the ability to manipulate the press to his own ends.

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12B.2 ANTITERRORISM - INTELLIGENCE

TASK: 12B.2.1 DEVELOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI's)

CONDITION(S): Unit has arranged to utilize all available intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement assets to determine what processed intelligence is available on the terrorist threat in the area of operations.

Requirement 12B.2.1.5 does not normally apply to FMF units. As reflected in the following requirement, the unit staff performs the threat assessment.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ The unit has contacted local law enforcement officials to ascertain how they might assist the unit in an antiterrorism role. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ The unit commander has ensured that key personnel have appropriate security clearances and access to intelligence information.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Operations and intelligence personnel create a portrait/profile of the terrorist organization(s) in the local or intended area of operations. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Open sources are consulted to determine additional information on terrorism in the intended area of operations. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ A threat assessment group is established. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ EEI's are developed by the commander or his staff/threat assessment group to fill in knowledge gaps of the terrorist threat in the intended area of operations. The intelligence cycle is employed.(KI)

ENCLOSURE (1)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

CONTACT LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Local law enforcement agencies in the intended area of operations can provide criminal information relative to terrorist activity. This can be accomplished by working through established channels set up by SOFA's, diplomatic efforts, or counterintelligence personnel. The relationship between local national agencies and U.S. military forces is very sensitive and must be handled through existing channels. Jurisdictional matters must be addressed and clearly understood by all concerned. Plans must address the specifics of making this contact, which apply to an intended area of operations.

A PORTRAIT OF THE TERRORIST(S)

One of the basic tenants of warfare is "know your enemy." Accordingly, threat analysis should be conducted on a continuing basis. This is best accomplished by a trained intelligence staff/threat assessment group ready to identify organizational and operational characteristics of threat terrorist groups. The following factors should be considered:

1. Organizational characteristics:
  - a. Type - committee, hierarchical.
  - b. Politics - fascist, leftist, communist.
  - c. Recruitment - schools, prisons, ethnic, religious organizations, cults.
  - d. Goals - overthrow/modification/support of present government.
  - e. Financing - criminal, foreign, private.
  - f. Composition - sex, race, education.
  - g. Connections - international support, schools.
2. Operational characteristics:
  - a. Planning - precise, long, shoddy, SOP's.
  - b. Timing - special religious, party days.
  - c. Tactics - bombing, assassination, kneecapping.
  - d. Collusion - reliance on insiders high or low.
  - e. Training - type, extent, location, sponsor, quality.
  - f. Weapons and equipment - type, number, condition.
  - g. Methods of operation.
  - h. Identities of personnel.
  - i. Assessment of previous operational success.

Once these factors are mapped out, the threat analysis can be continued. Additionally, if a factor cannot be determined, it may form the basis for an EEI to be presented to the intelligence community.

TERRORIST GROUP PERSONALITY/ORGANIZATIONAL PROFILE

Research has indicated an established organizational pattern which is common to most terrorist groups. This pattern is based upon sex, social status, and education. It breaks the group into three elements. These are the leaders, one or more operators, and a group of idealists.

The leader is irrationally dedicated to a set of ideals which differ from those of the society which is being opposed. However, the leader is not irrational, but rather dedicated and singleminded. In leftist terrorist groups the leader is often female. In rightist terrorist groups, the leader is never a female. The leader is almost always highly educated and manipulative in that she (or he) allows subordinate personnel to fulfill their fantasies in support of the organizations goals. The leader is capable of policy development, intellectual pursuit, and will generally have a background of radical behavior which precedes actual terrorist involvement.

The operator is most often a male with a low level of formal education and a long record of criminal/antisocial behavior which predates his involvement with terrorism. He is an opportunist who is in the group for self-fulfillment in the form of money, sex, and/or drugs. He has little, if any, group loyalty. He is not mentally ill, but is unable to feel guilt. He is recruited from prison populations by the leader on promise of ego fulfillment through violent action. He acts as the operational trainer and action leader. He provides technical criminal skills to the group and functions as field commander. He is manipulated by the leader, but doesn't care.

The idealists are a mixed group of middle class, partially educated ne'er-do-wells. Their role is that of followers and drudge workers who operate in support of the group. These men and women are used to scout potential robbery sites, map out safe houses, secure pay telephone numbers, and the like. They are sheep being lead by the leader and the opportunists.

NOTE: Women terrorists in the roles of both leader and idealists tend to be more prone to violence and more inflexible in their demands than their male counterparts. They are also more likely to attempt to surrender at the last moment in order to avoid death at the hands of counterterrorist forces.

#### OPEN SOURCES

Because the terrorist often plays to the news media in order to get public recognition of his cause, open sources such as books, newspapers, and magazines are good secondary intelligence sources. It is recommended that all such sources be cross-checked for accuracy because misleading propaganda may be embedded.

#### THREAT ASSESSMENT GROUP

The Threat Assessment Group can be used by the commander of a base or facility to assist him in developing a comprehensive threat statement and a threat analysis. The membership of this group may include the personnel listed below. An FMF commander would use his staff for this assessment function.

1. G-1/S-1.
2. G-2/S-2 or Counterintelligence.
3. G-3/S-3 or Operations Officer.
4. G-4/S-4.
5. NIS representative.
6. Ground defense officer.
7. CID intelligence.
8. Medical.
9. Public affairs officer.
10. EOD.
11. Provost marshal.

#### THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Intelligence includes four consecutive phases and is cyclic in nature. For example, after the initial determination of requirements, an item of information is collected, processed as intelligence and disseminated. As a result, new questions arise. These are stated as intelligence requirements, and the cycle commences again.

ENCLOSURE (1)

TASK: 12B.2.2 UTILIZE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI's)

CONDITION(S): The unit/organization has developed EEI's, arranged for security clearances and access, conducted an assessment of the threat, and opened or planned to open information and intelligence contacts along established lines of communication.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ EEI's have been developed. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ EEI's are passed to collection agencies.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ EEI's are under continuous review for applicability, pertinence, and reliability.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ As EEI's are filled they are expeditiously passed to the operational forces.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (EEI'S)

The following terrorist considerations will apply in developing EEI's: Organization (i.e., rigid cells, mob, etc.) recruiting methods (solicitation, volunteer, etc.), recruiting places (university, mosque, etc.), recruited population (ethnic, religious, sex, etc.), financing methods (robbery, external, etc.), international support (moral, physical, etc.), national support (moral, physical, financial, etc.), political affiliation (left, right, center), religious affiliation, planning complexity (demonstrated ability to conduct intricate operations), important events (i.e., religious holidays, other dates of importance to the terrorists), tactics (murder, kidnapping, robbery), favored weapons (bomb, handgun, garrote), method of supply (purchase, theft, etc.), degree of discipline (rabble or professional), motivation (glory, money, politics, religion), willingness to self-sacrifice (demonstrated?), willingness to kill (demonstrated?), ground training skills (sapper, sniper, etc.), aviation training skills (helo, fixed-wing), sea training skills (small boat, ship).

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TASK: 12B.2.3 CONDUCT INTELLIGENCE OBSERVATION

CONDITION(S): EEI's have been developed and disseminated. Individuals are briefed on a need-to-know basis. Filled requirements have been passed to the operational forces. Applicable EEI's have been passed to the operating forces.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Observation posts are manned by the same personnel on a daily basis. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Sentry posts are manned by the same personnel on a daily basis. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Security patrols cover same basic areas, but use varying routes and times. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Covert observation points are established, as applicable. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Sensors are employed and monitored, as applicable.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Vision and observation enhancements (i.e., binoculars, night vision goggles) are employed for observation, as applicable.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

INTELLIGENCE OBSERVATION

The "cop on the beat" attitude should be promoted among the unit's sentry and patrol forces. These Marines should be told what terrorist threat exists and what sort of action is expected. They should also be advised as to what information higher headquarters requires such as meetings, demonstrations, etc., by assigning Marines to geographical areas and keeping them there, a sense of the normal and abnormal can be instilled in each sentry. Thus, when conditions are abnormal (all women off the streets, no children playing, etc.) he can sense problems before they occur. Similarly, traffic patterns monitored by sensors can be observed to deviate from normal causing the unit to change its alert posture. Individual and unit training should stress observation and immediate reporting of abnormal circumstances encountered by sentries/patrols.

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TASK: 12B.2.4 COORDINATE INTELLIGENCE AND OPERATIONS EFFORTS

CONDITION(S): Individual Marines have been assigned to posts and patrol teams. Units are assigned geographical areas of responsibility.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Operations officer develops courses of action (CA's) consistent with the unit mission.
  
- .2 \_\_\_\_ CA's are screened during the threat assessment process to determine supportability/vulnerability in light of the terrorist(s) threat to the unit. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

ANALYSIS OF THE CA'S

The staff/threat assessment group, in addition to its continuing duties involved in developing terrorist threat intelligence, should also analyze CA's prepared by the operations officer. This analysis should review the CA's in light of information and intelligence about the terrorist organization which would support the CA and review the vulnerabilities of each CA to terrorist actions consistent with their capability.

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12B.3 ANTITERRORISM - PLANNING

TASK: 12B.3.1 CONDUCT OPERATIONAL TASKING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

CONDITION(S): Subsequent to basic operational planning, the integration of the operations and intelligence efforts must begin.

ENCLOSURE (1)

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ The unit has a specific threat awareness program integrated into unit training. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Vulnerability analyses of installations/positions within the area of operations have been conducted.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ The intelligence community has been tasked to fill knowledge gaps of the operational forces. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ The commander's priorities of effort to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist action have been established.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ The commander's priorities of effort are reviewed as the threat changes or develops. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Tasking and response of the intelligence community is both clear and rapid. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

#### SPECIFIC THREAT AWARENESS PROGRAM

Specific threat awareness training identifies the goals, weapons, and activities of specific threat terrorist groups. This training should include the types of intelligence gathering techniques favored by perceived threat organizations to breach the unit's operational security measures because terrorist intelligence gathering techniques are often readily identifiable by alert Marines. This information must be reported up the chain of command to enable the staff to integrate it with other known or perceived factors.

HUMINT to HUMINT involves the use of people to gather information about military installation, units, procedures, capabilities, and intentions. The terrorist can employ spies, conversations, and many open unclassified sources such as telephone directories to collect HUMINT. Marines should become alert when asked for or about such things as training schedules, unit movements, building functions, telephone numbers, and the like by civilians who are without a need-to-know.

SIGINT to SIGINT involves the intercept and exploitation of all forms of communications and electronic signals. The terrorist may be able to monitor many telephone transmissions, uncovered radio nets, and may even employ sophisticated listening devices. Marines should be alert to personnel "repairing" telephones which have been working properly or individuals on telephone poles in, or near, the area occupied by the unit. Similarly, radios or antennas near the unit's location or vehicles or vans with antennas could be used for gathering SIGINT information.

PHOTINT to PHOTINT is used to gather information by taking pictures from a variety of vantage points to include high ground and aircraft. It is particularly useful to the terrorist in raid planning. Marines should be alert to personnel taking pictures of, or near a military unit's area. Personnel taking pictures from buildings or high ground which overlook a unit's area should also be suspected.

OPPAT to OPPAT is used in many ways of conducting surveillance of operational patterns. Vendors are a common method of gathering this intelligence. The absence of normal vendors could also indicate impending action. Necessary contract services such as room/hallway cleaning, waste disposal, garbage pickup, and utilities repair are often used by terrorists for OPPAT surveillance and/or raid rehearsal.

#### VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

The analysis of vulnerability to terrorist attack is a complex task. There are many factors to be considered and none of them is a sole determinant of security. If a terrorist group wants to target a unit or facilities within its area, it probably will do so. The following factors are offered for consideration.

#### UNIT AREA/INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS AND SENSITIVITY

Strong factors favoring terrorist attack of a unit area or installation will be: If the installation contains special weapons or if VIP targets are assigned. Similarly, the vulnerability of a unit/installation without personnel trained in counterterrorism will be high. A well developed horizontal and vertical communications capability will reduce vulnerability, especially if there are dedicated

ENCLOSURE (1)

landlines and secure nets. Consideration should be given to the use of tactical covered communications with assigned tactical frequencies during conditions yellow and red. The rapid availability of well trained local law enforcement personnel will tend to reduce the threat. Proximity to other U.S. military units/installations is also a threat reducing factor. The proximity to urban and high population density areas are threat increasing factors as terrorists are often urban in nature and can hide in a city. The international terrorist in the modern age can cross borders at will.

OPERATIONAL TASKING OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Antiterrorism planning assists in the prevention of terrorist acts against unit personnel or installations. It includes threat analysis and a realistic assessment of available personnel security resources. Threat awareness programs must be developed and integrated into unit training programs. An analysis of installations within the unit's area of responsibility must be conducted with the aim of determining vulnerability to terrorist attack. The unit must then task the intelligence community to fill knowledge gaps so identified. This is a dynamic process which assists the commander both in establishing his initial priorities and in shifting those priorities as the threat changes or develops. The tasking of the intelligence community must be clear and concise. Additionally, the feedback to the operational staff and the commander must be positive and rapid.

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TASK: 12B.3.2 DEVELOP A CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN

CONDITION(S): A terrorist threat exists or is identified by the threat assessment process.

Potential threats are identified against friendly activities or involving a particular type of terrorist attack.

A Crisis Management Plan is developed as a coordinated staff effort. An FMF unit would not be required to establish a separate crisis management center (See Task 12B.3.2.9).

Task 12B.3.2.12 would be accomplished by regular staff members in connection with normal operational duties.

Requirement 12B.3.2.14 would be accomplished by an FMF unit when the force was designated/organized to manage the threat per task 12B.3.2.16.

Task 12B.3.2.29 would be accomplished by an FMF unit using its COC for this purpose. No separate organization is required for the FMF unit being evaluated.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Crisis Management Plan/SOP's have been prepared.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan contains SOP's developed to deal with separate types of terrorist activity.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan addresses the general terrorist threat situation facing the unit/installation.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ The outside agencies which will provide special types of assistance are identified. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan will list any assumptions upon which it is based.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan addresses terrorist threat conditions. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan establishes progressive security actions to be taken for each threat condition. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies alert notification procedures to be followed. (KI)
- .9 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan establishes a crisis management center for units/organizations which do not have an existing command center/combat operations center. (KI)
- .10 \_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies membership of CMT.

ENCLOSURE (1)



- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan establishes watch teams to ensure CMT is capable of 24-hour operations.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan contains checklist of duties for each CMT member. (KI)
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies the need for maintaining an operational log. (KI)
- .14 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan designates the commander of the TMF. (KI)
- .15 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan tasks the initial response force for isolation of terrorist incident scene. (KI)
- .16 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan establishes composition/organization/equipment for the TMF. (KI)
- .17 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan contains the concept of operations and specific tasks to be accomplished by the TMF and its subordinate teams. (KI)
- .18 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan provides direction for immediate recording and debriefing of all witnesses to the incident. (KI)
- .19 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies reporting procedures/requirements. (KI)
- .20 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies emergency first aid station location. (KI)
- .21 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies for handling and transporting mass casualties to major medical facilities.
- .22 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies location of temporary morgue. (KI)
- .23 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies location and operation of a press center. (KI)
- .24 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies location and operation of an information center. (KI)
- .25 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan specifies procedures to be followed concerning recovered property. (KI)
- .26 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan includes provisions for IED/Bomb disposal by EOD.
- .27 \_\_\_\_\_ Plans are made for logistical support during a prolonged incident. (KI)
- .28 \_\_\_\_\_ The Crisis Management Plan sets forth the chain of command for command and control as well as reporting of a terrorist incident. (KI)
- .29 \_\_\_\_\_ The location of the Crisis Management Center is designated, as required.
- .30 \_\_\_\_\_ Consideration is given to establishing an on-scene Crisis Management Center.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None

KEY INDICATORS:

CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN/SOP'S

Planning which will identify appropriate preventive security measures and correct response, should a terrorist incident occur, must address actions taken to prevent various types of attacks.

Although most terrorist attacks against military units/installations are bombings and other acts of sabotage, if a unit/installation is to be fully prepared, plans must be made for the worst possible scenario. Actions planned to prevent each separate type of terrorist action should be incorporated into separate SOP's.

SOP's for handling separate threats (i.e., dealing with threats of letter/package bombs, car bombs, hostage, barricade situation, etc.) should be included as annexes to the Crisis Management Plan. These SOP's should be coordinated so that they compliment each other.

ENCLOSURE (1)

#### OUTSIDE AGENCY SUPPORT

Planning to deal with the threat of terrorism must include detailed coordination with agencies outside the command which will provide support in the event of an actual terrorist attack. The agencies to be included in this planning/coordination will vary with the type of unit/installation conducting the planning and whether it is located in CONUS or overseas, at the time the planning is conducted.

#### TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS

The following terrorist threat conditions which describe progressive levels of terrorist threat to U.S. military facilities and personnel, have been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

As JCS approved terminology, these terms, definitions, and recommended security measures are intended to facilitate interservice coordination and support U.S. military antiterrorism activities.

Threat Condition Alpha is the lowest terrorist threat condition. It would apply when a nonspecific threat of terrorism against U.S. military personnel or facilities exists in a general geographic area. (Threat may be based on information that terrorist elements in area have general plans concerning military facilities.)

Threat Condition Bravo is a higher terrorist threat condition. It would apply when a specific threat of terrorism against U.S. military personnel or facilities exists within a particular geographic area. (Threat may be based on information that terrorist elements are actively preparing for operations in a particular area.)

Threat Condition Charlie is the next higher terrorist threat condition. It would apply when there is imminent threat of terrorist acts against specific U.S. military personnel or facilities. (Threat may be based on information regarding plans or preparations for terrorist attacks against specific persons or facilities.)

Threat Condition Delta is highest terrorist threat condition. It would apply when terrorist acts are performed against specific U.S. military personnel or facilities.

#### ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN FOR EACH THREAT CONDITION

Specific actions to be taken during each threat condition are planned. They can be tailored for each specific unit's situation; however, minimum actions which should be considered are contained in the succeeding tasks to this MPS:

1. Task 12B.3.3 - Actions Planned for Threat Condition Alpha
2. Task 12B.3.4 - Actions Planned for Threat Condition Bravo
3. Task 12B.3.5 - Actions Planned for Threat Condition Charlie
4. Task 12B.3.6 - Actions Planned for Threat Condition Delta

#### ALERT NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

Since attack by terrorists or an increase in threat condition may be declared without warning, at any hour, alert/reaction force response must be instantaneous and cognizant personnel must be made aware of ongoing/required activity. To this end the Crisis Management Plan must establish an alert notification checklist to assist all duty/watch personnel who might be the first to sense terrorist activity or who might receive a threat condition upgrade notification. Persons to be notified should be specified for Duty NCO's/Watch NCO's and for the Command duty officer/COC watch officer. These checklists should provide appropriate telephone numbers and must be subject to frequent review to ensure they remain current. The checklists should also provide a space to record the time each notification is made and the initials of the person accomplishing the notification.

ENCLOSURE (1)

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR SUBORDINATE UNIT WATCH PERSONNEL

<u>Notify</u>	<u>Phone Number</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Initials</u>
Watch officer			
Initial Response Force Commander			
PMO (as appropriate)			
NIS (when available)			
Dispensary			
Crash crew (if applicable)			
SJA (if assigned)			
PAO (if assigned)			
EOD representative assigned)			

SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR COMMAND DUTY COC WATCH OFFICER

<u>Notify</u>	<u>Phone Number</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Initial</u>
Commanding General/Officer			
Chief of Staff/Executive Officer			
American Counsel General			
(if applicable)			
Commander of designative			
Threat Management Force			
Higher Headquarters			
(if directed)			
Augmentation Forces			
(i.e., FBI, NIS, etc.)			

CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER

The location from which actions following a terrorist incident are coordinated must be specified. It should be in a restricted access area which is not itself inordinately vulnerable to terrorist action. It must be equipped with appropriate communications means, both secure and nonsecure. There must be separate working areas for the commander, the staff, and any other working groups such as "think tanks" which will be used. The telephone numbers for the Crisis Management Center should not be routinely listed in open source directories. This is necessary to prevent concerned civilians/dependents/news reporters, etc., from calling and jamming telephones which are required for control of the crisis. The telephone numbers, however, must be known to all agencies with whom coordinated actions will be taken in dealing with the terrorist incident.

FMF units would use existing COC's/Command Centers.

MEMBERSHIP OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM/COMBAT OPERATIONS CENTER

The CMT/COC is made up of representatives of various military staff sections. The representatives advise the commander in their areas of expertise and support the TMF as directed by the commander.

The CMT/COC may include the representatives from:

1. G-1/S-1 personnel.
2. G-2/S-2 intelligence.
3. G-3/S-3 operations.
4. G-4/S-4 logistics.
5. Special staff sections including (in cases where they are assigned/available):
  - a. Provost Marshal.
  - b. SJA.
  - c. Public affairs.

- d. Motor transport.
- e. Aviation.
- f. Communications.
- g. Facilities engineer.
- h. Medical activity.
- i. Chaplain.
- j. Explosive ordnance disposal section.
- k. Local CID office.
- l. Local NIS office.
- m. Civilian authorities/representatives.
- n. State and local police.
- o. Legal representatives such as the district attorney.

The CMT can become too large to be effective quickly. It may be wise to use key people only. The supporting staff can stand by at their duty sections. This reduces the number of unnecessary people in the CMT. Some staff agencies may only want a liaison person in the CMT with the key personnel at the staff section (i.e., the SJA may want the key personnel to be at the law office and only have a representative in the CMT. This would allow key people to research and discuss ideas freely without the confusion normally associated with the management of a crisis. Guidance and answers will be transmitted through the SJA liaison person). Other staff agencies might consider similar procedures to streamline the management and operation of their portion of a terrorist incident.

The CMT/COC must never be placed inside the outer perimeter established by the TMF commander.

Remember, the task of the CMT is to serve as a specialized organization in support of the commander during a counterterrorism operation. Activation of the CMT should complement rather than conflict with normal operating procedures.

The CMT might be located in a room that is used for other purposes and becomes the Crisis Management Center only during exercises and actual incidents. Having an area designated for CMT operations only during a crisis may be dictated by availability of facilities. The room could be modified with telephone jacks and outlets that would allow quick conversion from office or conference room to Crisis Management Center.

#### WATCH TEAMS ESTABLISHED

The plan should always include provisions for a prolonged event, including assignment of alternate team members, including each position in training exercises. Have plans for transfer of responsibilities during the incident. Be sure that each team member and alternate team member fully understands the task assigned to the CMT as a whole and to themselves in particular.

#### CRISIS MANAGEMENT TEAM MEMBER CHECKLISTS

Once a specified threat occurs, it is imperative that the Crisis Management Center be activated and initial actions be taken immediately by CMT members. Actions are often overlooked. A checklist will help eliminate this problem.

It is recommended that the staff members' checklists be kept in separate notebooks within the Crisis Management Center/COC. The following are recommended checklists which should be expanded as appropriate:

#### COMMANDING GENERAL/COMMANDING OFFICER/CHIEF OF STAFF/ EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Make initial notification and periodic updates to the next higher headquarters per reporting requirements.

Verify SIR's prepared by the G-3/S-3.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Meet with FBI representatives to determine jurisdiction and available FBI assets for CONUS scenarios. (See Task 12B.1.2.)

Provide guidance to subordinates and make operational decisions, as required.

PROVOST MARSHAL (WHEN ASSIGNED)

Establishes immediate contact with the TMF, and maintains constant monitoring of their activities.

Advises and informs the commander on all developments. Contacts the FBI, local law enforcement agencies, and CID. See Task 12B.1.2.)

Ensures ingress and egress on installation is controlled.

Ensures that all provost marshal assets are available, as needed.

Requests permission from the CMC to conduct wire and oral communications interceptions (coordinates with the counterintelligence/NIS/SJA), when appropriate.

Establishes the Crisis Management Plan/SOP's (for bomb, arson, and other threats), and implements them.

NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVE (WHEN AVAILABLE)

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Alerts NIS assets/resources.

Coordinates auxiliary investigators and assigns investigative leads.

Begins investigative procedures on suspects and victims.

Ensures proper procedures are followed by all investigators (e.g., chain of custody of evidence).

Ensures NIS personnel are at the TMF (i.e., data collection personnel, negotiation team).

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE (WHEN ASSIGNED)

Provides applicable legal guidance (jurisdiction, use of force, delegation of authority, etc.).

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER (WHEN ASSIGNED)

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Establishes CIB.

Controls press release; coordinates with G-3/S-3.

Provides other public affairs resources, as required.

Controls news media personnel with press passes, escorts, etc.

Obtains approval for the following items from the commander:

1. News releases.
2. News media personnel to enter outer perimeter.
3. Release of photographs of suspects, victims, and immediate scene.
4. Interviews with anyone other than the commander.
5. Direct communication with press personnel and suspect.

G-3/S-3 OPERATIONS OFFICER

Activates the Crisis Management Center.

Alerts/notifies CMT personnel (minus CID, provost marshal, FBI) and ensures their presence in the Crisis Management Center.

Ensures Crisis Management Center equipment is present and operational.

Ensures other functions of Crisis Management Center continue normally.

Ensures that events occurring at the Crisis Management Center concerning the special threat are recorded.

Alerts Training Aids Support Center photographers to provide pictorial and/or video tape account of Crisis Management Center, TMF, and SRT operations.

G/1/S-1

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Assures access to personnel files on suspects and victims.

Provides other G-1/S-1 and personnel assets, as required.

G-2/S-2

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Ensures a G-2/S-2 representative is located with or at the TMF.

Ensures intelligence files are obtained on suspect or suspect's group.

Provides other intelligence assets required.

G-4/S-4

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Alerts subordinate supply and transportation activities.

Ensures messing is available for CMT, TMF, and Press Center.

Provides other supply/maintenance, and transportation assets, as needed.

Alerts firefighting agencies.

Alerts procurement for possible necessary local purchase (e.g., items needed by TMF or to meet hostage demands; six-pack of beer, hamburgers, food, clothing, etc.).

FACILITIES ENGINEER/HOUSING (IF ASSIGNED)

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Obtains blueprints for facilities involved in the incident.

Alerts personnel capable of controlling electricity, water, air conditioning, etc.

Provides other support, as required.

COMMUNICATIONS

Check with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

ENCLOSURE (1)

Ensure telephone repairmen are available for connecting/disconnecting lines.

Set up backup communications to TMF (field phone, radio).

Test and setup recording equipment and public address system, as required.

Provide other communications assets, as required.

#### AIR OFFICER

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Knows status/availability of aircraft.

Have helicopter assets available for surveillance, medical evacuation, and/or insertion (preflighted and on standby).

Determines safe LZ nearest to area of incident, and plans its organization and control.

Provides other aviation assets, as required.

#### MEDICAL

Checks with G-3/S-3 upon entering the Crisis Management Center.

Ensures medical personnel are onsite with ambulance.

Alerts emergency room for possible gunshot and/or trauma victims.

Alerts medical facilities for possible mass casualties.

Provides other medical assets, as required.

#### MAINTAIN AN OPERATIONAL LOG

The operational log must be maintained. Entries will be made in chronological order in the handwriting of the person(s) assigned to maintain the log.

The following shall be entered in the Operational Log:

1. The first entry concerning the incident shall include the identity of the member assigned to maintain the log, the time it was opened, and a concise but complete description of the occurrence.
2. Record of notification made to other commands, units within the command, and other external commands/agencies.
3. Requests for additional personnel and equipment.
4. Assignments of personnel and any changes thereof.
5. Record of all messages transmitted and received (include time, authority, and identity of person receiving/transmitting message).
6. Orders given, actions taken, procedures adopted, and developments at the scene.
7. Visits of officials of the Marine Corps or any other agency.
8. When the operation is discontinued, the date/time and authority for discontinuance shall be entered in the log.
9. Where possible, a tape recording of all telephone conversations relative to the incident should be accomplished.

#### THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE

The Crisis Management Plan will designate the commander of the TMF. The CO of the unit tasked with this mission within an FMF unit, would have this title.

#### ISOLATION OF THE SCENE OF TERRORIST ACTION

The Crisis Management Plan specifies the mission for the forces which must take immediate action to isolate the scene of terrorist action. This IRF immediately identifies the nature of the situation and reports it. They will isolate the incident and contain the situation until relieved.

#### COMPOSITION/ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE

The TMF is organized into teams. These teams are discussed in Task 12B.3.6 of this MPS.

#### CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE

Discussion of the approved courses of action for the TMF, as well as tasks to be performed by the various subordinate teams are listed in Task 12B.3.6 of this MPS, as well as in Task 12B.5.5.

#### RECORD AND DEBRIEF ALL WITNESSES TO THE INCIDENT

The IRF should immediately record witnesses' names, and direct the witnesses to a safe location for further debriefing.

#### REPORTING PROCEDURES

Immediate and subsequent reporting to higher headquarters is necessary in any terrorist situation. These would be reported via SIR, per MCO 5740.2.

Local reporting requirements will include immediately advising command/COC of a terrorist incident providing "who, what, where, when, how" information upon which decision to sound alert can be based.

Instructions concerning after action reporting. (See Task 12B.7.3.)

#### EMERGENCY FIRST AID STATION

The emergency first aid station would also be addressed in planning and within the Crisis Management Plan.

Details would identify location of the aid station, ambulance parking area, triage, hospital and ambulance augmentation, as well as other standard equipment and personnel requirements.

#### HOSPITAL STANDBY FOR MASS CASUALTIES

The Crisis Management Plan identifies hospitals for mass casualty evacuation. Plans should identify projected number and type of casualties to be expected by the hospital.

#### TEMPORARY MORGUE FACILITY

Temporary morgue facility, if operating in an isolated environment, will require support planning and execution above that available within the unit capability. Specific planning for the support to locate, isolate, identify, store, process, and prepare human remains will be required. Items to be included in these considerations are: location, body bag and shroud requirements, tags, forms, and log, and support required to assist in identification of remains.

ENCLOSURE (1)



#### PRESS CENTER ESTABLISHED

A press center must be established to provide a focal point as well as a control measure in dealing with press representatives. Press considerations include: size of facility, sufficient outside telephone communications, and speedy gathering and transmitting of information. (See Task 12B.1.4.). The press center is part of the CIB and will be established under the direction of the OIC CIB.

Command considerations are to temper these press considerations with a balance for the sake of safety, expeditious rescue operations, and other security and emergency requirements. Discussion of the Press Center is found in the sample plan for the CIB contained in MCO P5720.61 (Marine Corps Public Affairs Manual).

#### INFORMATION CENTER ESTABLISHED

The Information Center differs from the Press Center insofar as it handles the inquiries concerning missing persons and property damage. The Information Center should have the capability to obtain the lists of the dead, injured, evacuees, and property damage.

Here again, release of this type of information would only be authorized upon approval by the commander or his designated representative.

#### INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING RECOVERED PROPERTY

The collection, safeguarding, itemizing, and disposal of recovered property must be covered in the Crisis Management Plan.

A very important part of this instruction includes reemphasis of the fact that terrorists have a nasty habit of boobytrapping items of equipment (i.e., flashlights, fire extinguishers, radios, etc.). Troops must be instructed to leave recovered/found property alone until trained personnel have screened them for bombs.

Trained bomb detection dogs can assist in this screening process.

#### PLAN LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR A PROLONGED INCIDENT

A terrorist incident may last for days, weeks, or even months.

Never assume that an incident will be resolved quickly, especially if it involves a hostage/barricade situation.


Logistics support must be planned for the TMF, CMT, command/COC, and others such as the CIB which will be established immediately following the terrorist incident. Preparations must be made to deliver food, medical supplies, and other logistical support to the hostages and their captives.

Special consideration must also be given to continuation of normal operations of other activities on the installation during a prolonged incident.


ENCLOSURE (1)

POST/STATION ORGANIZATIONS

CHAIN OF COMMAND FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM OPS



ENCLOSURE (1)



TASK: 12B.3.3 PLAN ACTIONS FOR TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION ALPHA

CONDITION(S): Nonspecific threat of terrorism against U.S. military personnel or facilities in a general geographic area exists. (Condition Alpha may be based on information that terrorist elements in the area have general plans concerning military facilities.)

Setting Condition Alpha may occur within the exercise scenario or may be caused by the evaluator, either through input of appropriate intelligence information or announcing to the evaluated unit that Terrorist Threat Condition Alpha is in effect.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Terrorist Threat Condition Alpha is acknowledged/  
reported to higher headquarters. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Unit antiterrorism security plans are reviewed. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Appropriate security actions are implemented. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Security awareness of suspicious persons, vehicles,  
and activities is reemphasized.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Vehicles entering threatened unit area/installation  
are spot checked.

- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Random check of identification is made of personnel entering threatened unit area/installation.
- .7 \_\_\_\_\_ Bomb threat procedures are reemphasized. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_\_ Bomb threat checklists are available and used to record data on bomb threats received by telephone.
- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Deliveries to dining facilities, clubs, and PX's are monitored.
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ Periodical checks made of buildings and facilities not in regular use.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ Personal security measures for high-risk personnel are reviewed. (KI)
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ Personal security measures for high-risk personnel are implemented, as appropriate. (KI)
- .13 \_\_\_\_\_ OpSec is reemphasized.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

REPORT/ACKNOWLEDGE THREAT CONDITION ALPHA

Terrorist Threat Condition Alpha may be set by the local commander on the advice of his threat assessment group, or based upon his own assessment.

Threat Condition Alpha may also be declared by higher headquarters.

In either case, Threat Condition Alpha is reported to higher headquarters if locally initiated, or acknowledged if set by higher headquarters. This should be accomplished via secure means to avoid unintended disclosure of this measure.

ANTITERRORISM PLANS REVIEWED

Antiterrorism plans are reviewed with specific attention paid to verification of the availability of reaction forces specified in the plan, whether they are U.S. forces or are to be provided by the host country.

APPROPRIATE SECURITY ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED

Declaring a specific threat condition to exist does not automatically include the requirement to institute security actions associated with that particular condition. Selection of the appropriate response to terrorist threats will remain the responsibility of the commander having control over the threatened organization. Accordingly, some of the specific requirements which are listed in this task may not be deemed sufficient and more stringent measures may be decided upon.

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES

Bomb threat procedures should be contained in a unit SOP. This should normally be published as a division/wing/FSSG SOP. One SOP should apply to all units operating at the same location.

SOP bomb procedures include such things as:

1. Limiting access to sensitive areas to authorized personnel only.
2. Locking of boiler rooms, storage areas, engine rooms, motor pools, and administrative offices when not in use.
3. Prepositioning and periodic inspections of fire-fighting equipment.
4. Reporting of personnel, acting in a suspicious manner (i.e., taking photos), suspicious packages, mail, or vehicles in the area.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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5. Designation of the priority sequence for facility/area searches.
6. Use of bomb threat checklist to record data from telephone threats.
7. Immediate notification to the COC/command center when bomb threats are received.
8. Designation of personnel to search facilities during a bomb threat (i.e., personnel who work or live in the area, MP's, others).
9. Instructions on how long search will continue (i.e., until completion, or until 10 minutes prior to the threatened detonation time).
10. Determination of the degree of evacuation required to safeguard life and limb.
11. Removal of suspected incendiary devices by EOD personnel only. Unit personnel will be instructed not to touch any suspected devices.
12. Prohibition against the use of two-way radios for a distance of at least 150 meters from the scene.
13. Briefing all newly arrived personnel on bomb threat procedures.

ENCLOSURE (1)

XII-B-30

BOMB THREAT REPORT FORM

INSTRUCTIONS: BE CALM. BE COURTEOUS. LISTEN, DO NOT INTERRUPT CALLER.  
NOTIFY SUPERVISOR/SECURITY OFFICER BY PREARRANGED SIGNAL WHILE CALLER  
IS ON LINE.

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Time \_\_\_\_\_

Exact Words of Person Placing Call: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

QUESTIONS TO ASK:

- 1. When is the bomb going to explode? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 2. Where is the bomb right now? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 3. What kind of bomb is it? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 4. What does it look like? \_\_\_\_\_
  - 5. Why did you place the bomb? \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_

TRY TO DETERMINE THE FOLLOWING (CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE):

Caller's Identity:    Make    Female    Adult    Juvenile    Age\_\_\_\_years

Voice:    Loud    Soft    High Pitch    Deep    Raspy    Pleasant    Intoxicated    Other

Accent:    Local    Not Local    Foreign Region

Speech:    Fast    Slow    Distinct    Distorted    Stutter    Nasal    Slurred    Lisp

Language:    Excellent    Good Fair    Poor    Foul    Other

Manner:    Calm    Angry    Rational    Irrational    Coherent    Incoherent

Deliberate    Emotional    Righteous    Laughing    Intoxicated

Background Noises:    Office Machines    Factory Machines    Bedlam    Trains    Animals  
                              Music    Quiet               Voices    Mixed           Airplanes  
                              Street Traffic    Party Atmosphere

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

ACTION TO TAKE IMMEDIATELY AFTER CALL:    Notify your supervisor/security  
officer as instructed.    Talk only to persons designated your supervisor/  
security officer.

\_\_\_\_\_

RECEIVING TELEPHONE NUMBER PERSON RECEIVING CALL

The distribution of Bomb Threat Report Forms can be simplified by printing a copy of the form on the first page of the installation/unit telephone directory and making sure that everyone knows it is there.

PERSONAL SECURITY MEASURES

At the earliest indication of a terrorist threat to high-risk personnel, they should be briefed on the threat and precautionary measures which can be taken to minimize vulnerability. Appropriate measures should be initiated. (See Task 12B.5.4)

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TASK: 12B.3.4 PLAN ACTIONS FOR TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION BRAVO

CONDITION(S): Specific threat of terrorism against U.S. military personnel or facilities in a general geographic area exists. (Threat Condition Bravo may be based on information that terrorist elements are actively preparing for operations in a particular area.)

Setting Threat Condition Bravo may occur within the exercise scenario or may be caused by the evaluator, either through input of appropriate intelligence information or announcing to the evaluated unit that Terrorist Threat Condition Bravo is in effect.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Terrorist Threat Condition Bravo is acknowledged/  
reported to higher headquarters. (KI)
- .2 ☐ Unit antiterrorism security plans are reviewed, as  
required. (KI)
- .3 ☐ Appropriate security actions are implemented. (KI)
- .4 ☐ All personnel are briefed on the threat condition  
and need to be alert.
- .5 ☐ Random checks of vehicles, packages, suitcases, and  
handbags carried into unit area/installation are  
initiated.
- .6 ☐ Random check of personal ID's is continued.
- .7 ☐ One-hundred percent ID checks are conducted for  
entry into controlled-access facilities/areas.
- .8 ☐ Increased frequency of checks are during nonduty  
hours of buildings, and special activity  
perimeters within unit/installation area.
- .9 ☐ Personal security measures in effect for high-risk  
personnel are reviewed.
- .10 ☐ Personal security measures for high-risk personnel  
are increased. (KI)
- .11 ☐ Review directives and regulations and brief  
personnel manning security posts concerning use of  
deadly force and ROE. (KI)
- .12 ☐ OpSec measures are stressed.
- .13 ☐ Barrier plan is reviewed and barrier materials are  
checked as required.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

REPORT/ACKNOWLEDGE THREAT CONDITION BRAVO

As with Condition Alpha, Threat Condition Bravo may be locally initiated or directed by higher headquarters. Either way, the declaration of Condition Bravo should be reported/acknowledged via secure means.

ENCLOSURE (1)

ANTITERRORISM PLANS REVIEWED

In cases where the Terrorist Threat Condition Alpha was in effect for an extended period of time, and where the increase in threat of terrorism causes the declaration of Threat Condition Bravo, without declaration of Condition Alpha, plans should be reviewed to identify necessary update action which may be indicated.

APPROPRIATE SECURITY ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED

Normally, identification of a terrorist threat capable of engaging multiple targets accurately under stress, is sufficient to warrant declaration. Threat Condition Bravo will dictate that security measures specified for Condition White be implemented immediately. Selection of the appropriate response continues to be the affected commander's responsibility, and accordingly, some of the specific requirements which are listed for this task may not be deemed sufficient and more stringent measures may be decided upon.

PERSONAL SECURITY MEASURES INCREASED

The personal security measures in effect for protection of high-risk personnel should be increased as the threat condition increases.

Measures to be considered include such possible actions as:

1. Limit public appearances.
2. Limited distribution/controlled accountability for general officer schedules/itineraries.
3. Discontinue flying general officer's personal flags outside their offices when they are present. An alternative during periods of highest risk would be fly flag normally; however, relocate general to an alternate location.
4. Maintain surveillance/attendance by driver/security personnel on all parked vehicles used by high-risk personnel.

BRIEF ON USE OF DEADLY FORCE

All personnel who perform security duty, whether as members of a guard force or as unit members in a security perimeter, must know the regulations which govern the use of deadly force. In addition to the regulations explained in essential subjects, all other ROE must be thoroughly briefed and understood. (See Task 12B.1.3.)

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TASK: 12B.3.5 PLAN ACTIONS FOR TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION CHARLIE

CONDITION(S): Imminent threat of terrorist acts against specific U.S. military personnel or facilities exists. (Threat Condition Charlie may be based on information regarding plans or preparations for terrorist attack(s) against specific persons or facilities.)

Setting Threat Condition Charlie may occur within the exercise scenario or may be caused by the evaluator, either through input of appropriate intelligence information or announcing to the evaluated unit that Terrorist Threat Condition Charlie is in effect.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Terrorist Threat Condition Charlie is acknowledged/  
reported to higher headquarters. (KI)
- .2 ☐ Appropriate security actions are implemented. (KI)
- .3 ☐ Reaction forces are placed oncall.
- .4 ☐ All personnel are briefed on the threat condition and need  
to be especially vigilant.
- .5 ☐ All vehicles and their contents are inspected prior to  
allowing entry into threatened area/installation. (KI)



- .6 \_\_\_\_ Suspicious parked vehicles are reported and checked.
- .7 \_\_\_\_ All packages, suitcases, and handbags entering the area/key facilities are inspected.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Controlled access to key facilities is strictly enforced. (KI)
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Restricted parking near key facilities is strictly enforced.
- .10 \_\_\_\_ Frequency of perimeter patrols in vicinity of facilities is increased.
- .11 \_\_\_\_ All security posts/positions are manned.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ Personal protection is provided for high-risk personnel, as required.
- .13 \_\_\_\_ OpSec measures are stressed.
- .14 \_\_\_\_ Protection of classified material is stressed and emergency destruction procedures are reviewed.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

REPORT/ACKNOWLEDGE THREAT CONDITION CHARLIE

As with lower threat conditions, Threat Condition Charlie may be locally initiated or directed by higher headquarters. Either way, the declaration of Threat Condition Charlie should be reported/acknowledged via secure means.

APPROPRIATE SECURITY ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED

Identification of a terrorist threat sufficient to warrant declaration of Threat Condition Charlie will dictate that security measures specified for lower terrorist threat conditions be implemented immediately.

Selection of the appropriate response is the responsibility of the affected commander, who may also immediately implement all security actions planned for Threat Condition Charlie.

ALL VEHICLES ARE INSPECTED/SEARCHED

All vehicles entering the threatened area/installation will be thoroughly inspected, to include all the vehicle's contents. Trained explosive detection dogs can greatly assist in this effort.

If, as is their right, civilians choose not to enter the area rather than submit to inspection, they should be turned away.

In cases where civilian law enforcement or host national personnel are present, they will handle suspicious instances where vehicles voluntarily turned away.

SUSPICIOUS PARKED VEHICLES REPORTED/CHECKED

Terrorists may have entered the threatened area/facility during a time when security on the gates was being done on a spotcheck or random inspection basis.

Any vehicle observed parked within or immediately adjacent to the threatened area which is in any way suspicious should be reported and checked. Here again, trained explosive detection dogs are of great assistance.

CONTROLLED ACCESS ENFORCED

Access to key facilities within the threatened area/installation is strictly controlled and may be limited to personnel with previous authorization.

ENCLOSURE(1)

Controlled access points provide another opportunity to inspect any packages or luggage carried by persons entering the key facilities.

TASK: 12B.3.6 PLAN ACTIONS FOR TERRORIST THREAT CONDITION DELTA

CONDITION(S): Imminent threat or actual terrorist acts against specific U.S. military personnel or facilities exists. (Threat Condition Delta may be based on information regarding plans or preparations for terrorist attack(s) against specific persons or facilities.)

Setting Threat Condition Delta may occur within the exercise scenario or may be caused by the evaluator, either through input of appropriate intelligence information or announcing to the evaluated unit that Terrorist Threat Condition Delta is in effect.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Terrorist Threat Condition Delta is acknowledged/  
reported to higher headquarters. (KI)
- .2 ☐ Appropriate security actions are implemented. (KI)
- .3 ☐ Reaction forces are called.
- .4 ☐ All personnel are briefed on the threat condition and need to  
be especially vigilant.
- .5 ☐ Barricades are manned at gates.
- .6 ☐ All vehicles and their contents are inspected prior to  
allowing entry into threatened area/installation. (KI)
- .7 ☐ Suspicious parked vehicles are reported and checked.
- .8 ☐ All packages, suitcases, and handbags entering the area/key  
facilities are inspected.
- .9 ☐ Controlled access to key facilities is strictly enforced. (KI)
- .10 ☐ Restricted parking near key facilities is strictly enforced.
- .11 ☐ Frequency of perimeter patrols in vicinity of facilities is  
increased.
- .12 ☐ All security posts/positions are manned.
- .13 ☐ Personal protection is provided for high-risk personnel,  
as required.
- .14 ☐ OpSec measures are stressed.
- .15 ☐ Protection of classified material is stressed and emergency  
destruction procedures are reviewed.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

REPORT/ACKNOWLEDGE THREAT CONDITION DELTA

As with lower threat conditions, Threat Condition Delta may be locally initiated or directed by higher headquarters. Either way, the declaration of Threat Condition Delta should be reported/acknowledged via secure means.

APPROPRIATE SECURITY ACTIONS IMPLEMENTED

Identification of a terrorist threat sufficient to warrant declaration of Threat Condition Delta will dictate that security measures specified for lower terrorist threat conditions be implemented immediately.

Selection of the appropriate response is the responsibility of the affected commander, who may also immediately implement all security actions planned for Threat Condition Delta.

ALL VEHICLES ARE INSPECTED/SEARCHED

All vehicles entering the threatened area/installation will be thoroughly inspected, to include all the vehicle's contents. Trained explosive detection dogs can greatly assist in this effort.

If, as is their right, civilians choose not to enter the area rather than submit to inspection, they should be turned away.

In cases where civilian law enforcement or host national personnel are present, they will handle suspicious instances where vehicles voluntarily turned away.

SUSPICIOUS PARKED VEHICLES REPORTED/CHECKED

Terrorists may have entered the threatened area/facility during a time when security on the gates was being done on a spotcheck or random inspection basis.

Any vehicle observed parked within or immediately adjacent to the threatened area which is in any way suspicious should be reported and checked. Here again, trained explosive detection dogs are of great assistance.

CONTROLLED ACCESS ENFORCED

Access to key facilities within the threatened area/installation is strictly controlled and may be limited to personnel with previous authorization.

Controlled access points provide another opportunity to inspect any packages or luggage carried by persons entering the key facilities.

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TASK: 12B.3.7 ORGANIZE THE THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE (TMF)

CONDITION(S): The Crisis Management Plan assigns a commander for the TMF, specifies its composition and equipment.

The TMF is tasked to execute the provisions of the Crisis Management Plan guided by SOP's established to deal with various kinds of threats.

Within FMF units planning for antiterrorism operations, an existing organization (i.e., battalion, company) would be designated as the TMF.

Smaller units (i.e., platoons, squads) would be designated as the SRT's.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ The TMF is organized in teams. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ SRT's should contain at least five men. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ SRT's train as a team. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ SRT's train at least 2 days per month, as a team, to maintain readiness.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ SRT training includes all tasks assigned in the Crisis Management Plan. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ The Negotiation Team is established. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Negotiators are never decision-makers. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Negotiators avoid face-to-face meeting when dealing with terrorists. (KI)

- .9 \_\_\_\_\_ Equipment is available for immediate use by Negotiation Team. (KI)
- .10 \_\_\_\_\_ The inner perimeter security force is established.
- .11 \_\_\_\_\_ The outer perimeter security force is established.
- .12 \_\_\_\_\_ TMF member checklists prepared. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE (TMF) IS ORGANIZED IN TEAMS

The TMF contains several types of teams. One type is the SRT which is the military equivalent of a civilian SWAT team. Another is the hostage negotiation team. The third team is split into inner and outer perimeter elements. Depending on the size of the incident site, the third team may be augmented or even replaced by members of the SRT. The sniper team (all personnel [sniper, spotter, security], rifles, spotting scopes, etc.), when employed, is normally attached to, and under the command of the SRT commander.

SRT ORGANIZATION/EQUIPMENT

The SRT should contain at least five Marines. However, the number of members may vary depending upon existing circumstances. Ideally, three to four teams should be trained and available for every major unit/installation/base. Consideration should be given to training an SRT for each military police/security watch shift; the goal is to have an SRT available at all times.

A five-men team would consist of: An SRT team leader, armed with a sidearm and an additional weapon, as required. The team leader may also carry the team radio, binoculars, and other needed equipment. The SRT team leader is responsible for locating and directing counterfire against targets, creating a plan of attack, and supervising its execution.

An SRT scout, armed with a sidearm and a semiautomatic rifle or shotgun. This team member will carry any equipment necessary to lead the team to the objective, such as a prybar, man-hole hook, or boltcutters. This team member leads the SRT to the objective by conducting a reconnaissance of the approach and withdrawal routes, building entrances and rooftops, and by removing obstacles such as padlocked doors. After completing the scouting mission, the scout may be assigned a defensive or security role for the team or be designated to participate in the assault.

An SRT marksman, armed with a sidearm and a high powered rifle with a telescopic sight. This team member also carries any specialized equipment designated by the SRT team leader. The SRT marksman should be trained and deployed so that if the need arises, he can control the situation with a few well placed shots at the command of the SRT team leader.

An SRT team observer, armed with a sidearm and a semiautomatic rifle. This team member carries a pair of binoculars for observation and fire direction, and other equipment, as required. This team member acts as the team recorder, recording events preceding and following the threat neutralization for inclusion in the after action report.

An SRT defense man, armed with a sidearm and semiautomatic weapon or 12-gauge shotgun. This team member also carries such needed equipment as rappelling ropes, harnesses, or demolitions. This team member's mission is to protect the team during ambush, during the approach, cover the team's withdrawal, and to assist and protect the SRT scout during reconnaissance. In addition, this team member provides close range assault fire against barricaded offenders or a hardened position.

SRT TRAINING

The established SRT's should receive concentrated team and individual training to establish their capability to perform individually and as a team. They should receive extensive training in combat in built-up areas, marksmanship, rappelling, physical training, first aid, and the use of specialized equipment.

Their training is designed to develop and rehearse the procedures they will use as a team in neutralizing or apprehending a barricaded offender with a minimum of danger to hostages, team members, or other personnel.

ENCLOSURE (1)

All team members should receive cross-training in the specialized duties of other members. Subsequent to initial training sessions, SRT training should be scheduled for at least 2 days each month, to maintain the required level of readiness. Preferable training is held 1 day, twice a month, at 2-week intervals.

SRT TRAINS TO EACH TASK ASSIGNED IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN

The SRT training program should ensure team readiness to perform all missions tasked in the Crisis Management Plan or which team might be assigned during an actual crisis. These include such tasks as:

1. Evacuation of innocents.
2. Rescue of hostages.
3. Apprehension of terrorists/criminals.
4. Attack with riot control agents.
5. Fire by selected marksmen (countersniper fire).
6. Assault of a terrorist position by:
  - a. Scaling or rappelling buildings or obstacles.
  - b. Using helicopters or armored vehicles.
  - c. Directing full firepower on the terrorist position.

NEGOTIATION TEAM IS ESTABLISHED

The negotiation team, which interacts with the terrorists on order of the TMF commander, should be established. A typical negotiation team would be made up of the following personnel:

1. An officer in charge.
2. A primary hostage negotiator (NIS or other trained hostage negotiator).
3. A backup hostage negotiator (same qualifications).
4. An NIS or military police investigator.
5. An NIS agent who is knowledgeable in international terrorism.
6. A linguist, in the event a different language is being used.
7. A specially trained psychologist/psychiatrist. (If not an actual team member, should be oncall.)

When selecting team members, the TMF commander should look for persons having the characteristics of successful negotiators. They should be:

1. Mature, mentally and emotionally stable (with an absence of negative factors like overbearing personality or antagonistic attitude).
2. Good listeners.
3. Experienced in communication techniques.
4. Sincere.
5. Able to be flexible.
6. Physically fit (negotiations may go on for a prolonged period).

ENCLOSURE (1)

#### NEGOTIATORS ARE NOT DECISION-MAKERS

Decision-makers (CG, C/S, CO) should never be negotiators. Negotiators should likewise not be used as decision-makers.

By removing the negotiator from the decision-making process, you establish the negotiator as a neutral who appears able to consider equally the interests of the terrorists and the interest of society.

The negotiator should strive to:

1. Allow terrorist to set the pace, mood, and topic of conversation.
2. Accept the terrorist's views neutrally, expressing neither approval nor disapproval.
3. Keep the terrorists talking.

The negotiator must be able to establish a rapport with the terrorists which will permit the negotiator to defer decisions and still maintain rapport when demands are delayed or refused. The psychological concept of transference between hostage-taker and negotiator is extremely important.

#### NEGOTIATORS AVOID FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS

The negotiation team, if they are qualified and normally carry arms, should be armed except during face-to-face negotiations. Face-to-face negotiations are recommended only as a last resort. Terrorists will not see a person in uniform or with a weapon as being neutral. They may even see them as a direct threat to the terrorists' security. In face-to-face meetings negotiators should dress in civilian clothes.

#### EQUIPMENT TO BE USED BY THE NEGOTIATION TEAM

Equipment for use by the negotiation team should be readily available. A useful method of ensuring that it is available when required is to set it aside in portable containers, field desks, etc. If it is prepacked items should be frequently inspected and checked to ensure they remain operational.

Equipment useful to the negotiation team includes:

1. A U.S. Army CID command hostage incident workbook, or similar reference.
2. Individual concealable body armor.
3. Regular cassette tape recorders and 10 hours of tapes.
4. Microcassette tape recorders and 10 hours of tapes.
5. Electronic monitoring equipment.
6. Ear microphones for telephones for recording and listening.
7. Portable typewriters.
8. Field tables and chairs.
9. Public address systems or bullhorns.
10. Reliable communications with the TMF and the terrorists.
11. Hand-held radios.
12. Paper and pencils.

#### INNER PERIMETER SECURITY FORCE ESTABLISHED

The inner perimeter security force will operate under the direct control of the TMF commander.

A typical inner perimeter element includes:

1. One officer in charge.
2. One noncommissioned officer in charge.
3. EOD Support. The senior EOD member will be responsible for the chosen Render Safe Procedure (RSP), if required.
4. Photographic/videotape recorder capability.

The photographic capability of the inner perimeter element could be an experienced military police investigator or CID agent. They would be trained in criminal investigation photography.

Photographs can identify terrorists or hostages. They can place particular items within the scene or surrounding area, and they provide evidence for followup legal action. Consider cameras that use self-developing or 35mm film, or videotape (best situation is all three).

The EOD support, if available to the inner perimeter element, should have two EOD technicians who can dispose of the explosive devices. They could also help train SRT's and other initial response personnel to identify explosives and explosive devices.

#### OUTER PERIMETER SECURITY FORCE ESTABLISHED

The outer perimeter security element has either an officer in charge or a noncommissioned officer in charge who is directly responsible to the TMF commander. The on-site commander sets the size of the outer perimeter security team to fit the needs of the installation. Remember this is a tactical perimeter and any passage of lines must be coordinated. A single entry point is encouraged to eliminate discretion on the part of members of this element. On installations with few resources, the outer perimeter may be made up of military police, augmented by other troops on a 4 or 5 to 1 ratio. Units or installations with limited or no law enforcement personnel may use personnel other than military police for this mission.

The outer perimeter security team should be prepared to:

1. Establish and maintain the area outside the perimeter of the incident scene.
2. Evacuate and seal off housing and troop billeting areas.
3. Control access to the incident area and installation.
4. Guard all critical and restricted areas outside the incident area.
5. Augment the installation law enforcement mission.

#### THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE MEMBER CHECKLISTS

Once a special threat incident occurs, it is imperative that the TMF be activated and certain actions be taken immediately. It is recommended that each member have a checklist of the actions performed immediately. A copy of these are maintained by the TMF commander, and each team leader should have a copy onhand upon arrival at the on-site command post. The following recommended checklist should be expanded as needed:

#### THREAT MANAGEMENT FORCE COMMANDER

Ensures an on-site command post is established out of range and sight of the suspect.

Ensures the duty personnel have made TMF notifications.

Ensures communications are established and maintained with the CMT.

Sends an initial situation report to the Crisis Management Center.

Ensures events are being recorded on an operational log, as they occur.

Ensures inner and outer perimeters have been established.

Ensures innocent personnel are being evacuated.

Ensures negotiators have, or are attempting to open, communications with the suspect.

SPECIAL REACTION TEAM COMMANDER

Assesses the situation.

Checks with the TMF commander immediately.

Ensures all SRT personnel and equipment are present.

Requests blueprints of affected building.

Assumes inner perimeter.

Coordinates with the TMF commander for specialized resources, personnel, etc.

NEGOTIATION TEAM CHIEF

Checks with TMF commander immediately.

Ensures negotiators and equipment are present.

Attempts to establish communications with the suspect, at the direction of the TMF commander.

Ensures all conversation is being recorded and that successive tapes overlap by 30 to 60 seconds.

Ensures that the negotiations team is setup in a separate room or area, and that access is limited.

INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE OIC/NCOIC

Ensures the area is properly cordoned off so that unauthorized personnel cannot enter unnoticed.

Establishes an inner perimeter.

Deploys Marines so that:

1. All exits from suspect's location are observable.
2. Marines are concealed and covered from rifle fire.
3. Any person leaving the inner perimeter is considered a suspect, and is searched and held for interrogation teams.
4. Marines relay any information observed from their positions.
5. Prior to arrival of counterintelligence personnel, Marines interview persons leaving the inner perimeter, or personnel in the initial vicinity of the scene, to determine number of suspects, number of hostages, number and type of weapons involved, description of suspects, names of hostages, and layout of rooms and/or building containing suspects and/or hostages. All witnesses should then be directed to a safe location for further debriefing.
6. Briefs TMF personnel on the situation upon their arrival.
7. Perimeter must have one point of exit/entrance.
8. Ensures that personnel not specifically authorized inside the outer perimeter are not permitted entry. All personnel not normally authorized entry must be approved by the TMF commander.
9. Checks with TMF commander immediately for situation update and orders.
10. Ensures evacuation of innocent personnel is completed, or is progressing in a safe, secure manner.
11. Relays all intelligence gathered to the TMF commander and data collection personnel (NIS/CID).

ENCLOSURE (1)



12. Checks with military police desk sergeant to ensure the team leader's patrol area of responsibility has been assumed by someone else, if appropriate.

TMF SUPPORT COORDINATOR

Checks with the TMF commander immediately.

Ensures the following personnel are present with equipment:

1. Medical, with ambulance (paramedics)
2. EOD (prepared for disposal and demolition)
3. Sniper team (all personnel [sniper spotter, security], rifles, spotting scopes, etc.) and ensure the team is attached to, and under the command of the SRT commander.
4. NIS data collection, arrests, and interrogation personnel.
5. Fire department.
6. Checks with SRT commander and chief negotiator to determine assets needed immediately, or in the future.
7. Advises the CMT of requirements (e.g., messing for special purpose personnel, equipment needed).

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12B.4 ANTITERRORISM - OPERATIONS SECURITY

TASK: 12B.4.1 PLAN PREVENTIVE MEASURES

CONDITION(S): The assessment of the vulnerability of the unit/area installations to be protected, has been completed.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Counterintelligence methods to deny the terrorists access to HUMINT are in effect. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Signals security methods to deny the terrorists access to SIGNIT are in effect. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Operations security methods to deny the terrorists access to intelligence are in effect. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

PLAN PREVENTIVE MEASURES FOR OPERATIONS SECURITY

The best method of reducing the incidence of terrorism is proactive (antiterrorism) vice reactive (counterterrorism). If you can prevent the terrorist act, you have won the battle. Operations Security (OPSEC) goes hand-in-hand with personnel security as prevention measures. Operations security involves denying the enemy any information in the areas of: HUMINT, through good counterintelligence. Signal Intelligence SIGINT, through good signals security. Operational Intelligence, through good operations security. The methods of denial are many and varied. Consequently, all types of denial must be addressed. Additionally, once a measure has been adopted, the terrorist may study and develop a method of breaching that measure. OPSEC is an ongoing practice. Changes in the perceived threat, the facilities being protected, the forces assigned, or even the season of the year may require an adjustment of OPSEC measures.

ENCLOSURE (1)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Counterintelligence involves those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, or subversion (including terrorists).

SIGNALS SECURITY

Signals security is a generic term which includes both communications security and electronics security. Communications Security (COMSEC) - is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. COMSEC includes; cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security of communications security materials and information.

Electronics Security - is the protection security resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from their interception and study of noncommunications electromagnetic radiations, e.g., radar.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

The process of denying adversaries information about friendly capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting indicators is associated with planning and conducting military operations and other activities.

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TASK: 12B.4.2 RECOGNIZE TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES

CONDITION(S): Preventive measures have been planned and personnel have been trained in denial of terrorist intelligence.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Special orders to sentries address reporting of suspected terrorist intelligence techniques. [(KI) and KI 12B.1.3]
- .2 \_\_\_\_ The unit specific threat awareness program teaches recognition of terrorist intelligence techniques. [(KI) also KI 12B.3.1]

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

RECOGNIZE TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES

Terrorist intelligence techniques take many forms. In a free and open society such as ours, there are many open sources which could aid the terrorist. Even though these are not classified, they enable potential enemies to penetrate operations security measures. The following examples are listed by OPSEC technique:

HUMINT - Questioning of individual Marines in public places about locations of key personnel, unit activities, and the like.

SIGINT - Antennas intercepting microwave beams, local base telephone directories with job description and building number (also base maps are in all base telephone directories).

PHOTINT - Base newspapers, cruise books, overflight by private aircraft, and photography of installations from nearby high terrain.

SPECIAL ORDERS ADDRESS SUSPECTED TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE  
TECHNIQUES

Terrorist intelligence gathering techniques are often readily identifiable by alert Marines.

HUMINT - Intelligence gathering techniques consist of efforts to obtain information which is generally unclassified. Marines should become alert when asked for or about such things as training schedules, unit movement, building functions, telephone numbers, and the like by civilians who are without a need-to-know.

SIGINT - Terrorists will often attempt to tap into tactical wire communications and telephone lines. Marines should be alert to personnel "repairing" telephones which have been working properly. Similarly, individuals on telephone poles on, or near, the base could be attempting intrusion.

PHOTINT - Obviously personnel taking pictures in restricted areas should cause suspicion. Similarly, personnel taking pictures from buildings overlooking installations should be suspect. Further, closed vehicles parked near installations could be used as photographic platforms, bombs, or surveillance activities.

There are many ways of conducting surveillance of patterns. Vendors are a common method of gathering intelligence. The absence of normal vendors could also indicate impending action. Necessary contract services such as waste disposal, garbage pickup, and utilities repair are often used by terrorists for OPPAT surveillance and/or raid rehearsal.

Marines should be aware that the terrorist can and will attempt to gather and solicit information for his efforts. Terrorist activities are, in general, well planned and based on sound intelligence. Marines should be aware of terrorist efforts and how to deny them success. Marines must be alert to the individual(s) who deny them success. Marines must be alert to the individual(s) who "does not fit," such as the dirty man in a clean area, the one in the neat uniform when everyone else is sweaty and dirty, the kids who are not playing along the route today, or the ones who just started playing where they have never played before. Marines must be alert, suspicious, and aware of the need to deny terrorists access to the intelligence they need. Sometimes the best answer to a suspicious question is, "Why do you want to know?"

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TASK: 12B.4.3 UTILIZE OPSEC MEASURES

CONDITION(S): Unit personnel have been trained to recognize terrorist intelligence techniques. This task is evaluated by random oral examination to determine understanding and comparison of published procedures with actual patterns.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_\_ Planned OpSec measures are understood by individual  
Marines of the unit.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS: None.

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TASK: 12B.4.4 ASSESS OPSEC VULNERABILITIES

CONDITION(S): The unit has trained personnel in the areas of OpSec awareness and terrorist intelligence techniques. The unit has published generalized procedures for OpSec that are understood by members of the unit. (JCS Booklet J3M-947-83 applies.)

ENCLOSURE (1)

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_    An OpSec team has been established.   (KI)
- .2    \_\_\_    The team issues OpSec planning guidance on an exception basis.   (KI)
- .3    \_\_\_    The team conducts OpSec surveys.   (KI)
- .4    \_\_\_    The team analyzes survey information.
- .5    \_\_\_    The team enters survey information into a historical data base.
- .6    \_\_\_    The team conducts trend analysis of the data base.
- .7    \_\_\_    The team keeps the commander informed of OpSec vulnerabilities and suggests CA's to reduce them.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:

OPSEC TEAM ESTABLISHED

In general the OpSec team should consist of representatives of the following unit activities:

- 1.   Operations.
- 2.   Intelligence.
- 3.   Counterintelligence.
- 4.   Facilities (when assigned).
- 5.   Provost marshal (when assigned).
- 6.   Subordinate units.

OPSEC PLANNING GUIDANCE

OpSec planning guidance should be issued early in the planning cycle to aid planners and participants to identify, during detailed planning, specific OpSec threats.

Planning guidance consists of:

- 1.   Current adversary knowledge.
- 2.   Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI's).
- 3.   OpSec threats.
- 4.   Indicators.

OPSEC SURVEYS

Certain types of operations or other activities are conducted repetitively from the same bases or in the same areas. This includes such things as flight operations, tests on ranges, exercise missile firings on ranges, sending supplies to units, air interceptor practice on ranges, issuing personnel orders, developments of forces overseas, and other similar matters. The danger arising is that, overtime, routines will dull personnel awareness of the need for OpSec. Stereotyped ways of doing tasks or deviations from routine procedures can become vulnerabilities and can be overlooked. In such situations, a thorough examination of operational procedures and security practices should be carried out. These examinations are termed OpSec surveys.

An OpSec survey checks on the effectiveness of all command operational functions from the standpoint of hostile intelligence systems. Surveys are not inspections. All personnel should be informed when a survey is to be conducted and that the survey is to improve command security effectiveness.

A concentrated examination of operational and security practices will generally turn up past and current deficiencies. Such results should be expected. The purpose of the survey is to improve future performance, not to find fault or punish individuals.

There are two basic kinds of surveys, command and formal. A command survey is an internal examination of OpSec practices. A formal survey involves formation of a specific survey team, with team members being drawn from both inside and outside the command. Formal surveys may be initiated by a letter of request from the commander to higher headquarters which states the specific scope and purpose of the survey, and when the survey is to be conducted.

There are three basic steps in an OpSec survey. The first is identification of EEFI for the operation, or other activity, to be examined. The second is the compilation of OpSec threat profiles of command functions. The third is examination and sampling of sources to determine information being made available to adversaries prior to, during, and after operations and other activities.

Once an OpSec survey has been completed, the commander must analyze the effect of vulnerabilities on operations. The commander must decide what active countermeasures must be taken or what risk of vulnerability is posed.

Detailed information on planning OpSec surveys is contained in JCS Booklet J3M-947-83 (OpSec Survey Guide) dated 15 June 1983.

#### SUGGESTED OPSEC SURVEY SEQUENCE AND CHECKLIST

##### Planning phase:

1. Develop survey scope/purpose.
2. Select survey team.
3. Familiarize survey team with survey techniques.
4. Review EEFI.
5. Develop a hostile intelligence threat/vulnerability assessment statement.
6. Familiarize survey team with operation/activity to be surveyed.
7. Develop functional outlines.
8. Plan general survey itinerary.
9. Announce survey.

##### Field survey phase:

1. Entrance brief (team).
2. Command brief (unit).
3. Data collection (team).
4. Exit brief (team).

##### Analysis and reporting phase:

1. Correlate functional outlines and empirical studies data.
2. Resolve, as appropriate, discrepancies on data.
3. Reassess and, if appropriate, revise EEFI.
4. Review all source threat.

5. Identify vulnerabilities through the correlation of events (as reflected in the functional outlines), products of any empirical studies, and the threat.
6. Prepare final report.
7. Final report.
8. Lessons learned.

#### COURSE ANALYSIS

As the OpSec team continues to conduct surveys and enter the results in the data base, long term trends will start to emerge. Such things as routine morning formations, standard delivery times at key installations, and other routine operational patterns will become evident. These patterns will then be either randomized to confuse any potential terrorists, or disguised through centralized deceptive measures.

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#### TASK: 12B.4.5 EMPLOY SPECIFIC OPSEC PROCEDURES

CONDITION(S): An OpSec vulnerability analysis has been conducted. Specific procedures will now be addressed.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ A specific OpSec plan for the area of operations has been developed. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ The unit avoids a set pattern of operations. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ The unit considers the employment of deception to mask operational patterns which cannot be altered. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ The SJA has approved random inspection procedures.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

#### SPECIFIC OPERATIONS SECURITY PLAN

A successful OpSec program will deny the terrorist access to intelligence and information. Since each unit's mission area of operations and threats will vary over both time and geography, specific OpSec procedures must be developed in an OpSec plan.

#### UNIT AVOIDS A SET PATTERN OF OPERATIONS

Changing operational procedures confuses the terrorists. The higher the level of random activity, the less likely a terrorist is going to attack your unit or installation. Such things as vehicular checks at gates during high traffic periods will disrupt normal work routines, but they will also reduce the chances of terrorists targeting the activity. You cannot always stop a terrorist attack from occurring, but you can decrease the chance of it occurring to your unit.

#### EMPLOYMENT OF DECEPTION

When a unit's operational patterns cannot be altered, deception measures should be considered to mask the patterns. However, the danger of deception is that it can confuse your own people. For this reason, any deceptive measures must be controlled at the highest level. Further, a rigorous analysis must be conducted to determine who has a "need-to-know" and who does not. Then, the appropriate personnel must be informed of any deception operations. Deception may be timed to coincide with threat satellite overhead times.

ENCLOSURE (1)

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE APPROVAL

Because of restrictions applying to personnel and vehicle searches, the SJA should be consulted prior to conducting random inspections.

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TASK: 12B.4.6 DEVELOP ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI)

CONDITION(S): During the course of the OpSec survey, EEFI will surface and be refined by the OpSec committee.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ The OpSec committee has developed EEFI threat.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ The commander has promulgated EEFI. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

DEVELOP OF EEFI

EEFI's are derived from the OpSec surveys and data base. These are items or activities associated with friendly planning which, if exposed to hostile agencies, would serve as intelligence indicators and tend to compromise friendly intentions. Some examples of EEFI are:

- 1. Restriction of troops at a certain time prior to activity.
- 2. Special requisitions with a required delivery time (i.e., 12 hours, 24 hours, etc.).
- 3. Preassault bombardment.
- 4. Increased patrolling/reconnaissance of an area.

PROMULGATION OF EEFI

Promulgation of EEFI must be controlled at the command level and promulgated to planners at all command and staff levels. EEFI considerations should direct all planning efforts.

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12B.5 ANTITERRORISM - PERSONNEL SECURITY

TASK: 12B.5.1 CONDUCT PLANNING AND PREPARATION

CONDITION(S): Staff is aware of the general terrorist threat which confronts them. Specific intelligence may also be available which increases the perceived threat level.

Threat assessments and planning are ongoing processes which may only require review and, if appropriate, update of published antiterrorist plans/orders/SOP's which deal with aspects of personnel security.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ An assessment of the threat by terrorists against personnel is made. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ An assessment of personnel security resources is made.

ENCLOSURE (1)

- .3 \_\_\_\_\_ Procedures to be followed for protection of primary and secondary targets are planned.
- .4 \_\_\_\_\_ Special procedures to be followed for protection of visiting VIP's or for high threat periods are planned.
- .5 \_\_\_\_\_ All procedures developed are included in appropriate plans/orders/SOP's.
- .6 \_\_\_\_\_ Awareness/education programs are developed. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

LEVEL OF THREAT IS ASSESSED

Personnel considered to be potential targets can be categorized as primary targets, secondary targets, or random targets.

Primary targets are selected for their publicity value to the terrorists. (An attack on a general attracts more media attention than an attack on a captain.) Primary targets are easily identifiable during a threat assessment. They also may have been named as selected targets in intelligence reports.

Terrorist groups almost always select alternative or secondary targets. If a primary target is identified and security measures are instituted which raise the risk to terrorists, they may decide to attack a secondary target.

Secondary targets are usually persons who are of lower grade and risk than primary targets, but who can still be of publicity value to terrorists. Most recent terrorist actions against preselected DoD personnel have been against secondary targets. These actions occurred after security measures to protect primary targets were taken.

Random targets include other personnel who, simply because they are military personnel or dependents, may be considered fair game by the terrorists.

PERSONNEL SECURITY RESOURCES ASSESSED

The availability of resources for assignment to measures which reduce the threat of terrorist attacks against personnel must be assessed.

Personal security and protective services may be appropriate for primary targets.

Resource limitations usually preclude assignment of personal security and protective services to secondary targets. In those cases individual self-protection measures may have to be relied upon.

It is not possible to provide protective services for every possible random target. Assessed requirements in this area are the basis for basic crime prevention training and awareness briefing programs.

AWARENESS/EDUCATION PROGRAMS

Military personnel, dignitaries, civilian employees, and dependents must be made aware of the terrorist threat in general, as well as the perceived threat level in the local area.

The program developed may include periodic briefings and dissemination of printed materials. The program must be developed in consultation with SJA to ensure the provisions of the Privacy Act and other legal restraints on the gathering, storage, and dissemination of information are complied with.

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ENCLOSURE (1)



TASK: 12B.5.2 RAISE THE LEVEL OF THREAT AWARENESS

CONDITION(S): Threat assessments have been made. Plans and procedures to be followed have been prepared.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ All personnel are made aware of the terrorist threat in general. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Personnel are made aware of specific threat targeting of people or facilities, as appropriate.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Personnel are encouraged to learn the preventive measures which they can use.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

PERSONNEL MADE AWARE OF GENERAL TERRORIST THREAT

Previously prepared briefings are presented and published information is disseminated.

The PAO can assist in developing and delivering awareness briefings outside normal unit training channels.

Presentations can be made at local or base schools and to social and service organizations.

These presentations should be designed to make participants aware of the personnel security threat in the area, rather than to frighten them.

Personnel should become aware of the types of tactics, and the facilities which are potential targets, for the terrorists.

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TASK: 12B.5.3 EDUCATE PERSONNEL ON PERSONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES TO BE USED

CONDITION(S): Threat Exists. Procedures have been developed and plans/orders/SOP's have been reviewed.

This task is evaluated by asking selected individuals about unit SOP's and plans which they by virtue of grade and duties would have need-to-know.

Although FMF units may be deployed (without dependents), their dependents are potential terrorists targets.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ All personnel receive training in crime prevention techniques. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Military personnel and dependents are encouraged to participate in crime watch programs.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know how to report suspicious activities.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ All personnel receive self-protection training. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Personnel know how to appear less conspicuous. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Need for families to practice personal security is stressed. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Families are encouraged to establish family security procedures. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Precautionary measures to be taken while traveling are stressed. (KI)
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Use of special protective measures are based on the threat. (KI)
- .10 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know techniques used to survive as a hostage. (KI)

- .11 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know proper reactions to bomb threats.
- .12 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know proper reactions to extortion threats. (KI)
- .13 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know proper reactions to bombings or assaults. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

#### CRIME PREVENTION TRAINING

Crime prevention training is the cornerstone of a good personnel security program. People who carry out crime prevention procedures in their quarters, offices, and in their every day activities will significantly decrease the possibility of becoming terrorist targets. The higher the risk to individuals, the more important it is that they follow crime prevention procedures.

Crime prevention procedures are designed to enhance the ability to anticipate, recognize, and appraise crime risks, and to initiate appropriate actions to remove or reduce that risk.

Crime prevention procedures are closely linked to the physical security and OpSec programs. Many of the procedures are similar in nature.

Crime prevention is a direct crime control method that applies to before-the-fact efforts to reduce criminal opportunity, protect human victims, and prevent prevent loss.

Instructions on how to properly report suspicious activity must be covered in the training. Crime watch programs are examples of a crime prevention program in action.

#### SELF-PROTECTION TRAINING

Self-protection begins with awareness of the environment. All personnel should be alert to and immediately report suspicious persons or activities near their quarters or offices. Terrorists must conduct surveillance of their target to ensure success when their plan is implemented. Even randomly selected targets are usually watched briefly before the incident. Surveillance can be detected by constant vigilance. This vigilance denies terrorists easy access to their targets. It can save lives.

Self-protection training also includes such information as:

1. Measures to be taken to be less conspicuous.
2. Regular security procedures.
3. Precautions to take while traveling.
4. Precaution for automobile travel.
5. Precautions for overnight accommodations.
6. Personal protection measures.
7. How to survive as a hostage or as a kidnap victim.
8. What hostage victim's family should/should not do.

Procedures for dealing with:

1. Bomb threats.
2. Extortion threats.
3. Assaults and bombings.

ENCLOSURE (1)

#### HOW TO BE LESS CONSPICUOUS

Being a Marine, or being an American in an overseas environment is by nature conspicuous. The following steps can be taken to assist in being less conspicuous:

1. Attempt to blend in with the surroundings.
2. Avoid showing off material wealth.
3. Drive an inconspicuous vehicle. Avoid special license plates, grade, or country designations, and luxury vehicles.
4. Use unmarked parking spaces, and vary where you park.
5. Do not place your family name on your home or vehicle.
6. Maintain an unlisted telephone number, and do not give it out indiscriminately.
7. Avoid publicity.
8. Information concerning your quarters, vehicle, personal routine, and security efforts should be known only by immediate family and friends, and security personnel, and then only on a need-to-know basis.
9. Avoid establishing obvious daily routines. Being unpredictable is your best defense.

#### ALL PERSONNEL AWARE OF NEED FOR PERSONAL SECURITY

All personnel must be aware of the importance of personal security procedures as part of the overall protective effort.

The importance of security and the seriousness of the threat must be stressed to all unit members.

Mutual concern should be cultivated so that all unit members are involved with the security effort.

#### FAMILY SECURITY PROCEDURES

Families should establish and follow family security procedures. These should include such measures as:

1. Habitually keeping outside doors and the garage door closed and locked.
2. Keeping all accessible windows closed and locked.
3. Keeping house keys separate from car keys and maintaining accountability for both.
4. Changing locks if keys are compromised.
5. Never opening doors to unscheduled repairmen or strangers.
6. Verifying all repair or delivery men when not recognized.
7. Routing all incoming mail through the office.
8. Not accepting unsolicited packages.
9. Never complying with requests from people, such as telephone repairmen, that the phone not be answered.
10. Never talk to prank callers as it only encourages them.
11. Being alert to all suspicious or unusual activity, and reporting everything that happens, regardless of how insignificant.
12. Developing a family duress code so that family members can warn each other when they are in danger.
13. Briefing all family members thoroughly on emergency procedures.

14. Special considerations for children should also be included in family security procedures. These include such measures as instructing children to:
  - a. Avoid isolated streets and play areas.
  - b. Travel and play in groups.
  - c. Never answer a stranger's questions.
  - d. Never go anywhere with a stranger.
  - e. Keep family members informed of their whereabouts.
  - f. Immediately report all attempts to question, annoy, or molest them.
  - g. Note all information possible about unusual incidents.
  - h. Ensuring that school officials will only release children to responsible, known members of the family or to briefed designates.
  - i. Not permitting children to ride public transportation unaccompanied.
  - j. Escorting children to and from school, if possible.
  - k. Never leaving young children at home unattended.
  - l. Requesting local military police to conduct a home security survey, or obtaining a copy of a home security checklist and doing it yourself.

#### PRECAUTIONS WHILE TRAVELING

Most terrorist attacks occur while the target is in transit, away from the home or office. The following precautionary measures can assist in avoiding possible attack:

1. Avoid established routines while traveling.
2. Have a working knowledge of local languages so that assistance may be requested.
3. When possible, travel in groups.
4. Avoid isolated roads, danger areas, civil disturbances, and crowds.
5. Do not antagonize the individual; quickly move to a safe haven and report the incident.
6. Keep emergency numbers handy, and always have exact change for a telephone call.
7. Keep staff members and family constantly aware of your location.
8. Whenever traveling overseas or in a high threat area, ensure all personal matters are in order (i.e., wills, insurance, power of attorney, etc.).

#### WHEN TRAVELING BY AUTOMOBILE:

1. Always keep your vehicle in good mechanical condition, and the gas tank at least half full.
2. If possible, vehicle should be equipped with devices to increase protection and safety (i.e., intrusion alarms, two-way radios, bomb blankets, etc.).
3. Specially equipped and hardened vehicles should be considered for high-risk personnel (i.e., general officers, VIP's, and other primary targets).
4. Always check vehicle over before getting into it.

Include:

1. Check for fingerprints, smudges, or any other signs of tampering on the exterior of the vehicle.

2. Check electronic tamper device, if installed.
3. Check underneath the vehicle and in fender wells for any foreign objects, loose wire, etc.
4. Check tires for stress marks or evidence of tampering.
5. Check wheel lug nuts/hubcaps for tampering.
6. Check interior of vehicle for any intruders or suspicious items.
7. Drive with vehicle doors locked and windows closed.
8. Secure vehicle, if it must be left unattended.
9. Never pick up hitchhikers or strangers.
10. Memorize the location of safe havens along regular routes (i.e., police and fire stations, or other busy places).
11. Do not stop for accidents or other problems which you observe.
12. Drive on to a telephone and report them.
13. If you are involved in a minor accident where you feel there is imminent danger to you or your passengers, it may be appropriate to drive away and assess the damage at a public location. Then report the accident to civilian authorities and military police.
14. Always use seat belts.
15. Drive in the center lane of multilane highways to make it more difficult for your car to be forced to the curb.
16. If you encounter a suspicious blockade:
17. Avoid it by driving in the opposite direction.
18. Avoid driving close behind other vehicles, or other situations where your vehicle can be boxed in.
19. Do not park your vehicle on the street at night (use attended lots or locked garages).
20. If you must leave your keys with an attendant, leave only the ignition key.

Other measures which may warrant consideration include:

1. If you must use public transportation, buses and trains are preferred to taxis.
2. Do not have markings on your luggage which link you to the U.S. Government.

WHEN STAYING OVERNIGHT:

1. Patronize reputable hotels only.
2. Avoid hotel paging.
3. Note all escape routes, when in hotel.
4. Do not discuss travel plans over hotel telephone.

In protecting high ranking individuals the following may also be considered:

1. Do not use hotel rooms located on first floor or ones that are easily accessible from outside.
2. Avoid riding elevators.
3. Make reservations in two or more hotels and use assumed or modified name. Try to avoid booking through a computer.

ENCLOSURE

### SPECIAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Other special protective techniques/measures which should be considered in instances where a high terrorist threat exists include:

1. Wearing body armor.
2. Armor inserts in briefcases.
3. Use of Chemical Mace or other nonlethal weapons allowed by local law.
4. Use of portable alarms.

### HOSTAGE/KIDNAP SURVIVAL TECHNIQUES

The likelihood of becoming a hostage is slim; however, personnel should know the techniques which will minimize the effects of hostage situations.

If taken hostage:

1. Stay calm and have faith; maintain your dignity and self respect.
2. Do not display bravado or cowardice.
3. Stay alert for possibilities to escape. Ensure the odds of success are in your favor, or do not attempt.
4. Establish rapport with your abductors; attempt to make friends.
5. Do not criticize or antagonize your captors.
6. Take note of everything that goes on (i.e., sounds, descriptions, times, telephone numbers, etc.)
7. Leave evidence at all locations you are taken to assist police in their search.
8. Anticipate isolation and other methods to break or disorient you.
9. Attempt to locate yourself as far away from your captors as possible. (Should police attempt a rescue, you will be out of the line of fire.) Set up a schedule of mental and physical activity, and follow it.
10. Comply with all instructions as well as you can.
11. Do not be afraid to ask (do not demand) for anything (i.e., books, paper, medical attention, etc.).
12. Eat whatever they give you, and do not refuse any favors.
13. Beware of a possible unconscious shift in your loyalties to your captors. (This shift is known as the Stockholm Syndrome.)

Guide for hostage's family:

1. Do not disturb the abduction scene and notify the military police immediately.
2. Do not reveal any facts about the incident to individuals outside the family EXCEPT POLICE.
3. Provide police with complete information on the hostage, when needed, (photographs, descriptions, etc.).

### HOW TO REACT TO

#### Bomb Threats

If a bomb threat is received, stay calm, be courteous, and listen. Activate a telephone recorder if one is available. Use a bomb threat form to note information about the caller and the bomb. (See format in KI 12B.3.3.)

Do Not Interrupt. Attempt to keep the caller on the line as long as possible. If possible, signal a co-worker to initiate a trace by describing a figure 8 in the air with your finger.

Report the threat to military police immediately and evacuate the threatened area, if a specific area is known.

Assist in the search if needed.

If a suspicious object or device is discovered, DO NOT TOUCH IT. Notify military police immediately, and leave the area.

Extortion Threats

If an extortion threat is received, stay calm, and handle in the same manner as a bomb threat, recording all pertinent data.

Ask to speak to the hostage, if applicable, to verify the threat.

Communicate problems of immediate compliance to demands, especially ransom. Sound cooperative, but make no promises (i.e., say, "I'll try".).

Establish a code between you and the caller in order to verify the validity of future calls, similar to a sentry's challenge and response.

Assaults and Bombings

If you are involved in an attack, DO NOT PANIC.

Take cover by lying prone on the floor immediately. Often two or more explosions are spaced apart, so do not get up until a few minutes have passed. During a small arms attack, staying low will clear fields of fire for security personnel.

After the attack, call police, call an ambulance, and assist wounded as necessary.

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TASK: 12B.5.4 EMPLOY PERSONAL SECURITY ACTIONS TO PROTECT HIGH-RISK PERSONNEL

CONDITION(S): High-risk personnel are present. A threat of terrorist action against them has been assessed or is perceived to be likely.

Personnel trained in providing personal security may not be available from outside sources.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Personal security mission is planned carefully in advance. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Close and continuous coordination is maintained between all agencies involved in a personal security mission. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ Every phase of the security mission is clearly defined. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Security measures include protection of temporary living accommodations when used. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Personnel assigned to a team to provide personal security are trained for this type of mission. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ The team providing personal security is allowed direct access to the person to be protected. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_ The person to be protected is briefed on the exact nature of the threat. (KI)
- .8 \_\_\_\_ The person to be protected is briefed on the measures which will be used. (KI)
- .9 \_\_\_\_ Driver assigned to the person to be protected is trained in evasive driving techniques. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

PERSONAL SECURITY PLANNING

The primary purpose of a personal security mission is to protect a distinguished person (VIP) from embarrassment, injury, and assassination.

Every phase of personal security must be planned in advance. The possibility of sudden changes to itinerary, however, requires that flexibility be the keynote in planning for such missions. Alternate or contingency plans must also be prepared in the event that any circumstances cause deviation from the basic plan. Operations security measures must be practiced at all times.

COORDINATION WITH ALL AGENCIES

Coordination among all agencies involved in personal security missions must be close and continuous. Some of the agencies which could be involved include: NIS, military police, CID, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, communications agencies, as well as local police, FBI, and Secret Service. There is no room for parochialism.

Whenever two or more agencies are protecting distinguished persons, the agency protecting the senior official is responsible overall.

CLEARLY DEFINE EACH PHASE OF PERSONAL SECURITY MISSION

Successful accomplishment of personal security requires careful and continued prior planning, analysis, research, and coordination.

Responsibilities should be established clearly and under the overall supervision of one single person to ensure mission accomplishment.

Personal security consists of an indepth defense characterized by a series of protective cordons. These protective cordons may consist of security personnel, physical barriers, or a combination of both.

Movement control within these cordons may be established by a system of passes or unobtrusive lapel buttons.

Specific individuals should be delegated responsibility for every phase of the security mission. Communications and coordination between responsible individuals must be effective and timely to ensure complete protection.

LIVING ACCOMMODATIONS ARE INCLUDED IN SECURITY MISSION

Security of temporary housing for a visiting dignitary is a vital consideration.

The house should be equipped with an alarm system if possible. Shrubbery should be cut low and away from doors and windows. Good exterior lighting is necessary to illuminate nonremovable shrubbery and eliminate building blind spots. Lighting should be installed in an inaccessible location, such as under the eaves, and be controlled by either timers or photoelectric switches which will turn the lights on and off automatically.

The house should have a good operating telephone for use in an emergency situation. In high threat areas a backup portable radio should also be used. These should be set on the military police or security force radio frequency network. A silent alarm may also be installed.

The house should have a room or area which is designated as the safe haven. The safe haven should be the most defensible part of the house, in most cases it is located in the bedroom area. The doors should be strengthened by adding bars and brackets or deadbolts top and bottom. An optical viewer installed in the bedroom doors would allow observation of the adjacent rooms. The safe haven should contain the alarm control unit, emergency communications, medical supplies, water, sanitary facilities, food, emergency lighting, etc. There should be an emergency exit from the safe haven in the event of fire. Any grill work should be hinged so that it can be opened only from the inside.

ENCLOSURE (1)



Security team members should search the house thoroughly before each use to ensure no bombs, listening devices, or other unauthorized items have been installed. Illumination of attics, crawl spaces, etc., will assist security details in this effort.

A complete floor plan must be available and it should be used during the search to ensure no spaces go unnoticed, and to allow update of any changes which have been made. The security team should become intimately familiar with the layout of the house and each room within the house. The floor plan should be maintained for possible use in a forcible entry operation, should that be necessary.

#### PERSONAL SECURITY TEAM IS TRAINED

Personnel assigned to personal security teams must be specifically trained for that mission. In addition to normal physical fitness and weapons training they must be trained on the use of the particular weapons the team is to use.

They should also be trained in body protection drills, antiambush drills, and evasive driving techniques.

#### TEAM HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO PERSON TO BE PROTECTED

The team providing personal security must be allowed DIRECT ACCESS to the person they will be assigned to protect.

On too many occasions the officer in charge or noncommissioned officer in charge is required to talk to the principal through an aide-de-camp, administrative assistant, or similar staff person. This is not a satisfactory way to communicate. It has an adverse impact on the security provided.

#### PERSON TO BE PROTECTED IS BRIEFED ON THE THREAT

It is imperative that the importance of the threat be emphasized to the person who is to be protected. Do not assume that the person is sensitive to the threat. A clear understanding and appreciation of the terrorist threat to them as an individual is necessary if they are to be convinced to accept security measures which require a modification of their behavior.

The briefer should be prepared to conduct the briefing and answer questions within a 30-minute time period.

#### PERSON TO BE PROTECTED IS BRIEFED ON SECURITY MEASURES TO BE USED

Perhaps the most important security measure which can be used is for the person to be protected to be mentally alert to what is going on around them. They should:

1. Get to know their surroundings.
2. Learn what people, things, and activities are normal.
3. Learn when activities occur and which belong.
4. When first rising in the morning, listen for unusual noises or activities around the residence, or the absence of normal noises or activities.
5. Without exposing themselves to observation, look outside, not always through the same window.
6. Before exiting from the residence for any reason (to pick up the morning paper, to walk the dog), again observe activities around the residence.
7. When leaving, look up and down the street for suspicious vehicles and individuals.

Be Alert to Surveillance. Past incidents indicate that terrorists kept the victim under surveillance for substantial periods of time to discover travel patterns and to arrange a suitable time and place for the kidnapping or assassination.

Be Unpredictable. Studies have shown that by simply avoiding routines, varying when, where, and how just about everything is done (and doing nothing else), reduces the chances of being attacked by 65 percent.

The briefing should also address specific protective techniques which the team will use. It is essential that the person under protection knows exactly what the security team members will do in a given situation. This includes knowing any code words or commands which will be used to initiate each protective drill. It also specifically must include the action which will be expected of him or her during each drill (i.e., when a team member grabs the VIP in one hand and a pistol in the other while simultaneously pivoting, firing, and pulling the VIP behind him; the person would be of greater assistance with the knowledge that the proper role is to be tucked behind the body of the protector, thereby taking the target out of the line of fire in the shortest possible time).

DRIVER ASSIGNED IS TRAINED IN EVASIVE DRIVING

Individual Marines assigned as drivers for senior Marine officers or other VIP's play a very important role in the total security efforts for these people. It is very important that their actions in event of emergency be logical and tempered with common sense, but based on a prescribed routine.

When the assigned driver is not a member of the security team, he should be temporarily replaced by the team driver. This is necessary to ensure not only the highest level of evasive driving experience, but also a driver who has trained with the security team and knows what maneuver is prescribed for each type of incident.

Drivers routinely assigned to senior Marine officers or other VIP's should attend a formal course in evasive driving techniques. Various quality driving courses are available through Federal agencies and commercial vendors.

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TASK: 12B.5.5 RESPOND TO HOSTAGE/BARRICADED SUSPECT SITUATIONS

CONDITION(S): Because locations, motivations, response capabilities, and other vital circumstances will differ, hostage/barricade situations must be dealt with on an individual basis.

Successful resolution can only be gained through clear and decisive coordinated actions which are geared to the situation and flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen developments.

In evaluations where hostage/barricaded suspects are not included in the scenario, this task is not applicable.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_\_ Plans/SOP's emphasize priority for safety of hostages and other persons involved. (KI)
- .2    \_\_\_\_ Sequence of actions to be conducted when terrorist hostage/barricade situation occurs are specified.
- .3    \_\_\_\_ Actions to be taken by the initial response force are contained in the SOP. (KI)
- .4    \_\_\_\_ All sentries and/or military police patrols not directly involved with the initial response remain in their assigned areas. (KI)
- .5    \_\_\_\_ On order, the Crisis Management Plan is implemented.
- .6    \_\_\_\_ TMF activated and deploys to scene of the incident.
- .7    \_\_\_\_ The inner perimeter security element establishes the inner perimeter.
- .8    \_\_\_\_ The outer perimeter security element establishes the outer perimeter.
- .9    \_\_\_\_ FBI/host nation notified that a hostage incident has occurred. (KI)
- .10   \_\_\_\_ FBI/host nation force is supported in cases where they assume control of the situation. (KI)
- .11   \_\_\_\_ In event FBI or host nation declines jurisdiction the military commander takes steps to resolve the situation.
- .12   \_\_\_\_ Course of action involving appropriate level of force is decided upon. (KI)

.13 \_\_\_\_ Actions are taken to terminate the incident. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

SOP'S EMPHASIZE PRIORITY FOR SAFETY OF HOSTAGES

The safety of hostages and their eventual release without injury must be the basis for plans and actions during a hostage/barricade situation.

The mission of the SRT and other TMF personnel in order of priority is:

1. Protection of lives (hostages, law enforcement personnel, bystanders, suspects).
2. Safe release of hostage(s).
3. Apprehension of the offender(s).
4. Isolation of the incident.
5. Protection of property and equipment.
6. Conduct of the assault.

SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN IS SPECIFIED

Because of the sensitive nature of hostage takings, it is wise to have a preplanned and well thought out sequence of actions to be taken until trained negotiators arrive at the scene.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY INITIAL RESPONSE FORCE

The initial response to a terrorist operation is usually made by the military police patrols and/or sentries on duty at the time the incident occurs.

The atmosphere which will prevail throughout the hostage incident, and indeed perhaps the final outcome, might well be determined by the actions of the IRF.

Whenever responding to a possible hostage situation, the IRF should practice restraint. Overreaction in this initial phase could easily result in the loss of life.

The primary actions to be accomplished by the initial reaction force are:

1. Identify the true nature of the situation. Is it a terrorist hostage taking or a criminal action such as in armed robbery?
2. "Plainclothes" military law enforcement personnel should be considered for use in making this determination.
3. Isolate the incident. Once a terrorist/hostage situation has been identified, it must be isolated from other personnel/activities as soon as possible. All bystanders and noncombatants should be removed from the incident area if such movement will not increase danger to those personnel.
4. Contain the situation. In the early phases of an incident, movement by the opponents can only increase the danger to hostages. The incident area will be cordoned off. No person or vehicle will be allowed to enter the cordon without authorization from the OIC/NCOIC of the IRF. Containment should affect the smallest possible area.
5. If the incident occurs in a large building, isolate the opponents in one part of the building. Once containment has been accomplished, IRF personnel should make no overt move against the opponents, except to protect life. The IRF has established a "waiting game," and time is its greatest ally.

OTHER SECURITY PERSONNEL/PATROLS REMAIN IN THEIR ASSIGNED  
AREAS

It is important that other military police patrols and/or sentries remain in assigned areas in an increased alert status in case the initial incident is only a diversionary tactic by the terrorists.

FBI OR HOST NATION NOTIFIED WHEN APPLICABLE

The FBI is notified in the event a hostage situation occurs within the United States. The FBI determines if the incident is of significant Federal interest. If so, an FBI CMT would be dispatched. This team would be headed by the special agent in charge (SAC).  
(See Task 12B.1.2.3.)

Notification would be likewise made to the host nation authorities in a hostage incident occurring on foreign soil. (See Task 12B.1.2.)

SUPPORT OF FBI/HOST NATION

In cases where the FBI or the host nation assume control over the incident, the installation/unit should be ready to support the FBI/host nation operation.

REMEMBER: Within the United States, the FBI has the discretionary authority to assume jurisdiction; the host nation has that authority in their own country.

As in any tactical operation, there can only be one commander. The installation/unit commander has initial control over the incident and maintains command of the installation/unit forces throughout the incident. However, jurisdiction over the actual incident may be assumed by the FBI or host nation.

LEVEL OF FORCE APPLIED IS APPROPRIATE AND APPROVED BY  
COMMANDER

There is no standard CA in a hostage/barricade incident. Action must be tailored to counter the threat presented by a specific situation. As a rule, containment and negotiations will be needed, and attempted prior to initiating more forceful CA's.

Suggested CA's, in order of increasing use of force are:

1. Containment (isolate and wait).
2. Negotiations.
3. Cutting off utilities.
4. Denial of food, medical attention.
5. Use of nonlethal weapons.
6. Water (high pressure hose).
7. Drugs (drugged food, water).
8. Tear gas.
9. Small arms fire by selected marksman.
10. Assault (fire and maneuver).
11. Full firepower.

ACTIONS TAKEN TO TERMINATE THE INCIDENT

Incident termination may be the result of successful negotiations, assault, or other actions, including surrender of the terrorists, or the terrorists may decide to exercise the extreme option of killing the hostages and committing suicide.

TASK: 12B.5.6 RESPOND TO LETTER AND PACKAGE BOMBS

CONDITION(S): Terrorists often use letter and package bombs in attacks against individuals.

This task will be considered to have been failed if personnel who are untrained tamper with a suspected letter or package bomb.

In evaluations where letter/package bombs are not included in the scenario, this task would not be applicable.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ All incoming letters and packages are screened. (KI)
- .2 \_\_\_\_ All mail handlers know how to recognize possible bombs received in the mail. (KI)
- .3 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know correct procedures for handling suspicious letters or packages. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ All personnel know correct procedures for reporting suspicious letters or packages. (KI)
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Possible bombs are disposed of by EOD or other designated specially trained personnel only.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

SCREEN ALL INCOMING LETTERS AND PACKAGES

All incoming letters and packages must be screened by personnel who are trained to recognize suspicious articles in the mail. In order to accomplish this:

- 1. All mail should come through the Fleet Post Office (FPO) or Army Post Office (APO) which provides postal support.
- 2. Mail, especially packages, should never be accepted at offices or homes from delivery people or messengers.
- 3. Private package and "overnight" mail delivery corporations are becoming increasingly available for use by nonmilitary elements for shipment of mail and packages. Accordingly, a central receiving agency for the unit or installation should be designated, and all incoming deliveries from private package/mail corporations should be made to that agency.

ALL MAIL HANDLERS KNOW HOW TO IDENTIFY MAIL BOMBS

All persons who handle incoming mail and packages at FPO/APO post offices, or at designated central receiving agencies must be trained to recognize suspicious articles received through the mail. All administrative personnel whose duties include receipt of mail or packages should also be familiar with methods of identifying possible letter/package bombs.

MAIL BOMB RECOGNITION CHECKLIST

Personnel screening incoming mail or packages should be suspicious of all items which match items shown on the following checklist:

- 1. The physical dimensions may be suspicious:
  - a. SIZE
    - (1) Is it excessively large?
    - (2) Is it unusually small?

b. WEIGHT

- (1) Is the weight unevenly distributed or is the balance lopsided?
- (2) Is it heavier than usual for its size?
- (3) Is it heavier than usual for the class of mail service used?
- (4) Is it unusually light for its size?

c. THICKNESS

- (1) Is it a medium size envelope, the thickness of a small book?
- (2) Is it a large envelope which appears bulky, an inch or more in thickness?
- (3) Is the thickness not uniform, or does it have bulges?

d. RIGIDITY

- (1) Is it more rigid than normal, particularly along its center length?
- (2) The postal markings may be suspicious:

e. STAMPS

- (1) Is there an excessive amount of postage?
- (2) Is there no postage at all?
- (3) Is it stamped with foreign postage stamps?

f. POSTMARK

- (1) Is the postmark from a foreign location?
- (2) Is the postmark from an unknown place?
- (3) Is the postmark from an unusual city or town?
- (4) Is the postmark (geographic area) different from the return address?
- (5) Is there any inconsistency between the postmark, the return address, and the country of origin of the stamps used?

2. The way the package or letter is wrapped may be suspicious:

a. WRAPPING/ENVELOPE

- (1) Is the envelope uneven or lopsided?
- (2) Is there any perceptible lump or bump in the envelope?
- (3) Is there a peculiar odor? (Many explosives used by terrorists smell like shoe polish, almonds, or marzipan.)
- (4) Is it unusually stiff for an envelope?
- (5) Is excessive sealing material used? (i.e., excessive tape, twine, or string).
- (6) Is there a sealed inner enclosure? (An envelope within an envelope.)
- (7) Is there a springiness when you feel the top, bottom, or sides of the envelope?
- (8) Is aluminum or tin foil visible?
- (9) Is string sticking out of the package or attached to it in an unusual place?

- (10) Are wires sticking out or attached?
- (11) Are there oil stains on the wrapping?
- (12) Are there ink stains or any other discolorations?
- (13) The way the package or letter is addressed may be suspicious:

b. ADDRESS

- (1) Is there no return address?
- (2) Is the address poorly written or typewritten?
- (3) Is the address hand printed?
- (4) Is the title for the executive incorrect?
- (5) Is a title used with an incomplete name (i.e., General Smith)?
- (6) Is it addressed to a high ranking executive by name, title, or department?
- (7) Is it addressed conspicuously with the receiver's name (i.e., "Personal for LtCol Jones," etc.)?

3. Restrictive handling notations may be cause for suspicion:

a. MARKINGS

- (1) Is the package marked for airmail, registered, certified, or special delivery?
- (2) Is it marked personal, confidential, private, or eyes only?

4. Handwriting may also be suspicious:

a. WRITING

- (1) Is the writing a foreign style?
- (2) Is any word misspelled or spelled in an unusual foreign manner?
- (3) In high threat areas, special metal detectors, X-ray machines, fluoroscopes, and vapor detection equipment may be available to be used by trained personnel. Bomb detection dogs can also be used.

HOW TO HANDLE SUSPICIOUS LETTERS OR PACKAGES

Suspect letters or packages should be isolated.

Suspect letters or packages should not be put in water, because this could weaken wrappings allowing mechanical devices to operate, or the water might initiate some chemical reaction and cause detonation, if the letter or package is in fact a bomb.

DO NOT TAMPER WITH THE SUSPECT ITEM IN ANY WAY.

Notify proper authorities and follow their advice.

Suspected bombs should be handled by trained EOD personnel.

Items of equipment designed to deal with bombs should be used, if available. These include such things as bomb blankets or special holding containers. EOD or bomb team members would have/use these.

Doors and windows in a room containing a suspect item should be opened to vent the blast should detonation occur.

12.B.6 ANTITERRORISM - PHYSICAL SECURITY

TASK: 12B.6.1 PLAN/REVIEW/UPDATE PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

CONDITION(S): Staff is aware of general terrorist threat which confronts them. Specific intelligence may also be available which increases in the perceived threat level.

Threat assessments planning and update of published portions of antiterrorism related plans/orders/SOP's, which deal with aspects of physical security.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Physical security plans/SOP's have been published.
- .2 ☐ An assessment of the threat by terrorists against personnel and property is made. (KI)
- .3 ☐ Facilities/activities which are mission essential and which are or may be vulnerable, are identified by priority. (KI)
- .4 ☐ Physical security measures necessary to protect critical facilities/activities identified as vulnerable are planned or reviewed as appropriate.
- .5 ☐ Revised physical security measures are implemented and plans/SOP's are updated. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

PHYSICAL SECURITY PLAN/SOP

Terrorists present a potential threat to FMF units deployed ashore on foreign soil as well as to fixed bases and installations overseas or in the U.S.

All units confronted with the threat of terrorism must have physical security plans/SOP's.

Specific areas to be considered in preparation of a physical security plan or SOP include:

- 1. Critical/vulnerable areas together with priority of their importance to the mission.
- 2. Control measures concerning:
  - a. Personnel access to the installation/area, as well as to incoming and outgoing deliveries controlled and monitored.
  - b. Material Control. How are incoming and outgoing deliveries controlled and monitored?
  - c. Vehicle Control entering and exiting and while inside the area, to include measures concerning; vehicle searches, parking regulations and restrictions, and escort of emergency vehicles.

Aids to security such as:

- a. Perimeter barriers, fences, berms, walls, etc.
- b. Clear zones maintained free from weeds or debris in conjunction with fence-type barriers.
- c. Protective lighting systems.



- d. Gates, when they are open/closed, manned by security guards or locked and unmanned.
  - e. Intrusion device systems in use. Whether they are internal or external systems.
  - f. Personnel movement controls for visitors, civilian workers, contractors, vendors, and access by after hours workers. Operational patterns should be considered. (See Task 12B.4.2.)
  - g. Communications systems used by security force, how often they are tested, and what authentication procedures are used. Again, operational patterns should be considered.
  - h. Security forces composition and organization, watch hours for each shift, essential posts manned, weapons and equipment, training/security/patrol dogs, sign/countersign, and the same information concerning alert force and augmentation forces.
  - i. Contingency plans in effect for natural disasters as well as special threat plans which coincide with physical security plans.
3. Coordination and liaison which has been established with:
- a. Local/host nation civilian authorities including state emergency services, police, county sheriff's department, and local city police and fire departments, and major medical facilities.
  - b. Federal agencies such as FBI, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau, Federal Marshal, U.S. Weather Bureau, and Federal Aviation Administration.
  - c. Military organizations such as NIS, and other bases/commands.

#### LEVEL OF THREAT IS ASSESSED

Physical security traditionally includes all measures designed to protect information, property and personnel, and to prevent criminal acts against them. Although terrorist activities include criminal acts, there are some differences between terrorist and other criminals.

Difference between terrorists and other criminals which must be considered when planning physical security against terrorist threats include:

1. Terrorists are likely to be more organized than common criminals.
2. They are also likely to be better trained and educated.
3. They are likely to be more highly motivated than other criminals.
4. Terrorists are generally heavily armed for a quick violent action.
5. Terrorists are generally more sophisticated in their ability to defeat physical security measures than common criminals.
6. To provide physical security against terrorists, it is necessary to consider that the goals of some terrorists will include their own self-destruction. This consideration in itself will require security measures which are different from those normally sufficient to prevent criminal acts.

#### PRIORITY OF VULNERABILITY DETERMINED FOR CRITICAL FACILITIES/ACTIVITIES

A key initial step in planning and preparation of physical security measures to prevent terrorist attack is the determination of facilities/activities which are critical to your mission, and which of them are or may be vulnerable.

The following considerations can assist in making these determinations:

1. How critical is a particular facility or activity to the unit/installation mission?
2. How attractive is a particular facility or activity as a target for terrorism? What does the terrorist need? Does he have plenty of money and equipment, but is seeking recognition?
3. How complete are existing physical security measures in effect at each facility or activity?

4. In determining this priority of vulnerabilities list, it is mandatory that you "think like a terrorist." Of the potential targets available, which ones will:
- a. Provide the most media coverage?
  - b. Create the most disruption to normal routine?
  - c. Provide needed arms, cash, or equipment to terrorists?
  - d. Having considered all potential target facilities/activities from the point of view of both the defender as well as the terrorist, they can be prioritized by both criticality to your mission and value as a target to the terrorist.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES ARE REVIEWED/PLANNED

When this prioritized list of facilities/activities to be protected has been determined or revalidated, the physical security measures in effect under an existing physical security plan must be reviewed to reconfirm their adequacy or identify necessary adjustments or requirements for new or additional physical security measures. This should be an ongoing process used by the threat assessment group to incorporate all significant intelligence developments into the recommendations made to the commander concerning the appropriateness of physical security measures in effect or anticipated.

REVISED PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED AND PLAN UPD

Any changes to existing physical security measures which were planned would be put into effect immediately, if required, or would be put into the plan/SOP as an updated measure to be used to increase security as dictated by an assessed higher threat level, or declared higher threat condition.

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TASK: 12B.6.2 RESPOND TO THE THREAT OF MOBILE BOMBS

CONDITION(S): Terrorists have often used automobiles and other vehicles loaded with explosives as a bomb.

The vehicle can be parked near an intended target to be exploded electronically on command or with a timing device set to explode at a time predetermined to cause maximum damage, or as a mobile bomb to be detonated on impact during a suicide attack.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Threat Assessment Group develops EEI's to assess potential threat for mobile bomb use by terrorists.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ Specific intelligence agencies are tasked to satisfy the EEI's developed.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ The vulnerability of the unit area/installation to attack by mobile bomb is determined. (KI)
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Stringent program is in effect to control vehicle decals (including issuance, monitoring, and recovery).
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Physical security measures in effect which provide protection against vehicle bombs are reviewed. (KI)
- .6 \_\_\_\_ Physical security measures which need improvement or need to be implemented are determined. (KI)
- .7 \_\_\_\_ Improvements to physical security which can be made with local assets are made.
- .8 \_\_\_\_ Improvements to physical security which cannot be made with existing assets are contracted for or requested from higher headquarters.
- .9 \_\_\_\_ All actions underway to improve physical security are monitored and supervised until completion. (KI)

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS: None.

KEY INDICATORS:

DEVELOP EEI'S FOR THREAT OF MOBILE BOMBS

The Threat Assessment Group would develop EEI's which develop information concerning the terrorist's: Technical sophistication necessary to construct mobile bombs, inclination to use mobile bombs, willingness to kill, willingness to die, etc. Mobile bombs include delivery by auto, truck, boat, airplane, helicopter, hand glider, motorcycle, train, swimmer delivered, or other mobile means.

VULNERABILITY DETERMINED

When the threat of mobile bombs exists the vulnerability of the area/installation must be determined as a prelude to developing countermeasures. Items to be considered in determining vulnerability to mobile bombs include:

1. Are potential targets readily accessible by road, air, railway?
2. Are urban areas located nearby where a mobile bomb could be prepared and hidden?
3. Are vehicles restricted in their approach by barriers, obstacles, or active defenses?
4. Are both threat targets adjacent to a waterway?
5. Are high threat targets located near fences or gates?
6. Are high threat targets visible from the air?
7. Do rules on use of force or ROE, which are in effect, limit sentries/guards discretion to fire on vehicles boats or aircraft which ignore restrictions, control signs, barriers, prohibited airspace, etc.

PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES IN EFFECT ARE REVIEWED

Those measures in effect must be reviewed to determine whether they are adequate for the assessed threat. Specific measures which should be reviewed include but are not limited to:

1. Frequency with which vehicles are stopped at gates for inspection/search.
2. Parking regulations concerning lots near critical facilities or high threat targets.
3. System of control used for vendors, delivery vehicles, appliance service, and other commercial vehicles.
4. Restricted areas in effect which limits vehicular traffic.

NEW OR IMPROVED MEASURES ARE IDENTIFIED

When measures in effect are determined to be inadequate, given the level of threat assessed, measures to be improved or implemented are determined. Those which can be accomplished within local assets are implemented. Those which exceed local capabilities are obtained from outside sources/higher headquarters.

Measures which may be accomplished locally include:

1. Marking clear zones along fences and barriers.
2. Altering/varying schedules when barriers are patrolled.
3. Using military working dogs to augment sentries, capability to detect explosives at gate, inspections of incoming vehicles.

4. Positioning concrete or sand obstacles, digging a moat/trench, or parking tracked vehicles or placing knife rests to prevent a high speed passage through gates.
5. Restricting parking near critical facilities/threat targets.
6. Blocking/barricading roads or waterways which lead near potential targets.
7. Stopping every vehicle for inspection as it enters gate.
8. Using bomb detection dogs to check all cars in parking areas near potential targets.
9. Making personnel who live within 1 mile of work walk to work.
10. Requiring all vendors, delivery vehicles, and other commercial vehicles to be physically escorted while on the installation.

Examples of measures which may require assistance or approval to implement include:

1. Installation of speed bumps on roads and barriers alongside to prevent high speed approach to or near any high threat target facilities.
2. Installation of bomb blast curtains in office buildings or other key facilities.
3. Digging or construction of trenches/berms as barriers to canalize or prevent access via possible avenues of approach.
4. Request change to ROE if determined to be too restrictive.

IMPROVEMENTS UNDERWAY OR REQUESTED ARE MONITORED/SUPERVISED

Attention by the commander to all outstanding requests for funds/ authorization to implement physical security measures is paramount. Direct interest by the commander translates to closer monitoring and better supervision by his subordinates.

Outstanding work requests may be closely monitored as well for locally made improvements. Terrorists are not deterred by pending work requests.

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12B.7 COUNTERTERRORISM - MANAGEMENT OF A CRISIS RESPONSE

TASK: 12B.7.1 IMPLEMENT THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PLAN

CONDITION(S): A Crisis Management Plan has been prepared.

A crisis situation occurs.

Requirements 12B.7.1.5 and 12B.7.1.6 would be accomplished by an FMF unit which had an existing COC in operations.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 \_\_\_\_ Incident reported to military police desk sergeant or to COC.
- .2 \_\_\_\_ TMF commander is notified.
- .3 \_\_\_\_ TMF is activated.
- .4 \_\_\_\_ Commanding general/officer and chief of staff/executive officer is notified.
- .5 \_\_\_\_ Crisis Management Center is activated.
- .6 \_\_\_\_ CMT is activated.

- .7    \_\_\_    FBI/host nation authorities are notified.
- .8    \_\_\_    Local law enforcement personnel are notified.
- .9    \_\_\_    Higher headquarters are notified of terrorist incident.
- .10   \_\_\_    Incident area is contained by the TMF.
- .11   \_\_\_    Crisis Management Center manned and operational within time  
          is specified in CMP.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:   None.

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TASK: 12B.7.2 RESPOND TO THE INCIDENT

CONDITION(S):  A Crisis Management Plan has been prepared which specifies duties to be performed by the TMF and its subordinate elements.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1    \_\_\_    Locally available resources are immediately committed  
          as the IRF.
- .2    \_\_\_    Other security patrols remain on their assigned  
          posts/routes.
- .3    \_\_\_    Possibility of a terrorist bomb is reemphasized.   (KI)
- .4    \_\_\_    Initial RF cordons off area of incident per the plan.
- .5    \_\_\_    TMF relieves IRF and establishes inner/outer perimeters  
          per the plan.
- .6    \_\_\_    TMF commander reports circumstances of situation to  
          Crisis Management.
- .7    \_\_\_    CA to be used resolving the incident is decided upon  
          by the commander in coordination with the FBI/host  
          nation authorities, as appropriate.
- .8    \_\_\_    TMF members are constantly kept advised of the situation  
          as it develops.   (KI)
- .9    \_\_\_    Preparations are initiated for a prolonged incident  
          per the plan.
- .10   \_\_\_    If actions required are beyond capability of local  
          resources, assistance is requested, as appropriate.
- .11   \_\_\_    Crisis Management Forces are organized to continue  
          operations on a 24-hour basis.

EVALUATOR INSTRUCTIONS:   None.

KEY INDICATORS:

POSSIBILITY OF A TERRORIST BOMB IS REEMPHASIZED

Terrorists have historically used bombs in two-thirds of their operations.

Responding units should be warned to be alert to possible use of bombs.  
Marines should be even more careful in cases where one bomb has been  
exploded.

Terrorists have also frequently set off a second bomb and in a location  
chosen to explode in the midst of the IRF sent.

TMF MEMBERS KEPT ADVISED OF THE SITUATION

It is important that all Marines at the scene of the incident be kept advised as the situation develops or changes. They must know how someone is going to go in or out of the affected area so that they are not surprised and inadvertent reaction causes the situation to further deteriorate.

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TASK: 128.7.3 CONDUCT AFTER ACTION REPORTING

CONDITION(S): A terrorist threat has taken place. Restitution was made and the incident has been resolved.

STANDARDS: EVAL: Y; N; NE

- .1 ☐ Termination of terrorist incident is reported to higher headquarters per the plan.
- .2 ☐ An after action report is prepared concerning the incident. (KI)
- .3 ☐ After action report is classified to limit access.

EVALUATOR INDICATORS:

KEY INDICATORS:

AFTER ACTION REPORT

An after action report checklist is shown below. It should be expanded to include all important actions and decisions which took place during the incident.

SAMPLE AFTER ACTION CHECKLIST

This checklist should be applied immediately following an actual terrorist incident.

Did intelligence sources provide adequate warning regarding the possibility of an incident occurring?

What level target did the terrorists attack: primary, secondary, on random?

Were the terrorists able to gather operational intelligence prior to the incident? How?

Which crime prevention areas could have been improved to decrease the probability of the event?

Operations security.

Personnel security.

Physical security.

Consider the Crisis Management Plan. Could it be modified to prevent another attack of this nature? How?

Could the Crisis Management Plan be modified to improve the initial response capability?

Could the Crisis Management Plan be modified to improve response capability during the incident?

What other assets were needed or could have been used to counter this attack?

What other steps were taken to:

- 1. Improve your antiterrorism capability?
- 2. Improve your counterterrorism capability?

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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